



African Union

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program

Operational Guidance Note

DDR and Countering Violent Extremism

African Union Commission

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

December 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	Introducing the Operational Guidance Note on DDR and CVE	6
1.1	DDR in Africa	6
1.2	DDR and the African Union	6
1.3	Operational Guidance Notes on DDR	7
1.4	OGN on DDR and CVE	7
1.5	DDR in traditional contexts	8
1.6	DDR in Violent Extremist Environments	9
1.7	The Overlap between DDR and CVE in Africa	10
2.	Concepts and Definitions	13
2.1	Terrorism	13
2.2	Violent Extremism (Conducive to Terrorism)	14
2.3	Radicalization (Extremism) Conducive to Terrorism	15
2.4	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)	16
2.5	Disengagement	16
2.6	Deradicalization	16
2.7	Counter-terrorism	16
2.8	Screening	18
2.9	Prosecution	18
2.10	Rehabilitation	18
2.11	Reintegration	18
2.12	Detention	18
3.	African and International Instruments	19
4.	Understanding Violent Extremist Environments	24
4.1	Drivers of and Journeys to Extremism Conducive to Terrorism	24
4.2	The Evolution of P/CVE	29
4.3	Exposing Sponsors of Violent Extremism	29

5.	Screening	30
5.1	Persons Associated with Terrorist Organizations	30
5.2	General Screening Considerations	32
5.3	Defining screening criteria	32
5.4	risk assessments and rehabilitation	33
6.	Prosecution and Detention.....	34
6.1	National CT Frameworks	35
6.2	Detention	36
6.3	Regional Cooperation	37
7.	Rehabilitating Persons Associated with Terrorist Groups	37
7.1	What is Rehabilitation?	38
7.2	Means of Rehabilitation	38
7.3	Disengagement	38
7.4	Deradicalization	39
7.5	Activities in Transitional Centers/Rehabilitation Facilities:	41
7.6	Rehabilitation in Prisons	43
8.	Reintegration	45
8.1	PARTICIPATION in Reintegration programs	45
	8.1.1 Reintegration after Screening.....	45
	8.1.2 Reintegration after Rehabilitation.....	45
8.2	Reintegration of Persons Associated with Terrorist Groups	46
8.3	Transitional Justice	46
9.	Cross-cutting issues	47
9.1	Planning for DDR ACTIVITIES	47
9.2	Mitigating Risks of Engagement	49
10.	Meeting the Needs of Specific Groups	51
10.1	Women	51

10.2	Children	53
10.3	Persons with Disabilities	55
11.	Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)	57

ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AGA	African Governance Architecture
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CADSP	Common Africa Defense and Security Policy
CT	Counterterrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRCP	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Capacity Program
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSD	(African Union) Defense and Security Division
FTFs	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GCTS	Global Counterterrorism Strategy
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
IDDRS	United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OGNs	Operational Guidance Notes
OROLSI	United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in Africa
OSASG	Office of the Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General
PCRDP	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy
PSD	(African Union) Peace and Security Department
PSOs	(African Union) Peace Support Operations
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RECs/RMs	Regional Economic Communities / Regional Mechanisms
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
VE	Violent Extremism

1. INTRODUCING THE OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE NOTE ON DDR AND CVE

1.1 DDR IN AFRICA

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has been a critical component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Africa, and elsewhere, since the late 1980s. Today, the African Union (AU) and its member states are increasingly relying on DDR initiatives to address the security threat that emerges when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks following armed conflicts. Moreover, the DDR section of the United Nations (UN) Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) is supporting DDR processes across UN peacekeeping operations in Africa¹, as well as several special political missions in collaboration with relevant United Nations Country Teams and operational organizations such as IOM, UNDP, UNICEF and UN Women². DDR has thus become a crucial element in peace processes and serves as a confidence-building tool.

1.2 DDR AND THE AFRICAN UNION

DDR initiatives are significant for the attainment of peace, security and stability in Africa. In light of this, the AU is working to consolidate the capacity of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to provide support for DDR efforts in Africa.

The mandate of the AU Commission to support DDR is contained within the 2004 Common Africa Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), and in the 2006 Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRDP). The APSA Roadmap (2011–2013) specifically stipulates that DDR must: “be integrated into the entire peace process, from the initial peace negotiations through peacekeeping and follow-on peace building activities.” It also recognized that whilst, historically, many DDR programs have often fallen under the auspices of the UN, there is increasing demand for the AU to play a strengthened role, particularly given the growing number of AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) including DDR activities.

Building on progress achieved, the APSTA roadmap (2016-2020) identified the need to continue to enhance the capacities of the African Union Commission (AUC), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and Member States to meet the DDR challenges in post-conflict African countries³. Under Strategic Priority 3 (Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding), the Roadmap outlines strategies envisaged to reach this objective, including the development of DDR policy documents to harmonize continental language on DDR.

¹ Namely in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Darfur (UNAMID), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Mali (MINUSMA), and South Sudan (UNMISS).

² Namely in Libya (UNSMIL), and Somalia (UNSOM), as well as the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General in Burundi (OSASG-Burundi)

³ African Union Commission, Peace and Security Department, *APSTA Roadmap (2016-2020)*, (Addis Ababa: AUC, December 2015), p.45, available from: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf> .

1.3 OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE NOTES ON DDR

As part of efforts to build the capacity of APSA, the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) - through its Defense and Security Division (DSD) - has developed a series of Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) covering several aspects of DDR. These OGNs aim to provide African stakeholders with practical guidance on the planning and implementation of DDR programs. The following OGNs have been produced:

- DDR and Children
- DDR and National Frameworks
- DDR and Reintegration
- DDR and Foreign Fighters
- DDR and Women
- DDR and Detention

Completed OGNs can be downloaded via the Defense and Security Division DDR web page at: <http://ddr.peaceau.org/en/>

While cognizant of the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), the OGNs are compliant with international best practice and complementary to existing DDR frameworks, most notably the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). Human rights considerations have also been integrated into the OGNs, in line with international and African human rights standards.

1.4 OGN ON DDR AND CVE

This OGN aims to provide African DDR practitioners and stakeholders with operational guidance on the growing overlap between DDR and the emerging field of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) as it relates to the screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals associated with armed groups designated as terrorist organizations (hereafter, persons associated with terrorist groups) by AU member states and/or the United Nations. It also aims to address Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and communities who engage with DDR programs and play a vital role in the process of screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of persons associated with terrorist groups.

Specifically, the OGN aims to:

- 1- Improve DDR practitioners' understanding of the characteristic features of violent extremist environments and their implications for DDR programming;
- 2- Take stock of lessons learnt and good practices emerging from African - and other - experiences in the screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of persons associated with terrorist groups; and
- 3- Provide operational guidance on the reintegration of persons associated with terrorist groups.

The OGN is informed by relevant international and African legal and policy instruments, as well as a thorough literature review. It benefited from extensive consultations with practitioners, experts and

stakeholders, including through two expert workshops, organized by the AUC in Addis Ababa in December 2017, and by the AUC – in cooperation with the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA) - in Cairo, Egypt in July 2018.

In the absence of international standards or guidance on the topic, this OGN is based on the current state of knowledge. It is hence subject to corrections, expansion, modification and regular revision.

1.5 DDR IN TRADITIONAL CONTEXTS

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants (re)join mainstream society, (re)gaining sustainable employment and income, and becoming again a recognized and respected citizen. Reintegration is essentially a social, economic and political process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance. *

The above definitions⁴ describe the programmatic pillars of traditional DDR, pursued with the following preconditions:

⁴ For more information, see: <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs.aspx>

- 1- a peace agreement is in place, providing the legal framework for DDR programming;
- 2- trust in the peace process;
- 3- willingness of the parties to engage in DDR; and
- 4- minimum guarantee of security.

Today, however, DDR is being called upon in environments, where some - or all - of these preconditions do not exist.

1.6 DDR IN VIOLENT EXTREMIST ENVIRONMENTS

DDR has traditionally been viewed as an important tool to prevent conflict relapse and the recurrence of violence in post-conflict situations. However, DDR practitioners are now called upon in cases of active conflict, where there may or may not be a peace agreement in place, or where the peace agreement is targeted by a wide array of spoilers, including terrorist groups and individuals. DDR activities also often take place in the shadow of robust peace support missions (such as AMISOM) and/or counterterrorism operations (such as in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region) against the very groups that DDR seeks to engage⁵. While there may be no specific legal requirement mandating the launch of a DDR program, general frameworks of international human rights law and international humanitarian law apply and may include specific DDR requirements for instance, under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

Environments of extremism conducive to terrorism (hereafter referred to as “violent extremist environments”) are characterized by the following:

- 1- **The nexus between conflict and terrorism:** According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index (GTI)⁶, much of the growth of global terrorist incidents in the last decade has been inspired by, or a direct outgrowth of, ongoing large-scale armed conflict, with 91 percent of all terrorist attacks and 95 percent of all terrorism-related deaths in 2016 occurring in countries that are involved in an armed conflict. This could not be truer than in African countries, which make up more than half of the 22 countries with the highest impact of terrorism in the world.
- 2- **The complex (and hybrid) nature of violence** carried out by a myriad of terrorist organizations (often tied to international criminal networks or involved in organized crime themselves), foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), and violent extremists with no clear organizational ties to terrorist organizations.
- 3- **Unamenable to political solutions:** the ideological nature of violent extremism conducive to terrorism turns conflicts into an existential zero-sum conflict with their rejection of the concept of statehood as a framework of governance, putting them beyond the reach of the international community’s traditional toolbox of conflict management and resolution.

⁵ Cockayne, j. and O’Neil, S. (2015), “UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose?”, United Nations University, P.7. Available at: <https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6149/UNDDRinAnEraofViolentExtremism.pdf>

⁶ The Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2017”. P.62. Available at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf>

- 4- **Protracted conflicts:** related to the above, violent extremist conflicts tend to be deadlier, costlier and more protracted, with civilians bearing the brunt of the suffering including gross human rights violations and wanton destruction of property.
- 5- **The transnational nature of the terrorist threat:** African terrorist organizations tend to operate beyond the national boundaries of their state of origin. They also tend to join global terrorist networks to improve their status, enhance their capabilities, and expand their pools of recruitment.

1.7 THE OVERLAP BETWEEN DDR AND CVE IN AFRICA

DDR activities are now being pursued during fully-fledged armed conflicts that lack the basic preconditions for DDR as laid out in the IDDRS. In addition, conflicts feature the active participation of violent extremist groups, many of which are listed as terrorist organizations by the UN. Thus they fall under the framework of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism regime with far-reaching political and legal repercussions for DDR.

In recognition of the above, DDR is being increasingly called upon in contexts of extremism conducive to terrorism, presenting practitioners with complex legal and operational challenges, and bringing to the forefront critical questions about when, how and with whom to engage⁷. In Somalia, for example, DDR is called upon to facilitate the reintegration of persons formerly associated with al-Shabaab into communities, while in Nigeria, reintegration programs are used to incentivize defection from Boko Haram.

This growing overlap between DDR and CVE was recognized by the international counterterrorism framework. In Resolution 2396 (2017), adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC called upon member states to assess and investigate suspected individuals whom they have reasonable grounds to believe are terrorists, including suspected foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), “to develop and implement comprehensive risk assessments for those individuals, and to take appropriate action, including by considering appropriate prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration measures in compliance with domestic and international law”⁸. The resolution went further, however, to call on member states to extend their support to countries of the Lake Chad region to develop and implement disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies⁹.

⁷ Muggah, R. & O'Donnell, C., (2015), “Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development.” Available at: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fs>

⁸ Security Council resolution 2349 (2017), Peace and security in Africa, S/RES/2349 (31 March 2017), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2349>

⁹ Ibid.

