Project Overview
The Decarbonizing Humanitarian Energy (DHE) Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) aims to address two persistent challenges facing humanitarian operations: the emissions and costs associated with humanitarian agency energy systems, and the lack of reliable energy access for the displaced populations that those agencies serve. It was launched in 2022 with financial contributions from the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), through the International Climate Initiative (IKI).
The DHE is implemented by three Programme Partners: UNITAR, through the Global Platform for Action on Sustainable Energy in Displacement Settings (GPA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP). The MPTF Office acts as the DHE’s Administrative Agent, responsible for fund administration and fiduciary oversight.
The Mid-Term Review (MTR) assessed DHE’s performance and identified lessons and recommendations for strengthening the Fund. The MTR applied a mixed methods approach, drawing on interviews, document analysis and a review of other MPTFs. The MTR encountered limitations related to heavy reliance on qualitative data, overlap with an ongoing restructuring process of the DHE’s design and strategy, and stakeholders multiplicity of perspectives.
Key review findings and conclusions
The rationale for DHE remains strong. DHE’s founding rationale – supporting both the decarbonisation of humanitarian operations and energy access for the displaced communities that those operations serve – is as relevant as ever. If anything, the need has only intensified given escalating operational costs and a considerably tighter funding environment for humanitarian activities. The long-time horizon offered by an MPTF is also particularly attractive for humanitarian agencies that are routinely forced to work with far shorter funding timeframes.
Ambiguous strategic direction from the outset. There were diverging expectations on the purpose of the DHE at the design stage (energy access v. decarbonisation) that were not reconciled at the implementation stage, partly because the Theory of Change (ToC) did not articulate a shared understanding of the DHE’s rationale. Yet, the MTR found that decarbonisation and energy access are interdependent rather than competing priorities for the humanitarian sector. The strategic case for an initiative focused on decarbonisation and energy access remains strong, and has only grown more urgent.
The MPTF modality was not well applied, but remains appropriate. The DHE was designed more like a programme rather than a flexible fund. As a result, the DHE design did not capitalise on the potential benefits of the MPTF model. The DHE framed the CCES as the Fund’s central delivery model, limiting flexibility and preventing alternative pathways from being explored. Nonetheless, the MPTF modality is well-suited to complex, systemic problems that require engagement from multiple stakeholders, as it is the DHE.
Blurred clarity of roles. With the DHE Secretariat and GPA under UNITAR, the distinction between the two entities’ functions was not clearly maintained. Lacking independent leadership and with limited capacity, the Secretariat was not well-positioned to play a neutral coordinating or convening role and DHE governance became fragmented. The lengthy process to recruit a Head of Secretariat deepened concerns about UNITAR’s capacity to ‘host’ the MPTF Secretariat.
Limited engagement from humanitarian agencies during inception. The DHE Fund aimed to support the humanitarian sector, and the concept for DHE was based on extensive consultation with – and inputs from – many key humanitarian agencies. However, once the Fund was established, engagement from major humanitarian agencies was limited. This left potential gaps in field-level insight, delivery realism (in humanitarian contexts) and sector-wide legitimacy.
Approach to localisation and energy transition partners onboarding was overly centralised. The Geneva-led onboarding process was perceived as top-down, but – more significantly – fed into broader concerns around whether the DHE’s approach was truly aligned with practices central to humanitarian action, such as localisation, responsiveness, and field ownership.
Lack of mechanisms to support implementation finance or derisking. The DHE offered technical diagnostics but no capital support to act on business cases. Agencies were expected to self-finance energy transitions, often without the means to do so. Although financing barriers were well understood as a central challenge from the outset, only limited progress was made to research and develop broader financing and derisking mechanisms.
Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) was not meaningfully operationalised. Although a results framework existed and some partner reporting took place, MEL was not used to measure outcomes, guide adaptation, or inform strategic decisions.
The Secretariat’s current leadership and approach to restructuring have restored confidence in DHE’s direction. There is broad support for – and confidence in – the Secretariat’s current leadership, the restructuring process they are leading, the strategic direction that they are building, as well as the early work with UNCDF to develop a financial mechanism for DHE.
Recommendations
Seven recommendations were issued by the MTR, by order of priority.
R1. GFFO should maintain its commitment to the DHE MPTF. The original investment filled a critical funding gap, and the need for this support is arguably more pressing in 2025 than it was when the commitment was originally made in 2022. DHE offers a platform through which Germany can continue to be the leading international donor on energy transitions in fragile settings.
R2. The DHE Secretariat should be moved to a new host institution.
R3. The DHE Secretariat should be stabilised with a core of fixed-term staffing. The managerial and technical capacity of the current Secretariat is robust, but all current personnel contracts are temporary and/or short-term in nature. This creates uncertainty not just for the individuals but also for the continuity of the Secretariat’s operation and – by extension – the DHE more broadly.
R4. The major UN humanitarian agencies should be invited to become full members of the Steering Committee (SC). While it may also be beneficial to incorporate these agencies as formal DHE partners, agency representatives should be invited to the SC regardless of whether an agency becomes a DHE partner. Moreover, the MTR expressly recommends that this representation be incorporated within the SC, and not through an additional governance of advisory body. Consideration should be given to inviting technical rather than political or strategic representatives
R5. The restructuring timeline should be extended until March 2026. Moreover, the restructuring process should consider i) maintaining a focus on both, decarbonisation and energy access; ii) retaining the MPTF modality, focusing in particular on using the modality to bring in new ideas, solutions and partners that deliver sustainable impact; iii) strengthening localisation and in-country oversight and implementation capacity; and iv) formally incorporating United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) finance and de-risking expertise.
R6. Start approaching new potential contributors sooner rather than later. While this may seem premature at the moment, the opportunity to influence DHE’s current change process is likely to be attractive to new donors, allowing them to improve the Fund’s alignment with their priorities. Aside from securing additional resources, new contributors are likely to also improve DHE governance, and should take some pressure off GFFO.
R7. Build a systematic approach to MEL, starting with reformulation of the TOC. The revision process should also help to build consensus and clarity across DHE’s stakeholders around the Fund’s new direction. Strengthening of the DHE’s approach to MEL should include a focus on ensuring consistent collection of outcome and impact level data, and on building processes for adaptive management.
Lessons Learned
L1. The timeline and sequencing of activities during the restructuring process need to be set up to allow for MTR recommendations to be implemented. In that sense, having the MTR completed early in the process helps to enable such sequencing. The fact that the MTR is completed in a timely manner is therefore welcome.
L2. Regular assessments such as this MTR on the Fund strategy should be built into the implementation cycle. Theories of change are always meant to be 'living' to some extent to reflect the normal changes, innovations and developments in a sector that can be expected over time. Building in a structured review and update process to the implementation cycle (i.e. commissioning an independent mid- and end-term review or evaluation for each strategic phase) as part of the Fund MEL framework would allow the Secretariat and SC to ensure that the theory of change, indicators/targets, and results chains remain valid and aligned with the mission of the DHE and needs of the sector.