

## Annex E: Review Audit Trail

To the comments received in July/August 2025 from the “Decarbonizing Humanitarian Energy Multi-Partner Trust Fund (DHE MPTF)” Steering Committee, Programme Partners and Secretariat.

The following comments were provided in track changes to the draft review report; they are referenced by author (“Author” column) and track change comment number (“#” column):

Author	#	Para No./ comment location	Comment/Feedback on the draft review report	Reviewer response and actions taken
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	1	Executive Summary (pag. II)	Please update to reflect any significant amendments in the body of the report.	All edits made.
SECRETAR IAT	2	Executive Summary (pag. II)	Stating the DHE was launched in late 2022 may suggest to the reader that activities started within that year. Since agreements were signed in mid-December 2022 and the Inception Phase started in 2023, it may be worth adding a footnote or being more specific.	<b>No edits:</b> the text already states “late” 2022, and the main body makes it clear that activities substantively started in 2023.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	3	Executive Summary (pag. II)	The MPTF structure was presented to GPA/UNITAR team as a way to pass through funds to multiple partners in a programmatic way, to make funding spend more efficient (e.g. not every partner needs to skim off x% of overheads when passing grants through). The complexity of the funding mechanism and requirements were not well communicated by the MPTF office and so I don’t know if this statement is 100% factual.	<b>No edits:</b> the point here is that – regardless of those failings – the modality is appropriate (if applied as intended).
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	4	Executive Summary (pag. II)	For background, the one challenge DHE was founded to solve was the generator replacement/solarisation + energy efficiency for humanitarian agencies (because it was IKI funding), and the energy access component was a ‘research question’. The goal was always to see what opportunities generators powering operations could also extend electrification to displaced communities, but the main indicators were 1) cost savings from switching to solar and 2) emissions reduction. The longer-term vision was to bring these two together (e.g. moving toward “Energy Transitions” in displacement hosting areas), but recognizing the key silo in the humanitarian agencies between how	This is now referenced later in the report, but is too much detail for the executive summary.

			they handle their power supply for their offices vs. for communities, we started with the main focus on operational power needs.	
SECRETAR IAT	5	Executive Summary (pag. II)	Suggested edit: “Instead, a central problem was that DHE was designed and implemented more like a pre-defined programme than a flexible, problem-led Fund” Justification for edit: inclusion of fund’s design as a factor in the DHE being more like a pre-defined programme.	<b>Agreed:</b> this is fully in line with the MTR findings.
Secretariat -MEL (Frederik Gaved)	6	Executive Summary (pag. II)	Is this correctly phrased? Referring to “operated by”	<b>Agreed:</b> Text revised and footnote added in main body of text: “There is, nevertheless, ambiguity surrounding the hosting of the Secretariat. While the DHE Manual of Operations identifies the GPA Coordination Unit in UNITAR as the host for the DHE Secretariat, the GPA Coordination Unit is, in fact, a project team within UNITAR. Reference is made to UNITAR hosting the GPA Coordination Unit, but the arrangement in place in UNITAR is formalized as a project as opposed to a hosting agreement. For this reason, the term ‘hosted’ is placed in apostrophes.”
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	7	Executive Summary (pag. II)	The DHE was developed by the GPA from 2019-2022 in a series of workshops with UN agencies/INGOs and private sector energy/finance partners (which is hosted at UNITAR). Suggest to re-word and show that GPA with it’s multi-stakeholder partnership network incubated/developed the program to solve systemic challenges as outlined in the inter-agency Global Plan of Action Framework: <a href="https://www.humanitarianenergy.org/what-is-the-gpa/resources-and-tools/global-plan-of-action-framework-document/">https://www.humanitarianenergy.org/what-is-the-gpa/resources-and-tools/global-plan-of-action-framework-document/</a>	Comment does not seem to correspond to highlighted text? This issue is now addressed later in the report, but is not discussed in the executive summary, for brevity.

SECRETA RIAT	8	Executive Summary (pag. II)	Please clarify what type of guidance was missing. Strategic?	<b>Agreed:</b> Yes, “strategic” is appropriate here.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	9	Executive Summary (pag. II)	UNITAR is the DHE Programme Partner, with the associated activities undertaken by the GPA.	<b>Agreed:</b> text changed here and throughout.
MPTFO	10	Executive Summary (pag. II)	The correct term is: “hosted” by UNITAR	<b>Agreed:</b> changed to ‘hosted’ and footnote added. For details see response under comment 6.
MPTFO	11	Executive Summary (pag. II)	UNITAR is the partner, not GPA.	<b>Agreed:</b> text changed here and throughout.
SECRETA RIAT	12	Executive Summary (pag. II)	Suggested edit: “responsible for fund administration and fiduciary oversight” Justification: The role of the MPTF Office goes beyond this. See how the MPTF Office defines it <a href="https://mptf.undp.org/page/who-we-are">https://mptf.undp.org/page/who-we-are</a> .	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
SECRETA RIAT	13	Executive Summary (pag. II)	Please revise the statement based on the following sequence of events: - The activity freeze happened in October 2024 since prodocs and budgets were not approved. - In December 2024, the SC approved budgets until 2025 and activities resumed. However, fund transfers beyond Q1 2025 were contingent on a series of conditions set by the SC, including revising the approach, with updated work plans and budgets. - The decision to undertake a review and restructuring process was made by the SC in March 2025, and activities beyond Q1 2025 were paused/phased out.	<b>Some edits</b> , but want to keep detail light for the executive summary.
SECRETA RIA	14	Executive Summary (Recommendation 5, pag. III)	Suggested edit “A focus on <i>both</i> decarbonisation <i>and</i> energy access outcomes” Justification for edit: clarification that the fund should deliver outcomes in both these areas. Additionally, it would help to specify that energy access should be an integral part of the offer (fully integrated in the ToC) and not an ad hoc component as is currently the case.	<b>Partly agreed:</b> “outcomes” added, but reference to the TOC would be too much detail for the executive summary.
UNITAR GPA	15	Executive Summary	And general decrease in funding in renewable energy/energy access in Africa	<b>No edits:</b> there is sufficient justification for the

(Aimee Jenks)		(Recommendation 1, pag. III)		recommendations already, and need to keep exec summary concise.
SECRETARIAT	16	Executive Summary (Recommendation 5, pag. III)	Please be more specific - This would require UNCDF joining as a full DHE programme partner (contingent on SC approval) and member of the SC to be able to both engage in strategic decisions, support the design and implementation of innovative financial mechanisms. SC discussions about onboarding UNCDF as a PP have taken place in early 2025 and initial work on a de-risking mechanism concept has been undertaken by UNCDF under the umbrella of UNDP.	<b>No edits:</b> the <i>general</i> wording is deliberate here – the MTR findings support UNCDF’s involvement, but DHE should decide on the <i>specifics</i> of how UNCDF should be involved.
SECRETARIAT	17	Executive Summary (Recommendation 3, pag. III)	Suggested edit: ‘all personnel contracts are temporary and/or short term.’ Justification: As of August 2025, all Secretariat personnel are on temporary and/or short-term contracts.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	18	Executive Summary (Recommendation 6, pag. III)	What about implementers? Currently implementation is limited to a few partners. This would need to be thought about in parallel (maybe a separate recommendation).	<b>No edits:</b> this recommendation is specifically about donors (contributors); the possibility of more implementers is covered in recommendations 4 and 5.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	19	Executive Summary (Recommendation 4, pag. III)	See comment on Recommendation 5 in section 6 of the document.	<b>No edits:</b> See responses to comments 137-140
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	20	Executive Summary (Recommendation 4, pag. III)	As an observer without decision making power? Or how? The competition between UN humanitarian agencies is very strong and they increasingly have very little experience on energy (most technical staffing got cut with this round of 4000+ staff cuts from UNHCR, IOM, etc). Adding in many humanitarian partners to an already complex decision making process risks tying the fund up even further and slowing down ability to achieve its desired impact. There could and probably should be another modality for humanitarian partners to be more systematically included in the process, but would advise against direct decision making over budgets/workplans etc at this stage. A technical advisory committee mechanism could be thought of as an alternative.	<b>No edits:</b> the recommendation is as full members, hence with decision making power. The <i>specifics</i> on whether they would also become PPs is for DHE to decide. However, the MTR also suggests that technical (i.e. energy focused) personnel from each agency be invited to the SC – more

				than one person suggested that this could help to bypass inter-agency rivalries.
SECRETA RIAT	21	Executive Summary (Recommendati on 4, pag. III)	<p>Please also refer to comment on recommendation 4 on page 21.</p> <p>Suggest to broaden the scope of this recommendation to allow other relevant agencies including INGOs to join the Steering Committee to help shape the strategic direction of the fund post restructuring. This could include agencies with relevant energy access, innovative finance or country/region-specific insights subject to the evolving requirements of the fund. Also suggest to differentiate between strategic level guidance and decisions and technical inputs to the process</p>	<b>Agreed:</b> this would be entirely appropriate, but – as per the original text – as a minimum the major UN agencies should be involved.
MPTFO	22	Executive Summary (Recommendati on 4, pag. III)	<p>Please note SC is a strategic body, the agencies should be invited at strategic level rather than at technical level. Same applies to current SC members. Normally, technical partners are part of the Technical Advisory Group.</p>	<b>No edits:</b> the framing here is very deliberate – just because the technical energy / decarb lead of (e.g.) WFP is a ‘technical’ expert, they absolutely still have strategic insight (it’s improbable that they would be the agency’s head of energy if they did not have strategic insight)
SECRETA RIAT	23	2.	Could references be added to this section to better understand which sources are informing which statements?	<b>No edits:</b> section 2 is just a brief DHE summary – references here would result in a long list of footnotes and would reduce readability.
SECRETA RIAT	24	2.1.1	As per comment above, please be more specific. Though legal documents were signed in late 2022, the Inception Phase began in January 2023	<b>No edits:</b> the text already states “late” 2022, and the main body makes it clear that activities substantively started in 2023.