The International Counter-Terrorism Legal Framework is comprised of UNSC resolutions, especially Chapter VII resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017), as well as 19 international counter-terrorism instruments or conventions which have been widely ratified by United Nations Member States. Resolution 1373 (2001) calls on Member States “to bring terrorists to justice”, while resolution 2178 (2014) calls on Member States to develop “prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters” and Resolution 2396 (2017) calls on Member States “to assess and investigate suspected individuals whom they have reasonable grounds to believe are terrorists, ... to develop and implement comprehensive risk assessments for those individuals, and to take appropriate action, including by considering appropriate prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration measures... in compliance with domestic and international law.”

In light of the above, there is growing debate about the merits of expanding the parameters of DDR. On one hand, some experts have argued that the fundamental changes in the dynamics of organized violence, partly because of the spread of violent extremism conducive to terrorism in Africa and the Middle East, combined with the rising expectations of DDR in contexts of peacebuilding, state-building and CVE, make such an expansion worth considering¹⁰. Others have cautioned against stretching the parameters of DDR, arguing that while programs, such as disengagement and deradicalization, share traits with DDR, they should be treated separately¹¹. A third group has called for the development of a new practice framework on the “Demobilization and Disengagement of Violent Extremists” (DDVE)¹². Moreover, with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions, such as Resolution 2396 (2017) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, member states were called upon to develop screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for domestic and foreign terrorist fighters.

Despite these competing arguments, respect for international law and standards remains central to the design and implementation of all DDR programs. For instance, UNSC Resolution 2349 (2017) calls upon states to ensure that measures adopted to counter terrorism comply with normative standards set under international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law.¹³

States and actors involved in DDR-CVE should appreciate the positive contribution of the right to freedom of expression, in particular by media and new technologies such as the internet as well as the full respect for freedom to seek, receive and impart information.¹⁴ Freedom of expression is particularly useful in the fight against racism, xenophobia and intolerance which are factors that can lead to violent extremism.¹⁵ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 19 does not permit any exceptions to or restrictions to hold an opinion. However, Article 19(3) allows restriction of

¹⁰ Muggah, R. & O'Donnell, C., (2015), “Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”, *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. Available at: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fs>

¹¹ James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen (2016), “Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation”, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Available at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf

¹² Cockayne, J. and O'Neil, S. (2015), “UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose?”, United Nations University. P.7. Available at: <https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6149/UNDDRinAnEraofViolentExtremism.pdf>

¹³ Para 9.

¹⁴ General Assembly Resolution 68/127 on *A world against violence and violent extremism*.

¹⁵ Ibid.

expression of views as provided by law and to the extent necessary for protection of national security, public order or of public health or morals, or for the respect of the rights or reputation of others.

2. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

2.1 TERRORISM

There is no universally agreed upon definition of terrorism, and the designation/listing of terrorist organizations can be highly politicized and at times arbitrary. Rather than defining terrorism, the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism¹⁶ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) defined what constitutes a “terrorist act.” Article 1-3 of the Convention defines “terrorist acts” to mean:

- (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party, and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
 - i. intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
 - ii. disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
 - iii. create general insurrection in a State;
- (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).

Similarly in 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Resolution 1566¹⁷, defined “terrorist acts” as: “Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

It should be noted, however, that the OAU Convention went a step further than UNSCR 1566 to differentiate between terrorism and “peoples’ legitimate struggle for liberation.” Article (3) of the convention stipulates:

1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.

¹⁶ OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Algiers, 14 July 1999, Organization of African Unity, available from: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/OAU-english.pdf>

¹⁷ Security Council resolution 1566, Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, S/RES/1566 (8 October 2004), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1566>

2. Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defense against a terrorist act.

2.2 VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CONDUCTIVE TO TERRORISM)

Like terrorism, there is no universally agreed upon definition of “violent extremism” (VE). According to the 2015 United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, “violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief.”

The Plan of Action on PVE states that “definitions of terrorism and violent extremism are the prerogative of Member States. However, they must be consistent with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law.” The Plan goes on to suggest that following the lead of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which has taken a practical approach in adopting - by consensus - the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, it will pursue a practical approach to PVE, without venturing to address questions of definition.

Available definitions for violent extremism include “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives”¹⁸; and “a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature” (Australian National Counter-Terrorism Committee)¹⁹.

A critical point that should be highlighted, however, is that the UN Plan of Action on PVE considers and addresses violent extremism only as, and when, conducive to terrorism²⁰, to avoid the wanton targeting of entire communities unjustly perceived by national authorities as associated with violent extremism which would undermine the legitimacy of, and lead to a backlash against, the prevention program. A year earlier, in its resolution 2178 (2014), the Security Council made explicit the link between violent extremism and terrorism: “violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism,” requires collective efforts, “including preventing radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters.”



While the above leaves the definition of VE open for various interpretations, it also allows for its contextualization. Practitioners can develop and agree on a “working definition” relevant to the context

¹⁸ Brown, Melissa et al. (2011) “The development response to violent extremism and insurgency”, USAID: P.2. Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf.

¹⁹ Nasser-Eddine M., Garnham B., Agostino K. and Caluya G., (2011), “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review”. The Australian Government, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre: P.9. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a543686.pdf>

²⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 (24 December 2015), available from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

in which they operate²¹, while taking into consideration the relativity of this term in accordance with societal norms and what is considered to be “extreme.”

2.3 RADICALIZATION (EXTREMISM) CONDUCTIVE TO TERRORISM

As and when conducive to terrorism, radicalization has been defined as the process of joining a terrorist group and/or supporting the violent pursuit of a radical political and/or religious agenda. In these cases, radicalization is usually characterized by binary thinking (us/them), an inability to accept alternative viewpoints, and the dehumanization of the other (the enemy).

It should be noted, however, that being a “radical” individual or to espouse “extremist” views is not necessarily a problem. Many radical individuals and movements, whose views were perceived as a departure from the “norm” in society, have been important drivers of positive social and political change, without resorting to violence.²² In other words, not all radicalization and extremism is conducive to terrorism. Moreover, not all members of terrorist groups are necessarily radicalized. (Not that they are any less culpable than hardened members and should indeed be held accountable on a par with other more “radical” members).

Radicalization is not always an individually driven process; it could also be a collective macro-societal process afflicting entire communities. Such “mass radicalization” is underpinned by a sense of “moral outrage” over perceived injustices that a community is being subjected to by the reigning state authorities. In such settings, the relative deprivation of one community when juxtaposed with the benefits enjoyed by other communities is usually the underlying reason for the radicalization of the former.



It is to be noted that, since violent extremist groups are often inclined to operate in a decentralized and secretive manner, their detection becomes problematic. Therefore, states may try to capture manifestations of radicalization early on in an approach which prioritizes security over the protection of human rights.²³ However, as noted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, this could risk infringement of absolute rights (freedom of belief and thought) and hinders the ability to apply limitations on human rights in a manner that is impartial and objective.²⁴

²¹ Simpson R. and Holdaway L.(2018), Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming, UNDP and International Alert, Available at: [http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/Dem Gov/improving-the-impact-of-preventing-violent-extremism-programming.html](http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/Dem%20Gov/improving-the-impact-of-preventing-violent-extremism-programming.html)

²² United Nations Development Programme, Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity, (New York: UNDP, 2016), available from <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/preventing-violent-extremism-through-promoting-inclusive-develop.html>

²³ United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Report on best practices and lessons learned on how protecting and promoting human rights contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism A/HRC/33/29 para 12.

²⁴ Ibid.

2.4 PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (P/CVE)

CVE is generally understood to include a broad range of policies, non-coercive approaches, programs and interventions aimed to counter/reduce the terrorist threat of existing terrorist groups and individuals²⁵. PVE, on the other hand, is understood to include preventative approaches, programs and interventions aimed to address the root causes of extremism conducive to terrorism, to improve community resilience and to stem the recruitment of individuals into terrorist organizations²⁶. It should be noted, however, that the two terms are used interchangeably by some.

2.5 DISENGAGEMENT

Disengagement programs and interventions aim to introduce a change in behavior (such as refraining from violence, defecting from a terrorist organization, etc.), but not necessarily a change in beliefs²⁷. In other words, a person might abandon violence, but still espouse radical or extremist views.

2.6 DERADICALIZATION

Deradicalization programs and interventions aim to introduce cognitive changes to an individual's belief system, leading them to renounce extremist ideologies conducive to terrorism²⁸. As such, deradicalization aims to achieve a deeper level of cognitive change and transformation than disengagement.



Similar to “radicalization,” “deradicalization” both as a term and as a programmatic intervention is highly controversial. Although individual freedoms of belief and thought (as granted under Article 18 of the ICCPR) should not be derogated from, restrictions could also be prescribed by law and could be “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” as stated by UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 22²⁹.

2.7 COUNTER-TERRORISM

Counterterrorism is generally understood to include a range of interventions that are focused on military tactics, law enforcement, intelligence and measures to counter and deal with the financing of

²⁵ Security Council resolution 2178, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, S/RES/2178 (24 September 2014), available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29

²⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 (24 December 2015), available from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

²⁷ Horgan, J (2009), “Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements”, Georgia State University, Routledge.


²⁸ Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2010) ‘Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalisation Programs’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22: 267-91.

²⁹ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion) 30 July 1993CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 para 1 and para 8.

terrorist activities or groups³⁰. The range of measures often included in counterterrorism efforts and to which member states of the UN committed to taking forward, can be found in UNSC resolutions, as well as the Global Counterterrorism Strategy (GCTS), adopted by the UNGA in 2006³¹.

Counter-terrorism measures vary across a wide spectrum of interventions that may include military/law enforcement operations, as well as prosecutorial tactics ranging from pre-trial detention to potential offenders to post-conviction incarceration.

To better understand the spectrum of interventions and their overlap under the frameworks of PVE, CVE and CT, UN DPKO has developed the below illustrative diagram.



³⁰ General Assembly resolution 60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, A/RES/60/288 (20 September 2006), available from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement>

³¹ Although the GCTS suggests a wide range of measures, including the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, CT as a term is often commonly used to describe measures more related to security and legal responses rather than wider social and political efforts.

2.8 SCREENING

The initial process of determining the main profile of a person, currently in the custody of authorities or under the responsibility of authorities, to recommend particular treatment, including further investigation or prosecution, rehabilitation and/or reintegration³².

2.9 PROSECUTION

Legal proceedings carried out against a criminal suspect or accused by a prosecutor that can lead to the trial of such person for having committed a criminal offense.

2.10 REHABILITATION

The measures undertaken to support the transition from being associated with terrorist groups to a citizen of the community, abandoning the use of violence to achieve change, generating income to cater for families' needs and avoiding recidivism³³. In violent extremist environments, efforts to support rehabilitation may often take place in prisons or detention-like conditions and centers. They may also often include efforts towards deradicalization and/or disengagement.

2.11 REINTEGRATION

The set of economic, social, psychosocial/health, security measures undertaken at the community level, aimed to support individuals and communities formerly associated with an armed 'terrorist' group to re-join their families and/or communities, becoming a member of society and a citizen and, gaining sustainable employment and income³⁴.

2.12 DETENTION

For the purposes of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (General Assembly resolution 43/173, annex), a "Detained Person" means "any person deprived of personal liberty, except as a result of conviction for an offence."³⁵

³² *ibid*

³³ *ibid*

³⁴ *ibid*

³⁵ General Assembly resolution 43/173, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, A/RES/43/173 (9 December 1988), available from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r173.htm>

3. AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

Below are the key universal and regional legal instruments, policy frameworks and operational guidance of relevance to dealing with persons associated with terrorist organizations in the context of DDR. An exhaustive list of instruments can be found in Annex 1.