SECRETARIA RIAT	25	2.1.2	Do we want to specifically state how this was using UNDP's 7 step process for the humanitarian sector? The CCES was build on that standard assessment + business case development process.	<b>Agreed:</b> important to reference the 7-step process here.
SECRETARIA RIAT	26	2.1.3	Suggested edit: Replace "operated" with "hosted" for Secretariat and GPA Justification for edit: clarification that UNITAR hosts the Secretariat and GPA teams This comment applies throughout the report.	<b>Agreed:</b> changed to 'hosted' and footnote added. For details see response under comment 6.
MPTFO	27	2.1.3	The correct term is "hosted" by UNITAR	<b>Agreed:</b> changed to 'hosted' and footnote added. For details see response under comment 6.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	28	2.1.3	UNITAR is the DHE Programme Partner, with the associated activities undertaken by the GPA.	<b>Agreed:</b> text changed here and throughout.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	29	2.1.3	Agree (with comment above). Current phrasing makes this seem like GPA and DHE are very different, whereas in reality DHE was a fund born out of GPA.	<b>Agreed:</b> text changed here and throughout.
SECRETARIA RIAT	30	2.1.4	"To date, nearly \$4.3 million of the original \$22.2 million funding has been transferred to the DHE's participating organisations, of which \$1.3 million has been reported as expended, although \$1.47 million in interest has been accrued. Consequently, at the time of writing the Fund had a balance of almost \$19.2 million." Justification for suggested edit: revised to reflect the fund's financial reporting status at the end of 2024, which is the most recent report - please see the fund's financial portal page at this link: <a href="#">Decarbonizing Humanitarian Energy Multi-Partner Trust Fund</a> Please note, that under the MPTF modality, fund's may be transferred to partners, but any unspent funds should be refunded at project closure. Because of the disruptions to DHE in 2024 and 2025, we are expecting that some of the funds transferred will be refunded	<b>Agreed:</b> suggested clause of "\$1.3 million has been reported as expended" is an important addition.
SECRETARIA RIAT (MEL Specialist)	31	Figure 1 (Page 2)	It would be very useful to understand how and why these specific outcome indicators were selected - and why no energy access dimension were included	<b>No edits:</b> that would be too granular for this report, but in summary it is not clear that

				there was too much thought or effort behind indicator selection.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	32	4.1.1 (Page 6)	Seems too prescriptive, this need emerged from the sector over multiple years, with all GPA Steering Group partners acknowledging the need for specific funding for both renewable energy for operations and energy access programs. The inter-agency GPA Framework document and wider Steering Group meeting notes from 2018-2022 can provide this evidence.	<b>PPME: Agreed:</b> Sentence shortened and reference to individual removed in response to two comments received.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	33	4.1.1 (Page 6)	Note: The concept note that was presented to IKI was developed through formal and informal engagement with GPA partners to address their challenges to decarbonise, which began with a series of workshops back in 20219. The IKI concept note was also shares shared with UNHCR, IOM, WFP, FAO and ICRC for consultation (August & September 2022). No significant comments were received on the approach were received, other than a commitment to ensure that HQ were informed before country operations so that they could coordinate and support the initiative, as local offices generally lacked technical capacity. See additional comments in paragraph 4.2.7	Edits in this para agreed.
MPTFO	34	4.1.2 (Page 6)	This is incorrect. It was required to have the ToRs developed and approved. MPTFO would only establish a MPTF when ToRs (annexed to the MoU) are validated by the PUNOs and when Donors have committed funding for this ToRs (as the ToRs are also annexed to the SAA, signaling donor's agreement with the ToRs)	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
MPTFO	35	4.1.3 (Page 6)	Suggest to correct, as inception phase is not always standard: In MPTFs, an inception phase may be used to fully developed a Fund's operational processes	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	36	4.1.3 (Page 6)	This was based on a recommendation from the MPTF Office and agreed with IKI.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
SECRETA RIAT	37	4.1.3 (Page 6)	It is also important to note that several important outputs/activities from the inception phase were either partially completed or not started, and deferred for completion in the operational phase. These represent significant gaps that were then not addressed in the operational phase and still remain outstanding.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.

			The status of the inception phase outputs completed and outstanding is provided in the inception phase close-out report <a href="#">2025-01-02 DHE MPTF Inception Phase Activities Close Out Status FINAL.pdf</a>	
SECRETAR IAT (MEL)	38	4.1.6 (Page 7)	Question: Can we provide any insight into the design process of the ToR? Where there any issues in the development - in particular in terms of 'co-design' and inclusion of partners / key sector stakeholders.	<b>Partly agreed:</b> some edits made to confirm that the “diagrammatic representation” wasn’t based on any formal TOC development / design process – such a process did not happen.
SECRETAR IAT	39	4.1.6 (Page 7)	Can a short analysis of the impact level of the ToC be included? In particular, it would be useful to: i) Understand why the impact level as articulated in the first ToC is not fit-for-purpose - especially with regards to the 'end beneficiary' or target groups of the Fund logic, and; ii) provide some initial insight into how impact could be articulated to better reflect the MPTF modality.	<b>No edits:</b> such an analysis would be reading too much into the (non-existent) design process for the TOC.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	40	4.1.6 (Page 7)	Note: The main focus of the funding was to decarbonise offices, as agreed with IKI, prior to the GFFO becoming the Ministry responsible for the project. UNITAR had stressed the need to IKI to have funds available to develop and assess energy access projects anchored to decarbonisation activities, something that many programme partners struggle to develop due to siloed teams and different budgetary rules between operations and programmes. This research funding was to provide support and evidence to partners on the benefits and methodology to anchor energy access projects to decarbonisation activities.	OK, but the documentation - the TOR - lacks precision on these points, which contributed to differing interpretations arising. The TOR was often cited by MTR interviewees as evidence in support of <u>their</u> interpretation of the Fund’s strategy...even when those interviewees had <u>different</u> interpretations of the Fund’s strategy (!). So there’s possibly a lesson here (for section 7) about formalising strategies, and not relying on informal agreements.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	41	4.1.6 (Page 7)	(As a replied of the comment above) Indeed - it was framed as ‘research’ at first, with the informal understanding with IKI that it would become more central over time once further data+analysis were done to understand possible concrete operational business models connecting the diesel generators of humanitarian offices & for wider operational purposes with community electricity needs.	



MPTFO	42	4.1.6 (Page 7)	MPTFO did not sense that the shareholders had different interpretation of the purpose when the MPTF was established. The divergence only emerged a year ago or so. Want to point this out for accuracy purpose. Initially, the partners were all aligned and there were no discussions on the fund's purpose.	<b>No edits:</b> divergence was evident (even <i>within</i> partners) from mid-2023.
SECRETARIAT	43	4.1.7 (Page 7)	Did the Reviewer find there was a limited understanding of the MPTF modality internally across personnel in the implementing partners and Secretariat? Could closer engagements with the MPTF Office during inception and implementation have helped to avoid some pitfalls?	Yes - there was limited understanding of MPTFs across partner personnel. <b>Edits made</b> to reflect this.
MPTFO	44	4.1.7 (Page 7)	MPTFO did provide detailed comments and guidance to the UNITAR Secretariat in Sept 2023 on a number of processes and on the MOP.	<b>No edits:</b> as noted in the subsequent sentence, numerous gaps have been identified in the TOR.
MPTFO	45	4.1.7 (Page 7)	It is important to highlight that each fund is different in nature and context. MPTFO was requested to establish this MPTF under very short timeline by the PUNOs and the donor, due to the fact that the funds had an expiry date. It was expected and agreed by all and communicated that a number of important standards would be developed during the inception phase.	<b>No edits:</b> the sentence is still accurate.
MPTFO	46	4.1.7 (Page 7)	MPTFO highlighted the gov distinction of roles to all parties separately. DHE Secretariat was also invited to join MPTFs Secretariats gathering in Geneva facilitated by MPTFO, to support the Secretariat in its work.	<b>No edits:</b> the sentence is still accurate.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	47	4.1.8 (KF1, Page 7)	Is it that the strategic direction wasn't clear, or the program partners were not mutually clear about the strategic direction? Re-reading the original ToC the strategic direction of providing centralized TA + bundling projects to achieve economies of scale and reduce transaction costs of project design seem clear (but far too prescriptive for an MPTF - as key finding 2 describes). The most ambiguous part was how the funds would be used - there was clarity from the UNITAR GPA team and originally discussions with the donor that the funds would be used for TA and energy efficiency (not for direct implementation by the agency), but maybe that was not clear across partners. Just bringing up as it seemed that the issue was more that partners maybe weren't aligned around / fully adopting the strategic direction which was written in the TOR/TOC? Raising as a point of discussion/consideration.	Relates back to comments 40 and 41 - the higher level parts of the TOR lacked precision, which contributed to (allowed for) different interpretations.
SECRETARIAT (MEL)	48	4.1.8 (KF1, Page 7)	As with the points above - another issue that could be identified here (or described more above) is the lack of a robust description of the impact of the	<b>No edits:</b> the TOC weaknesses are generally referred to within the findings

			Fund beyond more 'project level' outcomes. The programme structure meant that the Fund level unifying structure and outcomes/impact are missing as well.	("in part because the TOC failed to articulate a shared understanding").
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	49	4.1.8 (KF1, Page 7)	The original donor which the TOR and TOC was negotiated with (IKI) didn't have this expectation, so this doesn't seem correct.	But GFFO had this expectation from relatively early in the process. The key point here are the latter two sentences: the lack of reconciliation, which allowed for different interpretations.
SECRETAR IAT	50	4.1.8 (KF1, Page 7)	This ambiguity (or varying interpretations of the fund's scope) should be avoided by well defined and clearly articulated Terms of Reference for the fund (not just in the ToC) which are validated and approved by the SC.	<b>Agreed</b> , but no changes required.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	51	4.1.8 (KF1, Page 7)	As this was the agreed focus of the funding with IKI	OK, but see also comment 49: the key point here are the latter two sentences: the lack of reconciliation, which allowed for different interpretations.
MPTFO	52	4.2.1 (Page 8)	Secretariats don't report to MPTFO. They report to the UN chair of the fund and to the SC substantially. They work closely with MPTFO which provides guidance to them	<b>Agreed</b> : edits made.
MPTFO	53	4.2.1 (Page 8)	It should be "hosted" by UNITAR	<b>Agreed</b> : changed to 'hosted' and footnote added. For details see response under comment 6.
SECRETAR IAT	54	4.2.2 (Page 8)	Consider rephrasing: "the roles of the Secretariat and the GPA (through which UNITAR implements activities under the DHE) were frequently blurred"	<b>Agreed</b> : edits made.
SECRETAR IAT	55	4.2.2 (Page 8)	There are other factors that may have contributed to the confusion: 1) The Manual of operations states that " <i>The Secretariat function is an independent entity that is hosted by the Global Platform for Action on Sustainable Energy in Displacement Settings (GPA) at UNITAR</i> " and the ToR states that " <i>The Secretariat function will sit within the Global Platform for Action on Sustainable Energy in Displacement Settings (GPA), currently hosted by UNITAR</i> " 2) The branding of the DHE which includes the GPA in its logo	<b>Agreed</b> : some edits made.

			( <a href="https://mptf.undp.org/fund/dhe00">https://mptf.undp.org/fund/dhe00</a> ) as well as the DHE landing page under the GPA's website, etc.	
SECRETAR IAT	56	4.2.2 (Page 8)	In the absence of a fully staffed Secretariat team, several GPA personnel formally allocated a portion of their time to undertake or support Secretariat functions in 2024. There were also instances where GPA personnel represented the DHE Secretariat on missions (e.g. Nigeria) and events	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made (as per below suggestion, comment 57).
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	57	4.2.2 (Page 8)	I would suggest rewording this to "UNITAR GPA staff, often supported the under resourced Secretariat, in addition to undertaking activities on behalf of the GPA."	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
MPTFO	58	4.2.3 (Page 8)	"hosted"	<b>Agreed:</b> changed to 'hosted' and footnote added. For details see response under comment 6.
MPTFO	59	4.2.4 (Page 8)	Not included in the inception phase. These are developed before the fund is established. The inception phase was to focus on the Ops Manual and initial pilot, necessary recruitments	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
SECRETAR IAT	60	4.2.4 (Page 8)	Suggested edit: "Following the July 2023 coup in Niger, scoping work was initiated in Nigeria in August 2023." Justification: The SC decision to begin looking at Nigeria came in the August 2023 SC meeting. Practically speaking there wasn't an overlap with initiating work in Nigeria while Niger was still the primary focus, as suggested in the original text.	<b>No edits:</b> references to Nigeria are evident in the February 2023 SC minutes, with scoping work becoming more substantial by the March 2023 minutes.
SECRETAR IAT	61	4.2.5 (Page 8)	Suggested edit: "In tandem, DHE initiated work on exploring options for financing the implementation of the solutions proposed in the business cases as part of the CCES model, including possible derisking mechanisms, although strategies for other key innovative elements of the CCES concept were not developed (such as centralised procurement methods, bundling, third party delivery models, opportunities for climate finance)." Justification: to clarify that in addition to the derisking other key innovations remained under development during the inception phase. The work on a derisking mechanism was transferred from the GPA to UNDP which later involved UNCDF in the process.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.

UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	62	4.2.5 (Page 8)	Not sure what is meant by financing a CCES - that is not the case - one of the main drivers for the MPTF was to support the financing of more sustainable energy systems through the utilisation of energy as a service delivery model.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made as per above suggestion (comment 61).
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	63	4.2.6 (Page 8)	See comment on paragraph 4.2.7 on the development of the approach	<b>No edits:</b> the below comments are addressed, but this finding is separate – <u>at the point of implementation</u> ETPs felt there was only limited meaningful consultation on the approach to be taken.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	64	4.2.7 (Page 8)	<p>This is incorrect - the original concept had been in development since 2019, based on workshops with humanitarian partners including UNHCR, IOM, WFP, IOM, FAO, ICRC, Mercy Corps to address the problems they were facing in decarbonising their facilities - lack of funding, limited capacity and high costs - and how a coordinated approach could support their energy transition, with the additional benefit of utilising a standard approach that could facilitate joint procurement (bundling) and access to innovative financing, while reducing transaction costs.</p> <p>In addition, the CCES was an extension of a mini pilot in Nigeria, managed by UNITAR and supported by GIZ Nigeria, where energy assessments were undertaken with UNHCR, IOM, WFP, FAO, Mercy Corps, ICRC and UNICEF. Given staff turn over at GPA partner organisations it is fair to say that not all technical leads at ETP would be aware of their organisations involvement of the approach.</p> <p>It should also be noted that technical representatives of ETPs were invited to a workshop during the inception phase to discuss experiences with Energy Monitoring Devices in humanitarian settings (poor connectivity and power quality). The GPA were aware of research undertaken by ETPs and their experiences. This was not shared with the DHE team despite our manoeuvrings. Unfortunately many UN agencies are unwilling to share learnings and experiences where it reflects badly on existing approaches.</p>	<b>Agreed, and edits made:</b> this para (and associated finding) was not well written / framed. The text has been amended to confirm the extent of pre-DHE consultation with humanitarian actors. However, there is still a (less forceful) point to be made about limited engagement during the inception / <i>detailed</i> design phase.
SECRETARIAT	65	4.2.7 (Page 8)	Have GPA team members who were involved in the original design of the DHE provided any further details on the design process and the involvement of humanitarian actors in shaping the DHE and its ToR that could be referenced here?	

UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	66	4.2.7 (Page 8)	Also relevant project experience from Nigeria (see above), knowledge of what and what hasn't worked in displacement settings, and provide direct support to partners to address humanitarian challenges. UNITAR may not be seen as a humanitarian organisation but the energy team in the GPA is staffed by experienced specialists on the topic of energy in displacement settings and is seen as a go to resource for support and guidance.	
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	67	4.2.7 (Page 8)	Given the above, I suggest that this sentence is toned down. Of course all projects could benefit from additional engagement but the design was based on prolonged and substantive discussions with relevant partners at the technical level over a number of years.	
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	68	4.2.7 (Page 8)	(As a reply of the comment above) The GPA Framework document was written through an inter-agency process and was requested by the UN humanitarian partners on the GPA Steering Group. It has been a member driven, collective process with humanitarian partners with in-country infrastructure and long-term field presence. <a href="https://www.humanitarianenergy.org/what-is-the-gpa/resources-and-tools/global-plan-of-action-framework-document/">https://www.humanitarianenergy.org/what-is-the-gpa/resources-and-tools/global-plan-of-action-framework-document/</a>	
SECRETA RIAT	69	4.2.9 (Page 9)	The <a href="#">2023 Narrative Report, DHE.pdf</a> presents a different perspective on the Oslo workshop: <i>"...by the close of the meeting, attendees expressed feelings of stronger team identity, clearer understanding of DHE goals, and aligned approach to developing, and implementing the programme. The durable impacts of the Oslo meeting have allowed personnel across the PP to operate as "one DHE" team, and the effects of this improved cohesion have been materially felt throughout programme development efforts since."</i> Did interviews provide further insights that may explain this discrepancy?	<b>Partly agreed:</b> this extract from the narrative report is not representative of the views of everyone involved; however the original sentence is too strong / one-sided, so edits have been made.
SECRETAR IAT	70	4.2.9 (Page 9)	Suggest to include "as defined in the ToR" in order to point to the foundational document which defines the scope of the DHE.	<b>No edits:</b> this sentence is accurate and - as per other comments - the TOR was open to interpretation.
SECRETAR IAT	71	4.2.10 (Page 9)	Suggest also noting that the lack of a robust Fund-level risk management framework was and remains a significant gap. Developing such a framework was planned for the inception phase but not completed. While risk assessments (e.g., by UNDP) were conducted, which helped inform decision-making in the case of Niger, there was no consistent or formalized approach at	<b>No edits:</b> this gap wasn't raised as being influential / material on the Niger decision.