Instrument	Features/Key Points
<p>The Common Africa Defense and Security Policy (CADSP)</p>	<p>This policy was adopted at a meeting of AU Heads of State and Government in February 2004, and was premised on a common African perception of what is required to be done collectively by African States to ensure that Africa’s common defense and security interests and goals are safeguarded in the face of common threats to the continent. The CADSP declares that: <i>“The Peace and Security Council shall work towards the consolidation of peace agreements that have been negotiated; the establishment of conditions for political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and government institutions; the implementation of DDR programs, including those relating to child soldiers.”</i>³⁶</p> <p>Among other principles, the CADSP is informed by respect for human rights, rule of law and good governance.³⁷ The CADSP also recognizes African human rights treaties as part of instruments that guide its implementation.</p>
<p>Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRDP)</p>	<p>Building on the provisions of the CADSP, the 2006 AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) states that AU Member States emerging from conflict must: <i>“Plan and implement comprehensive and well-blended disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programs, as a basis for consolidating safety and security”.</i>³⁸</p>
<p>Agenda 2063</p>	<p>Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework for the socioeconomic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It includes a set of aspirations on peace and security, good governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law.</p> <p>Importantly it stresses the importance of establishing operational and policy linkages between work on Peace and Security, Governance and Human Rights. Establishing such linkages and interconnections is recognized as important when dealing with new DDR contexts.</p>

³⁶ AU (2004) SOLEMN DECLARATION ON A COMMON AFRICAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY, available at: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf>

³⁷ Ibid para 11.

³⁸ AU(2006) POLICY ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, available at: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policy-framwovowork-eng.pdf>

<p>The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Roadmaps (2011-2013 and 2016-2020)</p>	<p>The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) refers to the overall set of norms, structures, capacities and procedures established to enable the AU to carry out its tasks in the field of peace and security.</p>
	<p>The APSA Roadmap states (2013-2015) that DDR should <i>“be integrated into entire peace processes, from the initial peace negotiations through peacekeeping and follow-on peace building activities. This therefore calls for collaboration with relevant Units within the Peace and Security Department, and also with other relevant Departments. DDR on the continent is currently being undertaken under the auspices of the UN, but there is increasing demand for a strengthened role of the AU.”</i>³⁹</p>
	<p>One of the objectives of the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 is enhancement of the ‘capacities of AUC, RECs/RMs and Member States to meet the DDR challenges in post-conflict African countries.’⁴⁰ Under this objective the Roadmap has five strategies. The Roadmap states that: <i>‘The first strategy is geared towards mainstreaming gender through supporting DDR-related gender-sensitive activities that are also responsive to the needs of children and other marginalized and vulnerable groups. The second strategy consists of supporting DDR capacity building for Member States, RECs/RMs and AU peace support operations, including through the deployment of AU sponsored DDR experts. The third strategy entails the development of DDR policy documents, SOPs and training material to harmonize continental language on DDR. The fourth strategy involves convening a number of DDR forums in support of regional and continental dialogue on DDR. Finally, Member States will be assisted in fundraising for national DDR activities and in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the DDR processes they are engaged in. These strategies will be implemented in close collaboration with the United Nations and other international partners and organizations.’</i>⁴¹</p>
<p>African Governance Architecture (AGA)</p>	<p>The AGA promotes and protects human and people’s rights, the consolidation of democratic institutions, the assurance of good governance and respect to the rule of law.⁴²</p>
<p>OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999)</p>	<p>Article 1(3) of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and</p>

³⁹ AU (2016) Progress and Practice Brief: A Review of the AU DDR Capacity Programme (2013-2015) available at: <http://ddr.peaceau.org/uploads/final-ddr-progress-practice-brief-may-2016.pdf>

⁴⁰ The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Roadmap 2016-2020, p 44.

⁴¹ Ibid p 45.

⁴² For more information, see: <http://aga-platform.org/about>

	<p>Combating of Terrorism, 1999:</p> <p>“Terrorist act” means: (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii) create general insurrection in a State; (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).”</p> <p>The Convention under Article 22 provides that its provisions should not be interpreted as derogating from general principles of international law particularly the principles of International Humanitarian Law and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.</p>
<p>The African Model Anti-Terrorism Law</p>	<p>The main objective of this law is domestication of OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999)</p>
<p>African Charter on Humans and People’s Rights</p>	<p>This Charter is the main legal African instrument that should be abided by when implementing DDR programs. Rights entitled to individuals should be respected and initiative to promote these rights should be undertaken to avoid the transformation of youth into violent extremists due to gross human rights violations.</p>
<p>United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)</p>	<p>These Standards provide DDR practitioners the opportunity to make informed decisions based on a clear, flexible and in-depth body of guidance across the range of DDR activities. The Standards serve as a common foundation for the commencement of integrated operational planning in Headquarters and at the country level; and functions as a resource for the training of DDR specialists.⁴³</p> <p>The IDDRS emphasize respect for human rights in the design and implementation of DDR activities. Measures taken under DDR initiatives should be ‘designed to prevent those who have committed violations of human rights from going unpunished</p>

⁴³ For more information, see: <http://www.unndr.org/iddrs.aspx>

	<p>and to ensure that DDR programs do not operate as a reward system for the worst violators.’ Also, the IDDRS require all DDR interventions to be evaluated at all times against the ‘Do No Harm’ principle. DDR interventions should not be founded on false promises, and should not make individuals and communities less secure.</p> <p>The 2014 Operational Guide to the IDDRS notes that in preparing DDR programs there should be a framework that defines how inputs, activities and outputs will produce outcomes and how each of these outcomes will contribute to the overall goal of the program.⁴⁴</p>
<p>United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)</p>	<p>The Resolution urges UN Member States to adjust their national laws to ensure that terrorist acts are established as acts of criminal offence and that the seriousness of such acts are duly reflected in sentences served. It establishes the prima facie obligation of “bringing terrorists to justice”</p>
<p>United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014)</p>	<p>The resolution calls on Member States to develop “prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters. Also, the Resolution reaffirms that: <i>“measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, underscoring that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with effective counter-terrorism measures, and are an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort and notes the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and combat terrorism, and noting that failure to comply with these and other international obligations, including under the Charter of the United Nations, is one of the factors contributing to increased radicalization to violence and fosters a sense of impunity..”</i></p>
<p>United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017)</p>	<p>The resolution calls on Member States “to assess and investigate suspected individuals whom they have reasonable grounds to believe are terrorists, ... to develop and implement comprehensive risk assessments for those individuals, and to take appropriate action, including by considering appropriate prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration measures... in compliance with domestic and international law”</p> <p>The Resolution also reaffirms that: <i>“Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, underscoring</i></p>

⁴⁴ Pg 71.

	<p><i>that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with effective counter-terrorism measures, and are an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort and notes the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and combat terrorism, and noting that failure to comply with these and other international obligations, including under the Charter of the United Nations, is one of the factors contributing to increased radicalization to violence and fosters a sense of impunity.”</i></p>
<p>International Counter-Terrorism Framework</p>	<p>In addition to the three UNSC resolutions referred to above, 19 international counterterrorism instruments define different terrorist acts/offenses with clarity and precision, including, but not limited to, offenses related to terrorism financing, the taking of hostages, and terrorist bombing.</p>
<p>Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy</p>	<p>In 2006, UN Member States also agreed on the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which contains practical recommendations on tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building countries capacities to prevent and combat terrorism and ensuring the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism.</p> <p>The Strategy reaffirms that the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law are essential to all its components. The strategy recognizes that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting ends but are complementary and mutually reinforcing.</p> <p>Also the Strategy reaffirms <u>General Assembly resolution 60/158</u> of 16 December 2005 which provides the fundamental framework for the "Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism".</p>

4. UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT EXTREMIST ENVIRONMENTS

4.1 DRIVERS OF AND JOURNEYS TO EXTREMISM CONDUCTIVE TO TERRORISM

Understanding the context and the complex drivers of extremism conducive to terrorism is crucial for DDR practitioners. Based on existing research⁴⁵, the UNSG 2015 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism⁴⁶ distinguishes between two main categories of drivers of violent extremism:

- 1- **“Push Factors”** are conditions conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges.
- 2- **“Pull factors”** are individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action.

The following table illustrates “push” and “pull” factors⁴⁷:

Push Factors	
Lack of socioeconomic opportunities	Poverty and unemployment (especially among youth) lead to grievances and the erosion of government legitimacy. This provides an environment conducive to VE. States that fail to create decent jobs for youth, to increase and sustain levels of growth, to reduce poverty and unemployment, to control corruption, to improve equality and to manage relationships among communities in accordance with their human rights obligations, are more vulnerable to violent extremism and tend to witness a significant number of incidents connected to violent extremism. ⁴⁸ Citizens may regard weak development outcomes as an indication of the lack of government legitimacy, making state institutions less effective in addressing violent extremism when it arises. ⁴⁹ The absence of employment opportunities can make violent extremist groups an attractive source of livelihood.
Marginalization and discrimination	Monopoly over political power and economic opportunity by one group at the expense of other groups, leading to inequality, intercommunal tension, and alienation. This problem is compounded when such discrimination is (perceived to be) along ethnic, racial, tribal, religious and linguistic divisions.

⁴⁵ The Plan of Action calls for more research, both qualitative and quantitative, on this evolving phenomenon.

⁴⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 (24 December 2015), available from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

⁴⁷ Adapted from United Nations, General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 (24 December 2015), available from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

⁴⁸ Ibid, supra note 47, para 25.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Poor governance, violations of human rights and the rule of law	<p>Democratic deficits, repression, rampant corruption, and a widespread culture of impunity for unlawful state behavior heighten the allure of VE among individuals.</p> <p>When poor governance is combined with repressive state policies and practices which infringe human rights as well as the rule of law, the likelihood of violent extremism is increased.</p> <p>Human rights violations committed by state agencies can lead to violent extremism by individuals who are affected or marginalized. Violent extremist groups in certain instances exploit state repression and other grievances to seek support for their activities. Accordingly, repressive and heavy-handed mechanisms that violate human rights and the rule of law, such as the profiling of certain communities, the employment of intrusive surveillance measures and unnecessary prolongation of declared states of emergency, tend to increase the likelihood of joining violent extremist groups.⁵⁰</p>
Prolonged conflicts	<p>Prolonged and unresolved conflicts are likely to provide fertile grounds for violent extremism, not only on the basis of suffering and lack of governance structures resulting from the conflict itself but also because conflicts provide opportunities for violent extremist groups to exploit deep-rooted grievances in order to gain support and seize territories and resources.⁵¹ Failure to resolve conflicts allows insidious narratives propelled by violent extremists to thrive.</p>
Radicalization in prisons	<p>Prisons can be incubators for recruitment by terrorist organizations. This problem is exacerbated in cases of inhumane prison conditions or harsh treatment in detention facilities.</p>
Pull Factors	
Individual backgrounds and motivations	<p>Painful personal experiences which resonate with the narrative of violent extremist ideologies can increase the chances that an individual will embrace violent extremism.⁵² Personal motivations such as witnessing torture, the death of friends or relatives at the hands of state security agencies, and loss of property can heighten one's likelihood to embrace violent extremism. Although educated people play consequential roles in violent extremist groups, many members of violent extremist groups are poorly educated with almost no religious</p>

⁵⁰ Ibid, supra note 47, para 27

⁵¹ Ibid, supra note 47, para 30.