			the Fund level to guide strategic decisions on engagement or re-engagement in such contexts.	
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	72	4.2.10 (Page 9)	Suggest amending to reflect what happened. “DHE SC agreed to pause operations in Niger, based on an assessment of risk and focused its efforts on Nigeria.”	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
	73	4.2.10 (Page 9)	SECRETARIAT: Suggestion: Delete “at least some preliminary groundwork had already begun” Justification: As mentioned above, though adding Nigeria as the second of 5 pilot countries had already been discussed by the time of the coup, preliminary groundwork didn’t begin until August 2023.	<b>No edits:</b> as above, earlier SC minutes indicate that at least some scoping work was already underway in Nigeria.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	74	4.2.10 (Page 9)	No, Saddam Mohamed Zodi from NORCAP was supporting the DHE in Niger at the time of the coup and had to be evacuated.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
SECRETAR IAT	75	4.2.10 (Page 9)	The NORCAP Roving Energy Expert was based in Niger. He moved to Nigeria once the programme pivoted to focus initial implementation in the country.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made in line with comment 74 above.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	76	4.2.10 (Page 9)	I believe this comment is based on an over simplification of the situation in Niger and the status of Programme Partners. During the coup, people could not move around, international staff were evacuated, goods could not be imported, it would have been impossible to do anything meaningful. A risk assessment was maintained with regards to when it would be safe and practical to return. When the situation stabilised, dialogue with ETPS also highlighted that they did not have the capacity to support energy programming, as they sought to catch up with delivering core mandates - a perennial problem for the sector. There were also practical concerns about Programme Partners returning to Niger in 2024 while existing budgets for supporting Nigeria were not approved.	<b>No edits:</b> it is important to present this <i>external</i> perception here (even if those perceptions are based on incomplete info) as those perceptions were held by multiple stakeholders. The foregoing text does make the justification for pausing work in Niger sufficiently clear.
SECRETAR IAT	77	4.2.10 (Page 9)	Given the objective of the programming (ie to enable humanitarians to shift towards sustainable, cost-effective delivery models in protracted humanitarian settings), the volatile post-coup context in Niger was assessed as presenting a weak opportunity for DHE to pilot a new approach and demonstrate its relevance. Did the interviewee sources for this suggestion base their perspectives on any compelling evidence or analysis? Did their perspectives account for the	<b>No edits:</b> as above (comment 76) it is important to register external perceptions of the decision.

			fundamental differences between humanitarian agencies' emergency response work and DHE's work in the Humanitarian-Development nexus? See for context: Brief risk assessment and recommendations as presented to the DHE SC in November 2024 and February 2025: <a href="#">Niger—Risk Assessment and Recommendations.pptx</a>	
MPTFO	78	4.2.11 (KF3 Page 9)	To keep in mind that UN staff have to respect UN procedures and that also informed the fund decision as DHE is a UN fund. There were specific security parameters limiting the decision framework of the partners	<b>No edits:</b> as above (comment 76) it is important to register external perceptions of the decision.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	79	4.2.11 (KF4 Page 9)	I agree that increased participation would have helped, the way the finding is presently worded does not reflect the long term development of the initiative with key organisations and energy experts. I would suggest the finding remains but is reworked to reflect what happened and highlighted the limited timeframe as a the root cause for additional engagement.	As above, <b>agreed, and edits made:</b> this finding was not well written / framed. The text has been amended to confirm the extent of pre-DHE consultation with humanitarian actors. However, there is still a (less forceful) point to be made about limited engagement during the inception / <i>detailed</i> design phase.
SECRETA RIAT	80	4.2.11 (KF4 Page 9)	suggest to add “definition of the fund’s impact” which the insufficient engagement also contributed to	<b>No edits:</b> this is addressed within section 4.1
SECRETA RIAT	81	4.3.1	In addition to the Secretariat capacity and leadership issues identified, did the MTR identify any capacity or other gaps across the DHE more broadly?	While some interviewees noted that Programme Partners were often represented by junior staff that were not well-positioned to escalate issues, this was not a common view.
SECRETA RIAT	82	4.3.2	1) Please note the full-time Programme Officer was hired on a series of temporary, short-term contracts. 2) Whilst the HoS is a critical role, the failure to fully staff the Secretariat (6 positions had been approved and budgeted for) was equally as consequential making it very difficult to fulfill its functions and by extension manage the fund.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made here and in para 4.3.5

UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	83	4.3.2	Suggest changing to “shortcoming in capacity”	<b>Partly agreed:</b> rephrased to “shortcoming in Fund governance and capacity”
SECRETAR IAT	84	4.3.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There were email exchanges regarding the cost and level of the position dating back to December 2023, prior to the January 2024 SC meeting.</li> <li>- There were several conversations regarding this decision also involving other SC members and the candidate.</li> <li>- The decision to downgrade the position was captured in the budget approved by the SC (via email in January-February 2024)</li> </ul>	OK, but this was almost all happening outside the SC. The central point in para 4.3.3 is that the process “was entirely inappropriate from a governance perspective”. <b>No edits.</b>
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	85	4.3.3	It was clear and understood by all SC members at that meeting that the post had been downgraded and that the fund would only continue if this happened. The manner in which it was stressed was not appropriate to capture in the minutes. Suggest personal conversation with SC members for evidence.	<b>No edits:</b> as for comment 84, the para is very clear that the whole process was “entirely inappropriate from a governance perspective”.
SECRETAR IAT	86	4.3.5	<p>Suggested edit: Insert: “and particularly in the case of the DHE where the jointly delivered CCES model required extensive cross-party coordination.”</p> <p>Justification for edit: the DHE’s particular set up in the form of the CCES jointly delivered by the 3 PPs but without a nominated lead partner was reliant on the Secretariat to provide day-to-day operational coordination. This was an additional Secretariat function particular to this MPTF with an already understaffed Secretariat. In addition to the lack of Secretariat capacity, has there been a similar assessment of potential capacity gaps across the DHE?</p>	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
SECRETAR IAT	87	4.3.5	, and particularly in the case of the DHE where the jointly delivered CCES model required extensive cross-party coordination. . Track change suggested by the Secretariat.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	88	4.3.6 KF6	This was recognised by SC members and the Secretariat and the Secretariat reached out to the MPTF Office to provide all Steering Committee members with training to support the governance of the Fund.	<b>No edits:</b> this does not change the underlying finding.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	89	4.3.6 KF6	I believe “flawed” would be more appropriate -	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.



UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	90	4.4.1	The business case development was the initial overing to ETPs. Support in procurement, installation and commission was also offered by the CCES.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	91	4.4.2	Worth a mention of the location of staffing. Normally technical work being done in the country or region of implementation is appropriate, but the UNDP team is centered in Copenhagen and was not flexible to change the delivery model to set up the technical assistance in country of implementation.	<b>Agreed:</b> it is discussed elsewhere, but it is also very relevant for this para.
SECRETA RIAT	92	4.4.3	Did any adaptive management, actions or discussions take place to address this disconnect / adjust the approach	Partners did discuss and request changes to the process, but these were never implemented.
SECRETAR IAT	93	4.4.4	Correction: This was the GPA and not the Secretariat. The GPA was responsible for partner onboarding, as agreed with NORCAP to ensure organizations were formally signed on before DHE requested their data and began installing hardware in their facilities. After the formal sign-on, the relationship was fully handed over to the NORCAP country team to proceed with onboarding and ongoing coordination.	<b>Edits made</b> , but multiple interviewees understood that onboarding was being led by the Secretariat, which again demonstrates a misunderstanding of responsibilities.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	94	4.4.4	This was a prerequisite of the ETPs and agreed during the consultation exercise. Head Office global teams wanted to be aware of the outreach prior to any local engagement and then kept informed of progress. Prior to country engagement head office counterparts were to be informed, who would connect the DHE colleagues to the country representative, who would then be onboarded to the process. Once that had happened the Norcap local team took over the local relationship. It was recognised that the handover of the relationships and continued need to report back to HQ needed to be improved.	<b>No edits:</b> the broader finding is unchanged, and it is important to record external perspectives of the process.
SECRETAR IAT	95	4.4.4	The centralized approach was also put in place in response to a series of challenges that were faced, including complex dynamics between HQ and field level teams at different ETPs, as well as coordination and ownership issues across PPs due in part to the complex distribution of roles and responsibilities.	<b>No edits:</b> the broader finding is unchanged, and it is important to record external perspectives of the process.
SECRETA RIAT	96	4.4.5	(also relevant for paragraph 4.4.6) Please note that the DHE also sought to integrate alternative models such as energy-as-a-service (leasing or PPAs) into its business cases which would improve the economics of such decarbonization projects, as well as other	<b>No edits:</b> as noted in the comment, those plans were never realized, so the finding is unchanged.

			innovations and derisking. However this has not yet been integrated into the approach.	
SECRETAR IAT (MEL)	97	4.4.5	Question: What are the implications of this statement with regards to the overall validity of the ToC logic? Would the CCES model lead to significant results (especially considering a value-for-money component) when the inputs/outputs did not clearly lead to the indicator targets?	It does seem to be a gap in the logic, or at least a very 'strong' assumption (if we demonstrate how upgrades will save costs, ETPs will invest accordingly) that has proven to be <i>too</i> strong an assumption.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	98	4.4.5	This was a condition of funding, the donor did not want capital spent on energy systems powering humanitarian organisations own facilities. The development of business cases was intended to support internal funding and energy as a service delivery model. This was specifically mentioned in all calls and presentations made to ETPs. It was also acknowledged that the DHE Programme Partners would keep a track of the number of business cases developed that had not lead to a cleaner energy transition and revisit the need for capital support. Again this was explicitly mentioned in all calls and presentations. Additionally, to develop innovative funding mechanisms we need to have a pipeline of projects. The development of the business cases would create this pipeline.	<b>Partly agreed:</b> some edits made to acknowledge the link to donor restrictions, but the broader finding here is still accurate, regardless of the underlying context / reasons for lack of financial support.
SECRETAR IAT (MEL)	99	4.4.5	This statement suggests that the CCES model did not lead to the desired outcomes since humanitarian agencies did not to have the means to do so. Meaning the decision and/or ability to take action lies outside of the DHE's control.	See response to comment 97 above. The decision to take action lies outside of DHE's control ... as the intervention is <i>currently</i> formulated (i.e. this is potentially something that DHE <i>could</i> tackle / support).
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	100	4.4.5	This may be true but what we are hearing from donors is that the clean energy transition would save humanitarian organisations money and as such should be part of a broader investment programme from their core funding budgets, as they receive funding to operate and maintain offices. Neither sentiments reflect the truth, hence the desire to move towards energy as a service model and the creation of a pipeline of bundled projects to support	<b>No edits:</b> the point is of course entirely accurate, but it does not change the finding and – in any case – it is important to log external perspectives / frustrations.

			the creation of a de-risking mechanism and an economic driver for selling the associated environment attributes of the solar solutions. A clear aim of the DHE and its centralised approach.	
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	101	4.4.6	Oversimplification. It's a chicken and egg situation, you need an understanding of the number and size of projects (project pipeline) to be able to design the derisking mechanism. And you cant develop cost effective energy service contracts without a derisking mechanism. In addition, you need to understand the costs involved to be able to reach out to donors on transitioning to solar. So many GPA partners undertake the business case first, prior to looking for funding. One of the key messages from the S-UN/GPA Decarbonising Task Force was the need for support in energy monitoring devices and business case development. The business cases developed by the CCES would have created the project pipeline to develop the derisking mechanism and the proposal to be able to reach out to donors.	<b>Partly agreed:</b> the language has been softened here, but the broader point still stands, namely that – ultimately – there were no financing options available during DHE's initial implementation.
SECRETAR IAT	102	4.4.8	Question: Was lack of budget approvals in 2024 found to have played a role in limited implementation?	The core problems arose before any budgets were frozen, and 'pre-freeze' progress towards targets was essentially negligible. Obviously the budget freeze stopped any progress, but the prior limited implementation can not be attributed to the freeze.
SECRETAR IAT (MEL)	103	4.4.8	Question: Would the DHE have been able to achieve the expected results if the operational challenges hadn't been experienced? Or is it primarily the DHE's flawed design and CCES model?	It is not either / or: the MTR findings indicate that <i>both</i> the operational approach <i>and</i> the flawed design contributed to the lack of results. In retrospect, coordination should have been stronger and DHE should not have focused exclusively on CCES.

SECRETAR IAT (MEL)	104	4.4.10	There was a dashboard developed, which could - theoretically - provide data on diesel consumption reduced etc. Was it fit-for-purpose and usable as a viable MEL system?	Purely for technical data – other than emissions reductions and costs savings, it wouldn't have been appropriate for outcome / impact monitoring.
SECRETA RIAT	105	4.4.11	This could also be included in an analysis of the ToC - at the moment some of these points are scattered through the report and they could be gathered in one place to link clearly to Recommendation 5.	Arguably every finding (certainly the majority) can be related to the TOC – it would reduce readability to discuss all findings in the context of the TOC.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	106	4.4.11 (KF8)	As noted above, this was at the request of the ETPs.	<b>No edits:</b> see comment 94 – it is important to record external perspectives on how DHE was implemented.
SECRETA RIAT	107	4.4.11 (KF9)	The Geneva-led onboarding process was also put in place in response to a series of challenges that were faced, including complex dynamics between HQ and field level teams at different ETPs, as well as coordination and ownership issues across PPs due in part to the complex distribution of roles and responsibilities.	<b>No edits:</b> as per comments 94 and 107.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	108	4.4.10 (KF9)	True but consideration needs to be given to the context, as provided above.	<b>No edits:</b> see comment 94 – it is important to record external perspectives on how DHE was implemented.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	109	4.4.10 (KF11)	The WP approach was not aligned with the MPTF administrative structure, which made funding requests/disbursement very painful. The administrative structure of the MPTF was not explained or understood while the TOC and TOR were being developed due to lack of guidance from the MPTF office.	<b>No edits:</b> this point is fully agreed, but is already covered in paras 4.1.4 and 4.4.7
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	110	4.5.1	I think its more than that, consider the following: Was not delivering as intended, or at an acceptable pace or scale.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	111	4.5.1	I think its important to note that budgets were not being aproved and partners were threatening to freeze activities.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.

SECRETAR IAT	112	4.5.1	Suggested edit: “This ultimately resulted in GFFO’s non-approval of Programme Partner funding during 2024 (and by extension, pause DHE field operations), and then a partial approval of funding for 2025 subject to the update of 2025 delivery plans in Q1 of 2025. The update of the delivery plans was subsequently superseded by the SC decision to undertake a comprehensive assessment and restructuring process, with one element of that process being this MTR. “ Justification for edit: clarification on the chain of events leading up to the restructuring process being undertaken.	<b>Agreed:</b> not this exact wording, but edits made also in response to other comments.
MPTFO	113	4.5.1	In MPTFs, the decision making is made by consensus (there is no veto). It is a discussion that must lead to a consensus and the role of the UN Chair to facilitate the consensus. The sentence should be reformulated to take this into account	<b>Edits made.</b>
SECRETAR IAT	114	4.5.2	Track change suggested by the Secretariat (adding Secretariat instead of UNITAR)	<b>Agreed:</b> not this exact wording, but edits made.
SECRETAR IAT	115	4.5.2	The official title for this temporary arrangement is “Acting Secretariat Lead” - please correct throughout the report. Please also note that the Acting Secretariat Lead was brought on board to manage the Secretariat and the review and restructuring process decision happened once he joined the Secretariat. As such he was given the mandate by the SC to manage this crucial process.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made throughout.
SECRETAR IAT	116	4.5.3	Suggested edits: While all this work has strengthened the DHE’s foundations, significant vulnerabilities remain. Most materially, the staffing of Secretariat continues to be unstable and the options for recruiting Secretariat personnel using the contractual modalities currently available under UNITAR are short-term and/or temporary in nature, including for the critical Head of Secretariat role. The recruitment process for a permanent Head of Secretariat, which was meant to be completed by July 2025, was not initiated by UNITAR at the time of writing this report. Justification for edits: clarification to directly refer to general staffing and contract modalities available under UNITAR as the host agency and to remove specific references to individual contract details.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.

UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	117	4.5.3	Although factually correct, it is an oversimplification of the situation. It was a challenge to balance expectations against existing time limited budgetary restrictions. When recruited, the review was expected to be a lighter touch, with funded activities recommencing early 2025, thereby removing the likelihood of the MPTF being closed and allowing a longer term view to be taken with regards to creating staff positions at UNITAR. This deeper, more encompassing review (which is needed) is taking longer (and rightly so), which has resulted in the future “uncertainty” of the fund remaining in place. Although I feel it is fair to say that with every passing SC meeting the future of the fund is looking more positive with regards to Germany’s continued commitment.	<b>No edits:</b> the finding still stands, with the additional context not changing the overall conclusion here – it would not be appropriate to go into this level of detail in the main report.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	118	4.5.3	“miscommunication” on the reason behind the appointment to DHE Programme Partners	<b>No edits:</b> from the perspective of stakeholders outside UNITAR, it was a misstep
MPTFO	119	4.5.3	To “host” the DHE Secretariat (not “operate”)	<b>Agreed:</b> changed to ‘hosted’ and footnote added. For details see response under comment 6.
SECRETAR IAT	120	4.5.3	As above, the title is “Acting Secretariat Lead” please correct throughout the report. The permanent position will be Head of Secretariat, once recruited.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made throughout.
SECRETAR IAT	121	4.5.3	Suggested edits to avoid disclosing individual contract details and provide correct description of the sequence of events. Suggested edit: More immediately, no Head of Secretariat was recruited by the time the temporary Acting Secretariat Lead contract came to an end, with no clear pathway to ensure the continuity of the role. Following the 24 June 2025, SC meeting, the SC members held discussions to find solutions to this issue. This resulted in the extension of the Acting Secretariat Lead contract and the convening of an extraordinary SC meeting on 5 August 2025 to discuss the possible change of Secretariat hosting arrangements.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made, although not this exact wording.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	122	4.5.3 (KF14)	“miscommunication” on the reason behind the appointment to DHE Programme Partners	<b>No edits:</b> from the perspective of stakeholders outside UNITAR, it was a misstep
MPTFO	123	4.5.3 (KF14)	MPTF Secretariat host, instead of MPTF host.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
UNITAR GPA	124	5.1 (Page 14)	One of the strongest arguments is that the MPTF structure allows for funding beyond typical 3-5 year political timelines which is useful for longer-term	<b>Agreed,</b> but <b>no edits</b> as the point is made elsewhere (paras 5.1.2 and 5.3.3).