⁵² Ibid, supra note 47, para 33.

	education. This exposes them to the risk of indoctrination. ⁵³
Historical and collective grievances	Historical and collective grievances which result from oppression, domination, foreign intervention, and gross human rights violations can lead to narratives of victimization. This can keep alive emotive reactions which may be exploited by violent extremist groups. This is because the memory of painful past or present perceived or actual domination and repression, if upheld, can give rise to motivations to take revenge against the oppressors. ⁵⁴
Misrepresentation and misuse of religions, ideologies, and ethnic and cultural differences	Claim a religious or moral high ground, invoke a narrative of “us” vs. “them,” dehumanize the “enemy,” and justify the resort to violence and terrorism. Generally, violent extremist organizations thrive on misrepresentation and misuse of religious and political ideologies, ethnic divisions and cultural differences to mobilize support, to establish claims on territories and to recruit individuals. ⁵⁵ Misrepresentation and abuse of religion and political ideologies can be employed to fuel narratives that heighten the likelihood of joining violent extremist groups. This can undermine national unity and lead to violence and violations of human rights. Violent extremist groups such as ISIL, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab thrive on the distortion of religious and political ideologies.
Leadership and social networks	<p>Where historical and painful personal experiences exist, charismatic and political entrepreneurs can exploit them with the aim of fueling violent extremism.⁵⁶ Where governments have been oppressive and wantonly violated human rights, it is easier for charismatic leaders of violent extremist organizations to promote narratives of victimhood that can heighten individuals’ vulnerability to join violent extremist groups.</p> <p>Social networks also make it easier to spread distorted religious ideologies and narratives of victimhood to those who have suffered pain under certain oppressive regimes. This increases the likelihood of embracing violent extremist views.</p>

An alternative analytical framework differentiates between “structural motivators,” “individual incentives,” and “enabling factors”:

⁵³ Ibid, supra note 47, para 34.

⁵⁴ Ibid, supra note 47, para 35.

⁵⁵ Ibid, supra note 47, para 36.

⁵⁶ Ibid, supra note 47, para 37.

- **Structural Motivations:** (very similar to “push factors”) such as repression, unemployment, inequality, discrimination, inter-communal tensions, foreign states’ intervention, etc.⁵⁷
- **Individual Incentives:** such as finding a sense of purpose, belonging, acceptance, status, fear of repercussions by VE entities, expected reward in the afterlife, adventure, etc.
- **Enabling Factors:** such as the presence of radical mentors, access to radical online communities and individuals, access to weaponry, absence of family support, etc. ⁵⁸

All the above factors are prevalent in Africa. A recent report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) African Bureau highlighted this fact, as captured by the below infographic⁵⁹:



It should be noted, however, that while many communities suffer from one or more of the push factors (structural motivations) highlighted above, only a fraction of their members – if at all – follow the journey of extremism conducive to terrorism. Therefore, it is the interaction between the push and pull factors (the structural motivations, individual incentives, and enabling factors) that have the potential to transform the grievances and extremist ideas of some individuals into action.⁶⁰ This needs to be factored into the design and implementation of reintegration initiatives.

A holistic understanding of the host of drivers to violent extremism can help in the design of effective and tailored individual rehabilitation programs based on initial and ongoing assessments of individuals.

⁵⁷ The structural factors closely resemble push factors stated earlier. See page 2 -3

⁵⁸ James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen (2016), “Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation”, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Available at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf

⁵⁹ United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Africa (2017), “Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment”. Available at: <http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf>

⁶⁰ James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen (2016), “Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation”, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Available at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf

It can also help in the design of community-level preventive and responsive programs that aim to mitigate the risk of vulnerable individuals being recruited by violent extremist groups.

The complexity of drivers to radicalization is exacerbated by the fact that they change over time. This is particularly true in cases of protracted conflict, with their shifting dynamics and changing context. The design and implementation of DDR activities should mirror the complexity of the context and be flexible to respond to the ever-changing circumstances. In responding to dynamic and changing contexts, DDR should still engender respect for human rights. Where there are limitations to upholding certain fundamental human rights norms, such limitations should be proportionate and only serve a legitimate purpose.

DDR practitioners should also be aware of how VE drivers play out differently across genders, and the gender-specific drivers that mobilize men, women, boys and girls to join violent extremist groups. For instance, UNDP notes that VE and resulting displacement has a 'strong gender dimension. This is important to tailor interventions to the needs of the target-group(s). It is also essential in addressing human rights concerns that are peculiar to women, boys and girls in designing and implementing DDR activities.

UNDP's Elaboration of Women Involvement in P/CVE

"In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and the Middle East, women have been at the forefront of efforts to counter the political, social and cultural factors that enable violent extremism. Women are among the most powerful voices of prevention – in their homes, schools and communities - and women's organizations and movements have played a significant role in advocating for inclusion and tolerance. Women's organizations also provide alternative social, educational and economic activities for at-risk young women and men. Hence, they can uniquely help build the social cohesion needed to resist the appeal of a violent extremist group. Most of the current counter-violent extremist programs however focus only on men. Women are also absent from the decision-making processes on how to address violent extremism. A closer understanding of the roles women play in relation to violence and conflict is critical to the development of tailored strategies to strengthen resilience against violent extremism and to support victims and survivors. This not only requires reaching out to natural allies such as human-rights organizations, educational institutions and policy-makers already engaged in preventing violent extremism, but also calls for engaging with religious leaders, the media, community leaders, women's organizations, security forces and the private sector to promote values in compliance with international human rights standards and norms. Investing in women's economic autonomy is also critical in preventing violent extremism as women's economic status builds their own resilience, as well as that of their families, against joining extremist groups."

UNDP, Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity: A Development Response to Addressing Radicalization and Violent Extremism (2016) p 30.

DDR practitioners shall consider the following:

1. While nothing can justify violent extremism conducive to terrorism, it does not arise in vacuum. Grievances – actual or perceived – must be carefully analyzed.
2. Radicalization or extremism conducive to terrorism is an individual journey.

3. The factors leading to initial recruitment may differ from those associated with re-recruitment and/or staying or leaving a violent extremist group. Therefore, a thorough analysis of the situation needs to be conducted to understand the complexity and overlap of factors and how to design DDR activities accordingly. [Refer to **Section 7.3 Disengagement** for more analysis on why individuals leave terrorist groups]

4.2 THE EVOLUTION OF P/CVE

P/CVE, as a distinct field of practice, grew out of the recognition that, while security-based counterterrorism measures may be necessary in certain contexts, they are by no means sufficient for permanently uprooting the threat of violent extremism conducive to terrorism, and must be complemented with non-coercive approaches, programs and interventions aimed at:

- 1- countering/reducing the terrorist threat of existing terrorist groups and individuals; and
- 2- addressing the root causes of extremism conducive to terrorism, including by improving community resilience and stemming the recruitment of individuals into terrorist organizations.

P/CVE includes a wide range of activities including; mentorship through public sensitization campaigns, psychological support, family intervention, gender-based interventions, rehabilitation, basic education courses, cognitive skills programs, vocational training and employment assistance. Such interventions should be locally-relevant and multi-sectoral to meet the needs of the entire community.

With their focus on extremism as and when it is conducive to terrorism, P/CVE activities are widely considered as one aspect of an emerging comprehensive approach to countering terrorism. However, given the broad range of push and pull factors they aim to address, P/CVE approaches, programs and interventions resemble or overlap with development, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding efforts, including DDR⁶¹.

4.3 EXPOSING SPONSORS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Under the framework of UNSC Resolution 1373, states are under a chapter VII obligation to, *inter alia*, intensify their judicial and security cooperation in exchanging operational information regarding terrorist groups. In addition, states are called upon to exchange information to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. As well as being required to refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing the recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists.⁶²

⁶¹ICRC (2017), "Background Note and Guidance for National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism". Available at: <https://www.scribd.com/document/370481651/BACKGROUND-NOTE-AND-GUIDANCE-FOR-NATIONAL-RED-CROSS-AND-RED-CRESCENT-SOCIETIES-ON-PREVENTING-AND-COUNTERING-VIOLENT-EXTREMISM>

⁶² (UNSCR 1373 Para. 3)

5. SCREENING



This module should be read in conjunction with “Module 2.30: Participants, Beneficiaries, and Partners,” of the Operational Guide to the IDDRS.

The recent shift of the counterterrorism framework from solely focusing on prosecution (bringing terrorists to justice) to a more comprehensive approach (prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration) brings to the fore the important role of a thorough, comprehensive and coherent “screening” process.

Screening refers to the initial process of determining the main profile of a person associated with a terrorist group, who is in the custody of authorities, in order to recommend appropriate means of future treatment and handling, such as detention/prosecution, rehabilitation or reintegration back into the community. Screening should be conducted with all those associated with terrorist organizations, whether defectors, surrenders, or those captured on the battlefield. Screening should also adhere to normative standards as provided under International Human Rights Law, International Refugee Law and International Humanitarian Law when applicable. Discriminatory screening procedures according to race, community, gender, religion or nationality would be in violation of these legal instruments⁶³.

Proper documentation and information management should be integrated into the screening process by making sure that each individual is assigned a unique identification number, and that a written record of the date and time the individual entered the screening process is kept. Each case file should also include all other relevant information including details of their personal background and which member of their family/tribe/community is notified of their whereabouts etc.

5.1 PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

The traditional emphasis of DDR programs on formed military units, whether soldiers or rebels, made it generally clear who was eligible for reinsertion and reintegration assistance and who was not⁶⁴. In contrast, the nature of violent extremist environments and the characteristic features of terrorist groups operating in them, give rise to critical questions about when, how and with whom to engage among the many types of persons associated with terrorist groups.

At the outset, it should be noted that in the domain of CT, the term “**association**” or “**associated to**” is used more broadly than in the case of DDR. For the latter, the term “associated to” is used to refer to a person who has been involved with an armed group solely in a support capacity (but not in a combat role). In violent extremist contexts, by contrast, the term “associated to” means all persons (regardless of age, gender, etc.) with whom the authorities have authority over (i.e., through custody or otherwise)

⁶³ Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as UN SC Resolution 2349 (2017).

⁶⁴ The IDDRS provide operational guidance on “eligibility criteria” in contexts where a peace agreement exists.

out of the belief that they had some contact with a terrorist group, but without prejudging the nature of that relationship (combat role, support role, family members, victims, etc.)⁶⁵. This includes:

1. **Ex-combatants (male and female)** – screening and risk assessment should not only be able to establish that they were ex-combatants of terrorist groups, but also their place in the chain of command, their specific roles within the group, their motivations (vis a vis justifications) for joining the group, adherence to the group’s ideology, and reasons for leaving the group (especially in the case of defectors).
2. **Dependents** - civilians who rely on a combatant for their livelihood.
3. **Communities and victims** – in instances where terrorist organizations seized territory, they may have forced community members to take part in combat or to provide other forms of support, sometimes as the only way for survival. Support could either be the expression of sympathy towards the group, or could be in the form of direct material support or other forms of indirect abetment or aid. In this regard, it remains imperative to distinguish between those who have been coerced into supporting the group and those who actively and willingly provided support.
4. **Women and children** – women and children are often assumed to have played subordinate roles in terrorist groups. However, in groups such as Boko Haram, women and children have also assumed – voluntarily or involuntarily - combat roles, and have taken supportive or enabling roles (see also the AU OGNs on DDR and Women and DDR and Children).

If it is necessary to screen children, the four cardinal principles: best interests of the child, non-discrimination, participation and survival, life and development should be taken into consideration.

5. **Foreign terrorist fighters**⁶⁶ - “individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”⁶⁷. (See also the AU OGN on DDR and Foreign Fighters).
6. **Abductees, sexually exploited and slaves** – groups like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have resorted to kidnapping, abduction, sexual exploitation, slavery and human trafficking as tactics of war. In these instances, victims may be forced to take on combat and non-combat roles.

⁶⁵ For example: UN SC Res. 2396 (2017), UN SC Res. 2354 (2017) and UN SC Res. 2178 (2014).

⁶⁶ In the IDDRS foreign combatants are defined as members of armed forces or groups who are not nationals of the country in which they find themselves. Letters ‘e’ and ‘f’ above refer to foreign combatants. The definition is not limited to those joining armed groups; the phenomenon also includes foreign fighters joining regular armed forces, state-led and government armed forces.

⁶⁷ Security Council resolution 2178, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, S/RES/2178 (24 September 2014), available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29

Mindful of the above categories, determining the profile of persons associated with terrorist groups shall help in recommending the appropriate course of action. In other words, screening helps to differentiate between:

1. **Persons associated with terrorist groups who shall be brought to justice**, by means of accountability measures, including further investigation, referral to prosecution and punishment if convicted of having committed an act of terror (whether combined with rehabilitation efforts or not); and
2. **Persons associated with terrorist groups who should be included in a rehabilitation and/or reintegration program.**

5.2 GENERAL SCREENING CONSIDERATIONS

Screening shall be:

1. the responsibility of national authorities⁶⁸;
2. a multi-faceted process that involves a whole of government approach;
3. in compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law and standards, as well as the international and African counterterrorism frameworks.

5.3 DEFINING SCREENING CRITERIA

A starting point for choosing/developing the appropriate screening tool is to clearly define those acts of terrorism that are criminal acts, and that are not eligible for amnesty, based on national legal frameworks. If, through the screening process, preliminary evidence is found to suggest that an individual may have committed one (or more) of these crimes, then the individual in question should be channeled towards a criminal investigation and possible prosecution. If there is no evidence to suggest that an individual has committed crimes, then they may be channeled directly to a rehabilitation and reintegration program.

Despite the context-specific nature of violent extremism, the transnational nature of the terrorist threat makes regional cooperation a necessity. In regions affected by the activities of a terrorist group, such as the Lake Chad region, policy makers should consider the following with regards to screening⁶⁹:

1. developing a common understanding of the purpose of screening, including definitions of key concepts;
2. developing a coordinated regional approach to screening, based on a thorough mapping of national processes, including standard operating procedures at the regional level for screening;

⁶⁸It is to be noted, however, that in some cases other non-governmental/national entities have undergone the screening process such as the AMISOM in Somalia for Al-Shabaab members captured by AMISOM. But it is recommended that this process is always carried out in conjunction with national authorities to identify the future steps for these individuals.

⁶⁹ This section is based on the recommendations of the AU and the Lake Chad Basin Commission workshop on the "Screening, Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Boko Haram Associated Persons in the Lake Chad Region", 10-13 April, 2018, N'Djamena.

3. In case such a system is developed, it should take into consideration the relevant national, regional and international legal frameworks. It should also be gender sensitive and age appropriate;
4. Screening must be accompanied by oversight mechanisms, including compliance with international standards.

5.4 RISK ASSESSMENTS AND REHABILITATION

Screening processes typically assess only the possibility of criminal liability. However, practitioners may also need to understand whether individuals have particular rehabilitation needs. For example, those with extreme beliefs may need to participate in deradicalization programs, while those who joined VE groups for economic reasons may benefit from vocational training. Given that individuals with extreme beliefs may try to spread those beliefs, particularly in residential settings such as prisons or rehabilitation centers, it may also be necessary to assess whether a particular individual should be mixed or separated from a broader prison/rehabilitation center population. For these purposes, it is recommended that practitioners conduct systematic risk assessments.

Risk assessments assess whether people pose particular risks in order to identify suitable interventions to manage those risks. Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ) is increasingly recognized as the current best practice for conducting risk assessments⁷⁰. Several risk assessment instruments apply SPJ. The most relevant in cases of persons associated with terrorist groups are the consecutive versions of the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)⁷¹.

Risk Assessment in Nigeria

In Nigeria, a Treatment Team was assembled to deal with Violent Extremist Offenders. Members of this team were trained to use “Structured Professional Judgment and decision-making in conducting the assessments of violent extremist prisoners. Information was gathered, weighted and combined according to the Team’s judgment, assisted by a specialist risk assessment tool. The approach was therefore empirically guided, as each Team member was encouraged to consider the same set of risk assessment factors for each violent extremist prisoner they assessed”.

Atta Barkindo & Shane Bryans: De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: developing a basic prison based de-radicalisation programme

⁷⁰ For a detailed analysis of various risk assessment approaches and tools, see Joanne Richards (2018), “High Risk or Low Risk: Screening for Violent Extremists in DDR Programmes”, International Peacekeeping, Volume 25, 2018 - Issue 3.

⁷¹ Pressman, D. Elaine (2009), “Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism”, Ottawa: Public Safety Canada. Available at: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/2009-02-rdv/2009-02-rdv-eng.pdf>

It is particularly important that risk assessments are carried out on a periodic and ongoing basis. As highlighted by the Rome Memorandum, later assessments may be more accurate since they occur after assessors have had the opportunity to observe and interact with persons formerly associated with terrorist groups⁷². The results of these ongoing assessments can help in:

1. Security reclassification;
2. Evaluation of the effectiveness of DDR-CVE interventions, which would in turn inform decisions related to necessary adjustments and changes.

6. PROSECUTION AND DETENTION

The most important aspect of the international counterterrorism framework (as defined in Section 2 of this OGN) of relevance to DDR practitioners is the requirement of UNSC resolutions 1373 (2001)⁷³, 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017)⁷⁴ to “prosecute, rehabilitate and reintegrate” persons associated with terrorist organizations.

The *prima facie* obligation of the international and African CT frameworks is to consider prosecution, i.e. “bring terrorists to justice”⁷⁵. In other words, both frameworks condition “accountability” for individuals to be able to participate in “reintegration.” DDR practitioners should therefore be mindful of the obligation of Member States under the international counter-terrorism framework to assess whether a person associated to a terrorist group has committed a terrorist offence, or if there is evidence to proceed with a criminal investigation/prosecution in this regard.



Prosecution of persons suspected to be associated with a terrorist group must uphold the normative standards laid out under international human rights law on fair trial rights. This could be guided by the 12 guiding principles of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force on the “Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process in the Context of Countering Terrorism”⁷⁶. In situations where these rights are violated, DDR practitioners should refrain from engaging in such contexts.

⁷² Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders”. Available at: <https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/A/GCTF-Rome-Memorandum-ENG.pdf>

⁷³ Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1373>

⁷⁴ Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), Foreign Terrorist Fighters, available from <http://undocs.org/S/RES/2396%282017%29>

⁷⁵ The evolution of both frameworks recently to adopt a more comprehensive approach that includes “rehabilitation and reintegration”, in addition to prosecution, will be discussed in subsequent sections.

⁷⁶ Page 8.

6.1 NATIONAL CT FRAMEWORKS

The responsibility of meeting the *prima facie* obligation of bringing terrorists to justice rests with national authorities. In meeting this obligation:

- 1- National normative frameworks (laws, regulations, SOPs, etc.) should clearly define acts of terrorism that amount to crimes and establish common terminology around screening, prosecution (as well as rehabilitation and reintegration) to ensure understanding within and across countries and regions,
- 2- National normative frameworks should also be aligned with all relevant international standards (international humanitarian law, international human rights standards, the international CT framework⁷⁷).
- 3- National authorities should develop a comprehensive DDR strategy for persons associated with terrorist groups that is compliant with international legal frameworks and UN SC Resolutions. This should:
 - i. Include a prosecution strategy, including – as appropriate – outlining the non-punitive alternatives to sentencing;
 - ii. standardize screening procedures used by national authorities to channel individuals to prosecution if enough evidence for involvement in crimes is found (or to alternative routes, such as rehabilitation and reintegration);
- 4- Develop procedures for the collection of evidence for judicial processes.
- 5- Establish procedures for data collection and information sharing among implementing agencies, organizations and institutions.

⁷⁷ The labels or denominations given to persons accused of terrorist offences can in no way justify a curtailment of the rights and protection afforded to them under international law, notably IHL when applicable.

Listing of Armed Groups as Terrorist Organizations

Armed groups are listed as terrorist organizations by the UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, as well as other UN Security Council Sanctions Committees (Al-Shabaab).

The Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee also approved Boko Haram to the list of individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions and arms embargo.

The listing of armed groups as terrorist organizations has also been a common practice of Member States and inter-governmental organizations. It is common for armed groups to be listed as terrorist organizations by national governments under national law until peace negotiations start or a peace agreement is signed. Armed groups designated as terrorist organizations often deny using terrorism as a military tactic to achieve their goals. The issue of listing and delisting is a political decision as there is no international consensus on the definition of terrorism.

6.2 DETENTION

Detention can be justified for intelligence gathering and screening purposes by national law enforcement officials, as well as within the framework of peace support operations. In this case, detention should follow the Copenhagen Principles and Guidelines⁷⁸, and the Interim Standard Operating Procedures: Detention in United Nations Peace Operations, respectively⁷⁹.

Arbitrary detention is prohibited inter alia by article 9 of the ICCPR and by international humanitarian law as well. Detention must respect international standards and provide detainees with, among other things, adequate conditions of detention. Torture, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment are prohibited.⁸⁰ Detention in any facility which a person cannot leave at will must be governed by law. Detention rules apply equally to all detainees: for example, persons associated with a terrorist group must also not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment⁸¹. Furthermore, any limitation of rights and freedoms in the course of detention must meet the standards set under international law, including regional human rights law. with due regard to the “rights of others, collective security and common interest”⁸².



It is important to note that criminal investigations and prosecutions may require detaining persons suspected of having committed a criminal offense. However, the **deprivation of liberty of a suspect and**

⁷⁸ See: The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, MoFA, Denmark.

⁷⁹ Department of Peacekeeping Operation, UNDPKO. (2010). “Interim Standard Operating Procedures: Detention in United Nations Peace Operations”. Available from <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89521>

⁸⁰ ICCPR, article 7; and common article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations”. Available from <http://um.dk/en/~media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Copenhagen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf>

⁸¹ Article 7, ICCPR, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights under Article 5, and the African Commission in the case of Article 19 v Eritrea stated: “that the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment cannot be derogated from for any reason, in whatever the circumstances.”

⁸² The ACHPR under Article 27(2)

all subsequent treatment and procedures must **be in accordance with international law, including** human rights standards. These legal requirements will apply whether or not the detention is taking place in the context of a military or peace enforcement operation. In such cases, domestic criminal law will also apply, and should take into account other guiding standards such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (The Nelson Mandela Rules).

6.3 REGIONAL COOPERATION

National counter-terrorism frameworks differ between countries. As a result, the *prima facie* obligation to prosecute may be carried out differently in each of the countries concerned.

DDR practitioners should therefore support the development of regional approaches and the harmonization of national legal frameworks to underpin a comprehensive approach to prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of persons associated with terrorist organizations. In addition to cooperation in screening, regional cooperation should also include the development of procedures for the collection and sharing of evidence for judicial processes.

7. REHABILITATING PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUPS

Similar to the demobilization process in traditional DDR programs, a rehabilitation process through which persons associated with terrorist organizations abandon combat should be an integral component of P/CVE-related DDR activities. However, persons associated with terrorist organizations participate in this process differently; namely in two ways:

1. Because of the unstructured nature of violent extremist groups, individuals who defect, surrender or are captured, are treated in an individual manner and not demobilized collectively.
2. In traditional settings, demobilization entails both a physical and a mental aspect, whereby persons associated with terrorist organizations would undergo activities that would prepare them physically and mentally for the reintegration process. In violent extremist contexts, a physical and mental transformation occurs as well, but in two separate processes; disengagement and deradicalization. While both could be conducted in the same location, the process of “deradicalization” is often over-emphasized in violent extremist contexts because most, if not all, violent extremist groups in Africa have an ideological dimension that has to be dealt with before individuals are reintegrated back into society.