(Aimee Jenks)			energy access and renewable energy investments which usually require a 5+ year contracting timeline	
SECRETAR IAT	125	5.3.2 (Page 15)	Overall, the DHE is in the median but does this change if only regional and global MPTFs are taken into account?	Hardly any difference: DHE is still in the 5 <sup>th</sup> decile for contributions (median is only slightly higher at \$26.2m), and actually 25 per cent of funds have 1 contributor (39 per cent have 2).
MPTFO	126	5.3.4 (Page 17)	The Fund's establishment was fast-tracked due to the fact that the partners and the donor had indicated limited time to secure the funds. However, at inception phase. MPTFO provided detailed guidance to the MOP in bilateral discussions with the Secretariat. MPTFO also ensured Secretariat benefited from the shared learning sessions organized for Geneva hosted Secretariat. Once informed of the bilateral conversations and challenges between actors, MPTFO engaged in bilateral meetings with each actor, offering options from other MPTFs and solutions that could support the DHE.	<b>No edits:</b> this is not the perspective of other DHE stakeholders.
MPTFO	127	5.3.5 (Page 17)	Technical Advisory Groups are, typically ad-hoc bodies that provide technical inputs when/as needed, as a neutral independent source.	<b>Agreed</b> , but <b>no edits</b> required.
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	128	5.4.2	This consideration should be tempered by the reality that most renewable energy projects in humanitarian settings fail and are not operated or maintained after 6 mo-2 years of implementation (depending on how much O&M costs were budgeted in the procurement). There is a balance to be found between setting up the right kind of partnerships and who leads the implementation (e.g. service contracting structures which enable the private sector to deliver energy services for an appropriate fee for all parties). This nuance to be considered.	<b>Agreed</b> , but this point is also about DHE's responsiveness in terms of communications: <b>some edits</b> made to clarify this point.
SECRETAR IAT	129	5.4.2	While the DHE has not been able to deliver as intended since its inception, and has been perceived as slow, it is also important to make a distinction between rapid response to a crises setting and more protracted settings, between emergency response and the humanitarian-development nexus. Some of the solutions, and innovations that the DHE seeks to promote will likely take time to develop, pilot, replicate and scale. That is inherent to the innovation process and some of the solutions may also fail. However, that may be the pathway to develop innovative approaches that could be	<b>Agreed</b> , but this point is also about DHE's responsiveness in terms of communications: <b>some edits</b> made to clarify this point.

			transformational for the sector over time, as opposed to shorter-term and more traditional models which may perhaps be quicker to deploy but at a high cost.	
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	130	5.4.2	This also highlights the need for business case development, even when the agencies don't have funding available, as noted in an earlier response from GPA/UNITAR.	<b>Agreed, but no edits</b> required.
MPTFO	131	6. Conclusions and draft recommendations	Noted that the recommendations are ordered by priorities. It may be helpful to see how they relate and align to the conclusions.	<b>Annex D added</b> , mapping findings to conclusions to recommendations.
SECRETAR IAT (MEL)	132	6. Conclusions and draft recommendations	The recommendations are very actionable and utility-oriented - a big positive - but the linkages to conclusions are not always clear. There does not have to be a rigidly linear relation but the conclusions should justify the content of the recommendations more strongly.	<b>Annex D added</b> , mapping findings to conclusions to recommendations.
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	133	Conclusion 4 (Page 19)	As previously noted, they were involved since 2019, the approach was co-designed from feedback from multiple workshops and discussions.	<b>Edits made</b> in line with earlier edits (para 4.3.7 and finding 4).
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	134	Conclusion 5 (Page 19)	Was there any other consideration of energy funding vehicles to compare this recommendation? Many funds exist (EPP Africa, BGFA, MCFA, etc) which don't seem to be taken into account.	No: as discussed earlier in the report, moving from being an MPTF is essentially a non-starter at this point; but the report does provide reassurance that the MPTF is an appropriate solution.
SECRETAR IAT	135	Recommendation 2 (Page 20)	Edits already made by PPME to correct the sequence of events. In addition it must be noted that the extraordinary SC meeting was held on 5th August to discuss the hosting arrangements as per the SC's request.	<b>Edits agreed.</b>
SECRETAR IAT	136	Recommendation 3 (Page 20)	Suggested edit as shown below Justification for edit: A core of longer-term positions is required to provide stability and continuity for the Secretariat function over the duration of the fund over its 10 year span. But it is likely that the Secretariat will continue to use temporary, short-term assignments for certain functions in the future, and this practice is common for other MPTF Secretariat teams. Also suggest to use: "personnel" in place of staff as shown below Justification: All Secretariat personnel is currently non-staff	<b>Edits agreed.</b>



			<p><b>“RECOMMENDATION 3</b><i>The DHE Secretariat should be stabilised with a core of fixed-term staffing. The managerial and technical capacity of the current Secretariat is robust, but <b>all current personnel</b> contracts are temporary, and/or short-term in nature. This creates uncertainty not just for the <b>individuals</b> but also for the <b>continuity of the Secretariat’s operations and the DHE more broadly.</b>”</i></p>	
SECRETAR IAT	137	Recommendation 4 (Page 20)	<p>Please also refer to comment on recommendation 4 on page 21.</p> <p>SECRETARIAT:</p> <p>Suggest to broaden the scope of this recommendation to allow other relevant agencies including INGOs to join the Steering Committee to help shape the strategic direction of the fund post restructuring. This could include agencies with relevant energy access, innovative finance or country/region-specific insights subject to the evolving requirements of the fund. Also suggest to differentiate between strategic level guidance and decisions and technical inputs to the process</p>	<p><b>Agreed:</b> this would be entirely appropriate, but – as per the original text – as a minimum the major UN agencies should be involved.</p>
UNITAR GPA (Aimee Jenks)	138	Recommendation 4 (Page 20)	<p>These functions are usually split in the agencies (energy access technical lead under ‘programs’, while institutional renewable energy implementation under ‘facilities’ or ‘operations’). Also most of the technical expertise at global level is currently getting cut due to funding cuts. This recommendation risks 1) creating complex decision making processes that slow down implementation, and 2) mandating expertise comes onto the SC which is not there within the institutions in practice.</p> <p>This recommendation should be unpacked to avoid such risks</p>	<p>Agreed that these are all important considerations for refining the recommendation, but the core recommendation should remain, i.e. bringing in representation from the major UN agencies.</p>
MPTFO	139	Recommendation 4 (Page 20)	<p>A SC is not a technical level body. MPTFO would recommend strategic representation and considerations / discussions to take place to discuss how to incorporate technical lead feedbacks. It can be a permanent observer role or a position conveyed by the strategic lead for example, to be discussed, please consult MPTFO.</p>	<p>As per comment 22 above, just because the technical energy / decarb lead of (e.g.) WFP is a ‘technical’ expert, they absolutely still have strategic insight (it is improbable that they would be the agency’s head of energy if they didn’t have strategic insight)</p>
UNITAR GPA (Mark Gibson)	140	Recommendation 4 (Page 20)	<p>I agree that political and strategic representation from humanitarian partners at the SC level may be counter productive and that this should not happen.</p>	<p>Agreed that these are all important considerations for refining the recommendation,</p>