As such, in violent extremist contexts, persons associated with terrorist organizations undergo a rehabilitation phase whereby they disengage in a manner where they behaviorally shift away from violence and/or deradicalize in abandonment of violent ideologies and beliefs. Therefore it is important that P/CVE-related DDR activities transition from the idea of “demobilization” to “rehabilitation: disengagement and/or deradicalization”.

7.1 WHAT IS REHABILITATION?

The Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples' Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa, adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights during its 56th Ordinary Session in Banjul, Gambia in 2015, calls on member states to "adopt, as needed, non-punitive *counter-radicalization and deradicalization policies and programs* that include engaging and working with the media, civil society organizations, community leaders, religious authorities, women and victims of terrorism, formal and informal educational institutions, as well as legislative reforms, *prison rehabilitation programs*, and building national capacities, to ensure effective implementation and sustainability of these related measures."

Rehabilitation is the set of processes (disengagement and/or deradicalization) by which guidance and assistance are given to those who have committed violent extremist acts so that they can (again) become citizens of the community. Rehabilitation covers a wide array of activities including vocational, educational and work programs as well as medical and psychological treatment, counseling and cognitive-behavioral programs.

Reasons for Joining Al-Shabaab

A UN source estimated that 50% of the defectors who had been through the rehabilitation centers in Somalia joined al-Shabaab for economic reasons. Other reasons for joining al-Shabaab are peer-pressure, ideology, and indoctrination.

Asylum Research Community (2018) Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu).

7.2 MEANS OF REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation can be carried out in:

1. **Transitional Centers/Rehabilitation facilities:** disengagement and/or deradicalization processes in transitional centers or rehabilitation facilities are usually undertaken with those who have not committed prosecutable offenses.
2. **Prisons:** disengagement and/or deradicalization processes in prisons are undertaken with those who have been prosecuted for terrorist acts.

7.3 DISENGAGEMENT

Disengagement can be defined as:

"The process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change. Additionally, while disengagement may stem from role change,

that role change may be influenced by psychological factors such as disillusionment, burnout or the failure to reach the expectations that influenced initial involvement”.⁸³

Best practices from Africa and elsewhere suggest that persons associated with terrorist organizations defect from violent extremist groups because they develop negative connotations of the group, rather than adopting positive counter-ideas.⁸⁴ This is important for DDR practitioners to be able to develop effective disengagement activities.

To prompt individuals to disengage an adoption of the Five Ds of CVE model could be used. It is recommended that P/CVE experts should work together with DDR practitioners to assist in the planning, design and implementation of P/CVE-related activities as such.

The Five Ds, developed by the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) recommends that activities enticing members to disengage from violent extremist groups should produce the following messages:

- 1. Divided:** Violent Extremist participants do not agree on key elements of the movement.
Sample message: Al-Shabaab has warned its members against defection and detained and killed perceived ISIL sympathizers within its own ranks.
- 2. Disabused:** The facts undermine views of the Violent Extremist organisations.
Sample message: Both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab killed thousands of Sunni Muslims, despite their claims to only target disbelievers.
- 3. Disillusioned:** Participation in the Violent Extremist movement does not deliver expected benefits.
Sample message: Al-Shabaab claim to provide members with political participation opportunities within the group (as opposed to the government). However, members cannot negotiate decisions or show opposition.
- 4. Directionless:** The ideology is good, but they do not have a clear path toward action.
Sample message: Al-Shabaab’s alliance with Al-Qaeda shows a departure from the original aim which was to liberate Somalia and achieve local interests. However, the alliance would shift the group’s aim towards other global causes of Al-Qaeda’s.
- 5. Discouraged:** The ideology is good, but they are not winning.
Sample message: For decades Violent Extremist groups have been trying to win their battle or establish their own state. A look at history would demonstrate that they never did.

7.4 DERADICALIZATION

Deradicalization can be defined as:

⁸³ J. Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (UK: Routledge, 2009), p. 152.

⁸⁴ Berger, J. M. (2016) *Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption*

“A cognitive shift, a fundamental change in understanding. It is often triggered by a traumatic experience which ‘challenges the coherence of the individual’s worldview’ and can engender ‘post-traumatic growth.’ A ‘cognitive opening’ which makes an individual receptive to new ideas, is then created. This can be seized upon by social and law enforcement services to engage with the individual and persuade them of the error of their previous ways.”⁸⁵

The main components of the deradicalization process are:

1. **Religious Component:** Engaging with persons associated with terrorist organizations in theological discussions. This is important to challenge misinterpretations of religion that could also be conflated with political narratives. It is worth noting that this component should be fulfilled by credible religious scholars who are able to gain the trust and acceptance of persons associated with terrorist organizations, so as to embrace their teachings and alternative interpretations of religion.
2. **Psychological Component:** The assessment and support provided by psychologists. It is to be noted that persons associated with terrorist organizations may be suffering from negative emotions including feelings of loneliness and separation (having been part of a group and a collective identity). At this stage, the value structure of these persons is deconstructed and restructured, which would cause a state of imbalance. Therefore, the support of psychologists is crucial so that persons associated with terrorist organizations are able to develop better cognitive tools.
3. **Social Component:** Social support to both persons associated with terrorist organizations and their dependents. Family members should be allowed to visit and communicate with persons associated with terrorist organizations so as to support them during their deradicalization process. Families can act as catalysts in the deradicalization process and can urge persons associated with terrorist organizations to cooperate with authorities.



It is worth noting that disengagement and deradicalization activities are complementary to one another and may overlap. It is thus recommended that they are regarded as one process with two approaches that are interlinked with the aim of achieving the same goal of rehabilitating persons associated with terrorist groups and preparing them for reintegration back into society.



It is also worth noting that deradicalization is essential to ensure a shift in the ideology of persons associated with terrorist groups. However, this should not violate other human rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion. In situations where human rights are feared to be compromised, DDR practitioners should only engage in disengagement activities⁸⁶.

⁸⁵ Fink, N. C. and Hearne, E. (2008): *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, New York International Peace Institute; Demant, and Renee Garfinkel, “Personal Transformations: Moving from Violence to Peace,” special report no.186 (Washington, DC: USIP, April 2007), p.11, and Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, “Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners,” technical report series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).

⁸⁶ As stated in article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 22



The involvement of DDR practitioners in the rehabilitation phase, and in DDR as a whole, would be determined according to each context (mission versus non-mission, national-level versus community-level, etc.). Generally, DDR activities should be nationally-owned and driven. DDR practitioners should thus plan and design DDR activities in tandem with national authorities. As such, the planning phase would determine the scope by which DDR practitioners will be able to engage and operate.

7.5 ACTIVITIES IN TRANSITIONAL CENTERS/REHABILITATION FACILITIES:

- 1. Reception:** In violent extremist contexts, persons associated with terrorist organizations - whether captured, surrendered or defected - would arrive to a reception site that is run by security agencies. Basic registration information should be collected immediately upon reception.
- 2. Screening:** Contingent the organization of the program, receiving authorities may then hand over individuals to screening teams (see section 5). According to this process, certain individuals will be put on a track towards criminal investigation and prosecution, while others may proceed directly to rehabilitation centers and reintegration programs. Risk assessments to gauge rehabilitation needs may also be undertaken during this stage.
- 3. Introduction and briefing:** When arriving at a rehabilitation center/transitional facility, persons associated with terrorist organizations should be introduced to the site and debriefed on their activities, benefits, personal security and what to expect throughout the process. This is important to build trust and foresee any future challenges that might arise.
- 4. Counseling and referral:** Many persons associated with terrorist organizations have undergone trauma and psychological complications, especially in violent extremist settings because of the shift in beliefs and ideologies, as well as identity crises and disassociation from reality. Therefore, counseling and psychosocial assistance is necessary at this stage. The presence of family members - if bearing beliefs against those of the violent extremist group - could lead to positive results because it paves the way for acceptance by the community in the reintegration phase.
- 5. Health screening:** Health screening is necessary to identify the medical needs of participants. For example, In West Africa, it was found that Boko Haram have used drugs and substance abuse to recruit members. In Mali, it was recorded that Ansar Eddine have used sexual violence against women as a weapon of choice and a tactic of war. Therefore, there could be a need to deal with drug addiction and sexually transmitted diseases and traumas that require both psychological and medical assistance.
- 6. Training and education⁸⁷:** In some rehabilitation facilities, vocational training, schooling and religious education are provided to prepare persons associated with terrorist organizations

⁸⁷ The Human Rights Council, reaffirmed the important role that education, including human rights education and training, can play in preventing and countering violent extremism,⁸⁷ and encouraged States to cooperate in efforts to achieve the goals and targets under the Education For All movement and work to achieve the aims of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/137 of 19 December 2011.

for reintegration opportunities. It is important that the training and education provided is in line with the employment market.

7. **Deradicalization:** As aforementioned, these are activities that would cause a shift in the belief system of persons associated with terrorist organizations away from violence and radicalization conducive to terrorism.
8. **Pre-discharge awareness-raising/sensitization:** Before being discharged, persons associated with terrorist organizations should be advised on the challenges of the transition from military to civilian life.
9. **Discharge:** A discharge document — such as a disengagement and/or deradicalization declaration — would have symbolic value for persons associated with terrorist organizations, and should be given to them upon completion of the disengagement and/or deradicalization process.
10. **Exit panel/committee:** A panel/committee could be formed to assess whether persons associated with terrorist groups have completed their rehabilitation and can now move on to reintegration. This panel may include community leaders, national authority representatives and religious leaders.
11. **Reinsertion:** Reinsertion is the final step in the disengagement and/or deradicalization phase and aims to provide persons associated with terrorist groups with short-term social and economic support until they are able to enter a formal reintegration program.

It should be noted that reinsertion is immediate assistance that should only help persons associated with terrorist organizations to sustain a living until they are fully reintegrated in the community. Thus, reinsertion should not be regarded as a replacement for reintegration.

Somalia's Rehabilitation Transition Centers

“Four rehabilitation transition centers for disengaged Al-Shabaab fighters operate in Baidoa, Beledweyne, Kismaayo and Mogadishu. The Kismaayo centre became operational in June with the admission of the first group of 26 disengaged Al-Shabaab fighters. By the end of July, the Baidoa centre was supporting 148 beneficiaries, and an additional 70 had entered the reintegration phase. Both centres are run by IOM and funded by Germany. The centre in Mogadishu, which is supported by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, currently has 65 beneficiaries. Owing to a lack of funds, only 11 beneficiaries remain in the centre run by the Federal Government in Beledweyne. The Government has requested international support to enhance the capacity of the centre, which could encourage further defections.”

Security Council - Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia during the period from 1 May to 22 August 2017 (S/2017/751).

7.6 REHABILITATION IN PRISONS

These are activities undertaken in prisons for individuals who have been screened and subsequently prosecuted and convicted of terrorist acts. The below model is derived from the UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, as well as UNDP's model for Prison Assessment and the Proposed Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Offenders in the Maldives.

Stage 1: Assessment & Orientation Phase

If not already conducted a risk assessment should be undertaken (see section 5.4). The following data should also be collected: demographics, family history, academic history, employment history, developmental history, skills assessment, hobbies/interests/sports/recreational activities, criminal history (with offenders' perspective), religious orientation/assessment, psychological profiling with mental status examination, physical assessment, and legal history/collecting all records with reference to legal history.

Prison-Based Risk Assessment in Niger

At the moment, a risk assessment tool is being used in one of the four prisons in Niger. The risk assessment tool gathers information based on orientation interviews with detainees about their personal information, their needs and security risks. This is followed by an evaluation of the risk they pose and operational aspects of how to deal with these detainees.

Towards A Regional Strategy for the Screening, Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Boko Haram associated persons in the Lake Chad Basin Countries – Meeting Conclusions

This would be followed by an orientation and debriefing on the prison system and available programs, incentives, parole programs, beneficial law articles, and human rights policies. The tailored individual process of rehabilitation should then be explained to the convicted VE offender.

Stage 2: Institutional Rehabilitation Phase

Rehabilitation Unit: This unit will be responsible for making Individualized Rehabilitation Plans (IRP) according to the convicted VE offender's specific needs and ideological biases. This unit is also responsible for preparing individuals for their reintegration back into the community, and providing them with the necessary skills to sustain a living both economically and socially. IRPs may include the following components:

Behavioral and Psychological Services: These are activities that would result in behavioral change of convicted VE offenders. Expert psychologists, therapists and psychiatrists should be responsible for implementing these activities. It is recommended that they are specialized in the areas of radicalization and extremism.

Vocational Training: Convicted VE offenders should be trained in at least one vocational skill prior to their release into the community.

Education: Convicted VE offenders should have access to education and have reached at least a minimum level of education prior to their release into the community.

Deradicalization: To address extreme religious beliefs it is crucial that rehabilitation programs include deradicalization programs.

Sports and Recreation: Convicted VE offenders may also have access to organized outdoor sports (football, volleyball basketball, etc.) and indoor sports (chess, scrabble, cards, aerobics classes etc.)

Stage 3: Reintegration Phase (See following section)

Stage 4: Half-Way House/Drop-In Centers/Community Service/Employment Assistance Programs

This stage is necessary to assess the impact of the Individualized Rehabilitation Plan. It provides regular monitoring of convicted VE offenders upon their release from prison, while still providing them with services during their reintegration into the community. The needs and interests of those recently released from prison will change, especially during the first few months of civilian life. Therefore, a support system should be in place to ensure their full and successful reintegration and minimize chances of recidivism.



In order to ensure a rights-based approach, the rehabilitation process should be time-bound, and therefore, from the onset, planners should design a timeline for rehabilitation activities.



It is to be noted that deradicalization is a long-term process that, in some instances, could be supported throughout both the rehabilitation and reintegration phases. For this reason, timelines should be clearly defined in the planning phase.

8. REINTEGRATION



This Section should be read in conjunction with the AU OGN on Reintegration and IDDRS Module 4.30.

8.1 PARTICIPATION IN REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS

In traditional DDR contexts, reintegration is defined as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income ... [while also considering] social and political aspects”⁸⁸. In order to participate in a community-based reintegration program, persons previously associated with terrorist groups must no longer be under the physical control of the armed ‘terrorist’ group nor under the custody of authorities. Those participating in rehabilitation programs will therefore:

1. Have been screened by authorities and sent directly to rehabilitation centers. They will participate in reintegration programs after finishing their rehabilitation program.
2. Have been screened by authorities, prosecuted, acquitted, and then sent to complete a rehabilitation and reintegration program.
3. Have been screened by authorities, prosecuted, convicted, and served their sentence in prison.

8.1.1 Reintegration after Screening

As discussed in Section 5 of this OGN, screening is currently used by national authorities to differentiate between a) individuals that are channeled to prosecution; and b) individuals that are channeled to rehabilitation.

DDR practitioners should be aware of the security risks that may be faced by individuals who have voluntarily defected from their group, particularly during their return to civilian life during the reintegration phase. These individuals, and their families, are often the target of revenge by the terrorist group they were associated with.

8.1.2 Reintegration after Rehabilitation

While there is a growing number of rehabilitation centers being established in such contexts, only a few of those previously associated with terrorist groups have completed their rehabilitation and moved on to the reintegration phase. For DDR practitioners, the primary focus should be on ensuring that center-based rehabilitation and community-based reintegration are mutually reinforcing, including in situations where rehabilitation interventions should continue at the community level⁸⁹.

⁸⁸ IDDRS.

⁸⁹ IDDRS, reintegration module.

In cases where persons previously associated with terrorist organizations have not been rehabilitated, reintegration programs should consider how to meet their rehabilitation needs at the community level. For those that have been rehabilitated, mechanisms for follow up to ensure that no recidivism occurs should be in place.



In addition to the above official release points into reintegration, DDR practitioners should be aware that a significant number of persons associated with terrorist groups manage to bypass the screening, prosecution and rehabilitation process, by returning and “disappearing” back into communities. Many of these individuals will need rehabilitation and reintegration support, for which local strategies in cooperation with community leaders (tribal, religious, etc.) should be devised.

8.2 REINTEGRATION OF PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUPS

Reintegration programs should avoid overpromising and under-delivering on their objectives. This is essential to guarantee the sustainability of reintegration programs for persons previously associated with terrorist groups. As such, it remains crucial to conduct analysis and capacity assessments of the wide array of local, national and international service providers usually involved in the planning and implementation of reintegration programs. Reintegration programs should not only provide direct assistance to individuals released from prisons or rehabilitation centers, but also broader support to create a social and economic environment that can reabsorb those individuals.

DDR practitioners shall recognize the obligation to ensure adherence to relevant legal frameworks (both national and international), while also ensuring that reintegration needs are addressed early on and that reintegration measures are context-specific.

8.3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Approaches to reintegration that focus solely on supporting individuals previously associated with terrorist groups, while not taking into account the imperative of promoting reconciliation within the wider society, may undermine sustainable return to civilian life. As such, while it is important to be mindful of reintegration as an individually-driven process, we should also acknowledge that war torn societies in turn suffer from ‘collective trauma’ accrued as a result of the atrocities committed by the very individuals being supported by DDR activities.

As a result, it remains essential that policymakers consider, as appropriate and in line with applicable legal frameworks, promoting national, or local, reconciliation through adopting transitional justice and other accountability mechanisms that aim at providing amnesty for individuals who have not committed prosecutable terrorist offenses. This will create disincentives for joining VE groups, ensure that those responsible for the commission of the worst human rights violations are held accountable, as well as help and assist victims of terrorism through truth telling and reparations programs. This may in turn

promote justice by offering redress to victimized communities, as well as ensuring the non-recidivism of individuals who have left violent extremist groups.

9. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

9.1 PLANNING FOR DDR ACTIVITIES

In contexts of violent extremism conducive to terrorism, DDR activities shall be:

- 1- **Context-specific** – assessments shall be based on a comprehensive “conflict analysis” of the structural factors (push factors), which allow for the development and implementation of the necessary mitigation strategies;
- 2- **Nationally-owned** – noting the requirement that “reintegration should be part of the overall development of the country,” the implementation of the obligations of the CT framework, including striking the right balance between “prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration”, rests with national authorities. National ownership during DDR activities should, however, be construed widely to ensure full participation of various stakeholders.
- 3- **Tailored to the specific needs of “individuals,”** based on their individual journeys “to” extremism. DDR activities shall consider the many and complex needs to be addressed (economic, social, political, psychological, religious and physical, etc.), which vary from one individual to the other, so as to chart the appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration route.
- 4- **Mindful of motives/reasons for leaving armed ‘terrorist’ groups** (in cases of defection) and the risks of reintegrating individuals into communities, so as to develop the necessary mitigating strategies and measures.
- 5- **Mindful of the role of ideology/religion in driving or framing conflicts** – DDR practitioners should be aware of the nature and extent of the role of ideology/religion, either as a driver, an enabling factor, or merely a justification, in violent extremist environments. In all cases, religion – as a powerful expression of individual and group identity – can also be a powerful force for prevention and peacebuilding⁹⁰. DDR practitioners should – depending on context – support community initiatives that challenge misinterpretations of religious texts and those that promote tolerance and co-existence (together with peace education and civic engagement).

⁹⁰ According to UNDP, level of religious literacy, including the understanding the meaning of religious texts, is often low and religion is seldom the only push or pull factor.

CCCPA's Program on Preventing Radicalization and Extremism Leading to Terrorism in Africa

The program on Preventing Radicalization and Extremism Leading to Terrorism (PRELT), carried out by the Cairo International Center of Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA), adopts an approach that is community-based in its nature. It has actively contributed to African efforts by increasing the resilience of local communities to extremism and enhancing the capacity of local leaders and influencers to expose the fallacies and inconsistencies of terrorist ideologies and narratives. The program aims to equip local leaders and influencers with the necessary knowledge and skills to refute extremist interpretations of Islam, while propagating an alternative narrative of peace and coexistence within their local communities. PRELT trainings are thus based on fundamental and straightforward explanations of the rules and ethics of war and peace in Islam and Sharia Law.

- 6- **Flexible** – DDR activities in environments of violent extremism conducive to terrorism should be able to adjust to threats and challenges as they emerge.
- 7- **Harmonized** – the different components of DDR activities (both center and community-based) should be carefully harmonized. Rehabilitation among the various release points (screening, prosecution, prison and/or center-based rehabilitation) should lead to reintegration, while ensuring that they are complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing.
- 8- **Sensitive to the differentiated needs** of women, children and other individuals, as will be discussed in Section 9 of this OGN.
- 9- **Followed up** – DDR activities need to plan for ongoing assessments assessing the security risks of the individual as well as of communities. Halfway houses can also be capacitated to address specific treatment needs such as alcohol addiction, drug addiction, mental health problems, anger management, and other forms of rehabilitation.
- 10- **Provision of security** – Persons previously associated with terrorist groups, especially defectors, face serious security concerns during and after rehabilitation and reintegration. Halfway houses or community residences can offer residence and protection, as well as meet the specific needs of these individuals, such as counseling, assistance acquiring employment, etc.
- 11- **Strategic Communication** - Terrorist organizations have made use of new telecommunication technologies and tools, such as social media, to broaden their reach and influence. DDR practitioners should use the content shared by terrorist organizations via social media as an important source of information for designing DDR activities. They should also consider social media for implementing communication strategies that promote rehabilitation and reintegration, reaching participants in the reintegration program and receiving communities.

9.2 MITIGATING RISKS OF ENGAGEMENT

Whenever a terrorist organization claims control over a community, members of the community may be forcefully recruited into the armed group as combatants. Others may be associated in support roles demanded/required/forced by the terrorist group. These affected communities require rehabilitation and reintegration support.

The participation of affected communities, alongside other DDR participants, is important to ensure smooth reinsertion and reintegration and to minimize any resentment issues that may arise during the delivery of benefits associated with DDR activities. Strategies to maximize the resilience of affected communities include preparations for recovery from any further terrorist attacks and providing campaigning and awareness on the topics of peacebuilding, intercultural dialogue, and tolerance to diversity of identity in order to help victims feel integral to their society⁹¹⁹².

DDR practitioners should also be aware of the variety of political, legal, institutional, and reputational risks involved while supporting national authorities to undertake DDR activities in violent extremist/terrorist environments. These include:

1. Risks emerging from the perception of DDR activities as part of national, regional or international CT efforts, which would turn these activities into a target of terrorist groups (recent examples from Mali and Somalia). For example, during the reintegration phase, the use of firewalls and discretion measures should be carefully considered through the establishment of a distinct and independent reintegration agency or similar impartial institutional arrangement.
2. The widespread tendency for states to overuse extrajudicial and/or coercive security measures on detainees, which may include arbitrary executions, torture or intelligence gathering for counter terrorism usage, have an adverse effect on the legitimacy of activities creating a strong psychological barrier against defection. Arbitrary executions and torture violate international human rights obligations and are prohibited in all circumstances.
3. The worst enemy of rehabilitation programs is the negative publicity and rumors surrounding the program propagated by violent extremist programs. In this regard, agencies have a responsibility to lead a locally adapted public information campaign that informs communities and persons associated with terrorist groups of the merits of the DDR activities being implemented and dispels any rumors.
4. Without impugning the operational flexibility of the program, the individual security of defectors remains paramount against attempts by violent extremist group to retaliate against those who have defected or even reduced their active commitment to the cause espoused by the violent

⁹¹ (Cockayne, J., & O'Neil, S. (2015). UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? *United Nations University*.)