			<p>There is, however, a concern that historic SC meetings were too granular and technical, this would be exacerbated by the inclusion of technical heads, as their questions would be of a technical nature.</p> <p>I would advocate the inclusion of a Technical Advisory Board, whose input is channelled to the SC through the Secretariat be the best way forward.</p>	but see comments 22 and 139 above. As per the current wording of the recommendation, it is <u>not</u> advised that another advisory body / committee be set up <u>at this stage</u> .
SECRETAR IAT	141	Recommendation 5 (Page 20)	As stated above, this would need to be more specific so energy access becomes an integral part of the DHE offer and not an ad hoc component as it currently the case. This would also mean bringing more energy access actors (which may be different from the humanitarian actors) on board. The DHE could help make that link, but this should then be captured in recommendation #4.	Agreed that this is an important consideration for refining the recommendation; recommendation 4 already includes a reference to energy access.
SECRETARIAT	142	Recommendation 5 (Page 21)	If the DHE pivots to operating as a fund, funding a variety of projects across different geographies, a lot of these elements will need to materialize at the project level.	A project that has been developed within – and will be managed within – a given country would arguably ‘fit the bill’ here ( <b>no edits required</b> at this stage)
SECRETAR IAT	143	Recommendation 5 (Page 21)	See comment in the executive summary	<b>No edits:</b> the <i>general</i> wording is deliberate here – the MTR findings support UNCDF’s involvement, but DHE should decide on the <i>specifics</i> of how UNCDF should be involved.
SECRETAR IAT	144	Recommendation 5 (Page 21)	<p>A key output of the restructuring process should be a quality Terms of Reference for the fund, clearly articulating the purpose, scope and objectives of the fund, setting out the ToC, and defining a functional structure.</p> <p>The SC should to provide their support to seeing the ToR completed properly and be aligned in their endorsement of the new version.</p> <p>There are also many gaps from the inception phase which remain unaddressed, which also add to the work to be undertaken during this restructuring.</p>	<b>Agreed</b> , but it assumed that a revised TOR is an inherent part of the restructuring process, so no recommendation is required on that particular aspect.
MPTFO	145	Recommendation 7 (Page 21)	MPTFO is available to support the Secretariat on MEL	<b>No edits</b> required.

SECRETARIAT	146	Lessons Learned (Page 21)	<p>SUGGESTIONS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The MTR process and in particular the interviews were well managed and in general we have received positive feedback about the process.</li> <li>- The MTR key findings/conclusions and recommendations being most useful, as they can inform the way forward.</li> <li>- The timeline and sequencing of activities during the restructuring process need to be set up to allow for MTR recommendations to be incorporated. In that sense, having the MTR completed early in the process is better to enable that. The fact that the MTR is being completed in a timely manner is therefore welcome.</li> <li>- Regular assessments such as this MTR on the Fund strategy should be built into the implementation cycle. ToC are always meant to be 'living' to some extent to reflect the normal changes, innovations and developments in a sector that can be expected over time. Building in a structured review and update process to the implementation cycle (i.e. commissioning an independent mid- and end-term review or evaluation for each strategic phase) as part of the Fund MEL framework would allow the Secretariat and Steering Committee to ensure that the ToC, indicators/targets, and results chains remain valid and aligned with the mission of the DHE and needs of the sector.</li> </ul>	<b>Agreed:</b> some added to Lessons Learned section.
NORCAP	147	Executive Summary (page ii)	The correct referencing is “NORCAP, part of the Norwegian Refugee Council”	<b>Edits made.</b>
NORCAP	148	Executive Summary (page iii)	<p>This has also been discussed earlier but then it was advised that they should become part of an advisory committee, rather than SC members. A too large SC is foreseen to make decision making and other processes slower, which could hamper progress.</p> <p>The SC is strategic whilst a technical advisory board could be established to ensure alignment with other humanitarian agencies strategies and initiatives making sure that the scope and design of the DHE responds to their needs.</p>	See comments 139 and 140 above.

NORCAP	149	Executive Summary (page iii)	Both decarbonisation and energy access has always been part of the DHE, although energy access has been more an extension of decarbonisation activities. We suggest this recommendation to be stated a bit clearer to avoid any misunderstandings.	<b>Agreed:</b> the recommendation reiterates that dual focus, albeit simplified for the executive summary: some stakeholders felt that DHE should only focus on decarb, some felt it should only focus on energy access, but the majority view – and the MTR’s recommendation – is to retain the dual focus (see also related comment 14).
NORCAP	150	2.1.1	Suggest to include that whilst the grant-based approach is commonly the same, the actual implementation and management of decarbonisation project and energy access projects commonly lie within different units/offices of humanitarian agencies.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
NORCAP	151	2.1.4	It should be clarified whether this is based on actual expenditure, or only the approved budgets which has been dispersed to PPs by the MPTF-O? This is important as several of the PPs have significant underspend due to the delays in activities, funds that will be returned to the MPTF-O. Hence, if this is the budgeted amounts, it does not reflect the reality and actual expenditures of PPs.	<b>Agreed,</b> as per comment 30 above.
NORCAP	152	4.1.1	This section should include references to the Fund’s TOR and the stated purpose of the DHE as outlined there. This is important as all PPs and the donor have signed this document and as such that is the legal document that should guide all activities. The omission of referencing this document would be a strong weakness of this report, as it lays the foundations for many of the elements specified in the analysis here.	<b>Partly agreed:</b> some edits have been made by virtue of responding to a number of other comments; however the section already discusses the TOR, TOC and fund purpose at length.
NORCAP	153	4.1.6	We believe this section needs to be revised to reflect what was agreed upon in the DHEs Fund TOR, agreement with the GFFO, as this states clearly what the purpose of the DHE was suppose to be and has been signed by all parties.	<b>Partly agreed:</b> the section represents the finding of the MTR around the “lack of definition as to how energy access would be tackled” –

			There is a need to also include that the concern actually related to the reluctance of the private sector to engage in Niger following the coup. Whilst the humanitarian situation increased, the context for piloting DHEs private sector collaboration was assessed to be increasingly challenging, and not ideal for creating quick results.	disagree that the purpose was clear. However, reference to private sector (dis)engagement in Niger have been incorporated in response to comment 154.
NORCAP	154	4.2.10	There is a need to also include that the concern actually related to the reluctance of the private sector to engage in Niger following the coup. Whilst the humanitarian situation increased, the context for piloting DHEs private sector collaboration was assessed to be increasingly challenging, and not ideal for creating quick results.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
NORCAP	155	4.4 (page 11)	We believe there is a need to also include more on the delay in budget approvals in this phase and how this also affected the program implementation, causing delays which then affected the results achievement negatively.	<b>No edits:</b> as per comment 102, the core problems arose before any budgets were frozen, and 'pre-freeze' progress towards targets was essentially negligible. Obviously the budget freeze stopped any progress, but the prior limited implementation can't be attributed to the freeze.
NORCAP	156	4.4 (page 11)	We believe the restructuring work that the PPs undertook in the latter part of 2024, to bring front and centre the energy access piece as per the donor's request is largely omitted in this document but should be included. There was 2 month intensive process, followed by budget development, stakeholder re-engagement after the budget freeze and approved by the SC and especially the donor, with dedicated effort made to prioritize ETPs that had a clear link to energy access.	<b>No edits:</b> this was not a major point of discussion or concern across interviews, and it is not clear that including this level of detail would change the findings.
NORCAP	157	4.4.3	We do not believe this is a correct description of the situation, but that there were perhaps differing views between UNDP and NORCAP on certain aspects and their appropriateness for a specific context, these did not cause any direct delays.	<b>No edits:</b> this was the MTR's finding, based on multiple interviews / perspectives.

NORCAP	158	4.5.1	We believe this needs to be revised, as it was not GFFO freezing activities, but NORCAP freezing Nigeria activities due to the lack of budget approval by the GFFO. Due to the lack of budget approval, NORCAP could not continue activities in Nigeria.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made (see also comment 111).
NORCAP	159	5.2	The question has never been decarbonisation or energy access, but rather what comes first. In the original DHE, decarbonisation was meant to be the first focus, with then energy access activities anchored to the decarbonisation projects to decrease the costs and ensure longer term sustainability in providing energy access for displaced populations.	<b>No edits:</b> interviewees often raised the tension between the two, with multiple interviewees suggesting DHE should focus on just one or the other.
NORCAP	160	Conclusion 4 (Page 19)	Support this comment. (refer to comment #133)	<b>Edits made</b> in line with earlier edits (para 4.3.7 and finding 4).
NORCAP	161	Recommendation 4 (page 20)	We believe this recommendation requires further explanation and analysis, including the pros and cons of including additional parties in the SC. What has previously been decided is to include humanitarian agencies in an Advisory Board and more on the technical level, to ensure that the DHE is taking into account these agencies' strategies, initiatives and needs in its activities.	See comments 137-140.
IKI Office, Zukunft – Umwelt – Gesellschaft (ZUG) gGmbH	162	4.2.9	The 2023 interim report stated that „following a Programme Partners meeting in Oslo, the Secretariat revised the programme ToR to reflect an expanded scope that includes direct support to energy access projects anchored to CCES-supported humanitarian solar projects.“ Did interviewees provide any insights as to whether or how this ToR amendment changed their perception of the fund's scope? Was this change communicated to all staff members after the workshop?	As per comments 40-41 above, the lack of precision within the TOR allowed for differing interpretations of the Fund's purpose, and - in retrospect - it was unwise to design DHE's approach to energy access based on informal agreements / understandings. Many interviewees felt that the increased emphasis on energy

				access was not aligned to the DHE's original intention. The change / pivot was very well known across DHE partners.
IKI Office, Zukunft – Umwelt – Gesellschaft (ZUG) gGmbH	163	5.1.2 (page 14)	From GFFO through IKI (referring to IKI and GFFO)	<b>Edits made</b> , but suggested phrasing is not accurate.
IKI Office, Zukunft – Umwelt – Gesellschaft (ZUG) gGmbH	164	Annex B: Review question matrix (page 43)	IKI Office at ZUG	<b>Edits made.</b>
IKI	165	Annex D	ZUG gGmbH (referring to IKI, two times mentioned)	<b>Edits made.</b>
GFFO	166	Recommendation 2	the decision for a move to UNDP has now been taken. This should be reflected in the wording.	<b>Edits made:</b> footnote added.
GFFO	167	Recommendation 5	while we support that a focus on both decarbonisation and energy access is valid, the SC has most recently clearly expressed a particular focus on the energy access needs. This promises the strongest impact for local communities and value for money in terms of CO2/GHG reduction. This should be reflected in writing as part of recommendation 5.	<b>No edits:</b> the recommendation is higher-level – only that a dual focus be retained.
UNDP	168	Executive Summary	Please clarify that the situation refers to the improvement of the capacity of the DHE Secretariat. It is also important to note that multiple actions have contributed to the improving the situation, including the transfer of the chairing of the SC to the alternate chair in Dec. 2024, and the overall improvement of the capacity of the Secretariat.	<b>No edits:</b> this finding refers to the whole DHE, not just the Secretariat.
UNDP	169	2.1.4 (page 1)	Has this total amount been expended or allocated to projects budget? This is an important precision as we understand that Programme Partners are currently in the process of financial closure and may return unused funds from the approved budget to the MPTF.	<b>Edits made</b> as per comment 30 above.

UNDP	170	4.1.1 (page 6)	It is important to note that the efforts of the GPA were and are broader than an individual and is steered by a partnership, although recognizing the leadership that this individual has had in driving the GPA and humanitarian decarbonization agenda forward.	<b>PPME: Agreed:</b> Sentence shortened and reference to individual removed in response to two comments received.
UNDP	171	4.1.4 (page 6)	Rather the retrofitting the programmatic features, it was an exercise of operationalizing the programmatic features as per the established MPTF Fund structure.	<b>No edits:</b> disagree that this is a more accurate description.
UNDP	172	4.2.1 (page 7)	Hosted (correction refer to “operated”	<b>Agreed:</b> changed to ‘hosted’ and footnote added. For details see response under comment 6.
UNDP	173	4.2.5 (page 8)	The team was the overall UNDP ITM (Information and Technology Management) of which the Green Energy Team is a part of.	<b>Agreed:</b> edits made.
UNDP	174	4.2.7 (page 8)	It is important to note that the initial design of the DHE was informed by the GPA partnership which had been working on this topic many years prior to the development of the DHE, with many technical workshop and discussions organized and led around the challenges related to the transition to renewable energy in humanitarian settings.	As for comments 64-68, <b>agreed, and edits made:</b> this para (and associated finding) was not well written / framed. The text has been amended to confirm the extent of pre-DHE consultation with humanitarian actors. However, there is still a (less forceful) point to be made about limited engagement during the inception / <i>detailed</i> design phase.
UNDP	175	4.2.10 (page 9)	Please note that many donors, including Germany and the EU suspended aid to Niger after the coup: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/germany-suspends-aid-to-niger-cooperation-after-coup">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/germany-suspends-aid-to-niger-cooperation-after-coup</a>	<b>No edits:</b> as per comments 76-78 above, it is important to present this external perception here (even if those perceptions are based on incomplete info) as those



				perceptions were held by multiple stakeholders. The foregoing text does make the justification for pausing work in Niger sufficiently clear.
UNDP	176	4.4.3 (page 11)	While recognizing that there were discussions amongst UNDP and NORCAP regarding some implementation aspects of the 7-Step Process, we do not consider that these can be qualified as tensions. Ultimately these discussions were translated into clarifications that allowed the development of a number of Business Cases on the ground.	<b>No edits:</b> as per comment 157 above, this was the MTR's finding, based on multiple interviews / perspectives.
UNDP	178	4.4.3 (page 11)	Proposed Roles & Responsibilities were shared and discussed but where never formalized.	<b>Partly agreed:</b> multiple interviewees indicated that the roles were not clearly communicated, but text amended to indicate that neither were R&Rs formalised.
UNDP	179	4.4.3 (page 11)	<p>In regard to the qualification of the 7-step as rigid, it is important to note that it is a well established methodology, recognized by the United Nations Sustainable Development Group as best practice (<a href="#">BOS Practice Notes - Green Energy Solar Solution-v2.pdf</a>). UNDP has deployed this methodology extensively. During the first five year of implementation of UNDP Greening Moonshot, our Corporate target of reducing UNDP's corporate carbon footprint by 50% by 2030, 101 green energy and 81 e-mobility projects have been funded, reducing the organization's energy carbon footprint by almost 17% and saving UNDP over \$19 million in energy cost, during the lifetime of the investments. A large share of these projects have been implemented applying the 7-Step Process and with the support of UNDP Green Energy Team.</p> <p>As such it is important to differentiate issues that may arise from the single solution of CCES originally pursued by the DHE, with the issues related to the 7-Step process.</p>	<b>No edits:</b> para 4.2.5 indicates that the methodology is well-established. Para 4.4.3 then discusses the application of the methodology within the context of DHE / CCES.

UNDP	180	4.4.3 (page 11)	As per the above comment (referring to: “was too technocratic and insufficiently contextualised”	<b>No edits</b> , as per comment 179 above.
UNDP	181	4.4.6 (page 11)	While recognizing significant delays and issues related to the distribution of roles and responsibilities for the development of a financial de-risking instrument, it is important to note that during Q1 2025 UNDP, upon request of the SC and Secretariat UNDP engaged with UNCDF to prepare a Roadmap for developing and establishing a De-Risking Facility (DRF) in the context of the Decarbonizing Humanitarian Energy (DHE) Programme	<b>No edits</b> : the latest advances are well-acknowledged (and positively assessed) in paras 4.5.2, key finding 13, and recommendation 5.
UNDP	182	4.4.7 (page 12)	In addition, there were some overlap between the work packages, which added further complexities in their implementation.	<b>No edits</b> : the para already notes that overlapping mandates was part of the problem.
UNDP	183	4.5.1 (page 13)	<p>The Decision to suspend the implementation of the DHE and focus on a re-structuring was taken by the SC and UNDP supported this decision. At the 18<sup>th</sup> SC meeting which took place in April 2025, UNDP Reiterated “its position as voiced during the previous SC meeting (March 4th, 2025) and recommended throughout this process – [noting that] this is not just an MTR, it is a restructuring process and UNDP anticipates that the structure of the DHE may change significantly.</p> <p>Therefore, UNDP supports a suspension of activities, to focus on the restructuring and likely reinitiating activities through a different structure and implementation modality. As such, the team composition may also be very different.”</p>	<b>Edits made</b> in line with comments 110-114 and 158 above.
UNDP	184	4.5.3 (page 13)	The extraordinary SC meeting objective was to discuss more broadly the issue of the Secretariat capacity, staffing and stability and to seeking a management solution. This resulted in the request to the Secretariat to assess alternative hosting arrangements, in line with what recommendation 2 and 3 of the draft MTR. Please reformulate to reflect the above.	<b>Edits made</b> in line with comment 116 above.

UNDP	185	5.4.3 (page 18)	<p>The 7-step process can provide this support from the assessment (step-1) until the Operation &amp; Maintenance of the Systems (step-7). However, in its initial iteration the DHE focused on deploying support and resources for step 1 Energy Audit &amp; Assessment Using IoT Devices and 2. Business Case. If resources were made available by the humanitarian agencies or the DHE, support could have been provided throughout the 7 steps.</p>	<p><b>No edits:</b> it is important to represent the perspectives of participating ETPs and other stakeholders. If the 7-step methodology can address the gaps identified by partners, then DHE can take that into account when planning the next phase/s of work.</p>
UNDP	186	5.4.4 (page 18)	<p>It is important to note that the business cases (step 2) are elaborated based on estimates informed by recent interventions and Long-Term Agreements with technology providers. During Step 3, Procurement, bidding process are undertaken to identify the best value for money. The strategy for procurement is also developed based on specific market conditions (eg. Local vs international). The core governing principle in UNDP's procurement is to obtain the best value for money. Best value for money should not be equated with the lowest price. It requires an integrated assessment of technical, organizational and pricing factors in light of their relative importance (i.e., reliability, quality, experience, reputation, past performance, cost/fee and reasonableness). Parameters can also include social, environmental and other strategic objectives defined in the procurement plan.</p> <p>No business cases performed for the DHE have yet moved with UNDP support to this subsequent step, as such it would be difficult to confirm this observation with specific and comparable quotes.</p>	<p><b>No edits:</b> it is important to represent the perspectives of participating ETPs and other stakeholders. If the 7-step methodology can address the gaps identified by partners, then DHE can take that into account when planning the next phase/s of work.</p>
UNDP	187	Recommendation 2 (page 20)	<p>A decision to transition the Secretariat was now adopted in the <u>20th meeting of the DHE Steering Committee (SC)</u>. The final version of the MTR may want to reflect this.</p>	<p><b>Edits made:</b> footnote added.</p>