⁹² (United Nations. 2018. "Handbook of Good Practices to Support Victims' Associations in Africa and the Middle East". United Nations publication. Available at: https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/sites/www.un.org.victimsofterrorism/files/oct-uncct-handbook_of_good_practices_to_support_victim27s_associations_-web.pdf.)

extremists. Similarly, program staff, specialists and other counterparts encouraging people to defect should be adequately secured as they are often prime targets for violent extremists.

5. The possibility of motivated violent extremists re-engaging in terrorism following their release features prominently as a strong inhibiting factor impeding the timely release of detainees who have completed the rehabilitation program. As such, risk reduction strategies, including deradicalization programs, should be mainstreamed as an integral component of the rehabilitation process to forestall such a scenario.
6. The risk of stigmatization arising from engaging with religious initiatives, leaders or faith-based organizations. DDR practitioners should be careful that their support of such endeavors does not lead to stereotyping, broad generalizations, or the singling out of certain communities.⁹³
7. Violent extremist groups tend to thrive in areas where the role of civil society is limited. CSOs often have credibility and the ability to help address grievances that give rise to violent extremism in the first place. In addition, they are in a good position to serve as a link between communities or individuals' interests and the authorities and can support efforts to link traditional mechanisms with countering violent extremism (CVE) and rehabilitation and reintegration programming. Stakeholders must take care to partner with CSOs that represent a diversity of viewpoints and interests, prioritize the broader interests of the community they represent, and ensure the accountability of authorities to the community⁹⁴.

⁹³ Noting for example 1. UNDP (2014) "Guidelines on Engaging with Faith-based Organizations and Religious Leaders" and Ex Post Paper RAN (2016), 2. "How to Cooperate with Religious Organizations and Communities within the Local Approach to Radicalization"3. Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point for Recruitment. UNDP 2017

⁹⁴ (Christina Nemr, Lara Nonninger, Eva Entenmann, Fulco van Deventer, and Bibi van Ginkel, "It Takes a Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism," Global Center on Cooperative Security, August 2018.)

10. MEETING THE NEEDS OF SPECIFIC GROUPS

10.1 WOMEN



This Section should be read in conjunction with the AU OGN on DDR and Women.

The inclusion of a gender perspective in reintegration programs is an established practice and the IDDRS includes a cross-cutting module on women, gender and DDR (Module 5.10).

Hence, it is key to recall that women have different roles in armed groups and this extends to groups listed as terrorist organizations. Although still under-researched, findings indicate the same factors that push men to join terrorist groups drive women as well. A possible motive that differentiates men and women is that of marriage, where women actively join armed groups pulled by the goal of marrying a fighter who is willing to sacrifice himself for a greater cause that she may share. Increasing the availability of data disaggregated by sex and age and substantive research on the perspectives of women on and their experience with designated terrorist or violent extremist groups will help inform DDR in this regard.⁹⁵

Gender goes beyond responding to the reintegration needs of female members of terrorist organizations. Gender perspectives, including issues of masculinities, should be addressed and undertaken holistically in any reintegration intervention and conflict and peace assessment. The vulnerable situations specifically experienced by women must be considered, addressed and mitigated. Women associated with armed terrorist groups may have been recruited against their will and subjected to sexual and gender-based violence. Indeed, the violations experienced by women and girls in these contexts are broad and compounded, often resulting in social stigma, economic hardship and discrimination. Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes should be tailored to meet these varying needs accordingly⁹⁶.

Security Council resolutions 2242 (2015) and 2331 (2016) express deep concern at the fact that “acts of sexual and gender-based violence ... are known to be part of the strategic objectives and ideology of certain terrorist groups, used as a tactic of terrorism and an instrument to increase their finances and their power.” Women face specific types of stigma, partly due to the blurred lines of membership. Stigmatization can inhibit reintegration and women with children fathered in the group face a higher

⁹⁵ Report of the Secretary General on Women and Peace and Security, UN Doc S/2017/861, 16 October 2017, paras. 44–45. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and UN-Women, summary report of its Research Symposium, held in New York, on 18 July 2018. Available at www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Summary-report_final.pdf.

⁹⁶ Report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security, 9 October 2018, paras 72-74, available online here: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1831325.pdf>

risk. At the same time, women can play a crucial role in disengaging and deradicalizing violent extremists.⁹⁷ Women in security forces or women who have knowledge of gender and violence can work in addressing violent extremism issues in families and in local communities.⁹⁸ Any intervention must be mindful of not inadvertently supporting biased gender norms, for example by depicting women associated with terrorist organizations as 'more unnatural' than the men.

In supporting reintegration, states and RECs/RMs should take into consideration mechanisms that should be put in place to eliminate the stigmatization and discrimination of women. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and more specifically in Africa, Protocol to The African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women In Africa, all provide a robust basis for the abolition of discrimination against women, and this should be and must be extended to reintegration initiatives.

The reintegration of women associated with terrorist groups follows much of the process in orthodox DDR (see OGN on Women and on Reintegration). Specific issues to consider include:

- Gender sensitive approaches to reintegration by ensuring fair distribution of reintegration packages.
- Respect for the family and emotional bond between women and men fighters of terrorist groups, as some women may wish to stay with their partners. However, the reasons for this and whether it may in some instances just be related to a need for physical protection and lack of alternative support mechanisms requires careful assessment.
- Gender sensitive counseling and psycho-social support services should be provided to women prior to reintegration.
- It cannot be assumed that women do not hold extremist views conducive to terrorism. Hence, women associated with terrorist groups should be enrolled in appropriate activities prior to and after reintegration.
- Reintegration of women associated with terrorist groups should consider their family needs. For example, specific support may be needed to address stigma that women face within their families; or to mitigate economic hardship they face when caring for children.
- The risk of women re-joining terrorist groups and other armed groups (vigilantes, militias and criminal networks) is real.
- Female associates of terrorism subjected to sexual violence or gender-based violence and forced to collaborate with terrorist organizations need to be addressed separately from those who willingly joined the group. During the reintegration of victims of terrorism, practitioners need to be fully equipped and trained to deal with victims according to their needs, encouraging a victim-centric approach, and try to lessen the risk of stigmatization when the victims return to their communities. Furthermore, the implementation of comprehensive procedures, including medical or psychological support as well as

⁹⁸ <http://eca.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/05/women-need-to-be-engaged-in-prevention-of-and-response-to-violent-extremism-say-experts> Also refer to: UN Women, "Women and Violent Radicalization in Jordan", Available online at: <http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2016/women-violent-radicalization-jordan-en.pdf?la=en&vs=3843>

differentiating between females and males will help the recovery and healing process of victims⁹⁹.

10.2 CHILDREN



This Section should be read in conjunction with the AU OGN on DDR and Children.

DDR practitioners should note the following aspects when dealing with children:

- Understanding the different roles played by boys and girls is important and so gender-sensitive approaches should be adopted in release negotiations, reunion with families and re-insertion into communities.
- The reunion and reconciliation of children with their families is as important as reintegrating children into their communities.
- In instances where children associated with VE groups cannot be reintegrated with their original family, alternative ‘family-based’ arrangements should be made, keeping in mind social and cultural attitudes.
- There is a need to consider the specific needs of girls and boys associated with VE groups, including screening, family tracing and reunification activities. Gender balance and sensitivity should be reflected in program human resource planning.
- The collation and provision of information on children associated with VE groups, including their experiences with VE groups to gauge appropriate reintegration support.
- Prepare families and communities for the reintegration of children associated with VE groups in light of the experiences children have had.
- Support for re-entry into education should be included as a key component of reintegration planning.
- Careful consideration, based on national and international legal statutes should guide the treatment of children associated with VE groups indicted for criminal activities. In particular, alternatives to prosecution and detention which focus on rehabilitation and reintegration of the child should be considered¹⁰⁰.
- Reintegration of children should take into consideration the four cardinal principles that guide all matters concerning children namely: non-discrimination; child participation; life, survival and development and the best interest of the child.

⁹⁹ (United Nations. 2018. “Handbook of Good Practices to Support Victims’ Associations in Africa and the Middle East”. United Nations publication. Available at: https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/sites/www.un.org.victimsofterrorism/files/oct-uncct-handbook_of_good_practices_to_support_victim27s_associations_-web.pdf.)

¹⁰⁰ Security Council Resolution 2427 (2018), paragraph 19, which sets out as follows: “21. Urges Member States to consider non-judicial measures as alternatives to prosecution and detention that focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration for children formerly associated with armed forces and armed groups taking into account that deprivation of liberty of children should be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time, as well as to avoid wherever possible the use of pretrial detention for children, and calls on Member States to apply due process for all children detained for association with armed forces and armed groups;”

Children should not go through the same DDR processes as adults. Instead, children should be separated from their commanders, disarmed and then admitted into **Interim Care Centers (ICCs)** that are run by child protection agencies. ICCs are important because they include:

- Specialized officers that work on tracing the families of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFG).
- Run sensitization campaigns within communities to prepare them for the return of CAAFG.
- Medical and psychiatric support to traumatized children.
- Civilian life skills courses to ex CAAFG.

Reintegration of Women and Children associated with Boko Haram and ISIL as emphasized by UNSC

“[UNSC] *Stresses* the need to pay particular attention to the treatment and reintegration of women and children formerly associated with Boko Haram and ISIL, including through the signing and implementing of protocols for the rapid handover of children suspected of having association with Boko Haram to relevant civilian child protection actors, as well as access for child protection actors to all centres holding children, in accordance with applicable international obligations, and the best interests of the child.”

Equally relevant is the UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005) and Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child¹⁰¹, which stress the primary role of states in providing effective protection and relief to all children affected by armed conflicts – that may involve violent extremism. The resolution calls on states to ensure that the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict are integrated in peace processes and post conflict recovery and reconstruction programs including P/CVE-Related DDR activities. In addition, the Resolution urges states to strengthen the capacities of national institutions and local civil society networks for advocacy, protection and rehabilitation of children affected by armed conflict in order to ensure the sustainability of local child-protection initiatives.

Unlike adults, CAAFG’s principal obstacle to reintegration is at the social level, because they are often faced with the stigma of having been associated with armed groups. Some may even not accept infants born to Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAFG) on the pretext that they carry rebel/terrorist blood. As such the main challenges & opportunities of CAAFG’s social reintegration are:

- Acceptance by the family and community.
- Employment guidance and career counseling services for children working to generate sustainable incomes for their households.
- Life skills: mediation skills, non-violent conflict resolution, personal hygiene, activities for building resilience and coping mechanisms, activities for building self-confidence and esteem.

¹⁰¹ All African States are party to the CRC, alongside the Security Council Resolution already mentioned: Article 39 provides that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of [...] armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.”

- Special care and support should also be granted to CAAFG. In schools, for example, teachers should be trained to always keep an eye on them and be more attentive to their needs.

10.3 PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

Persons with disabilities – despite an acknowledgement that mental and physical trauma have impacts on civilians and ex-combatants – are often excluded from reintegration processes.¹⁰² This gap should be addressed when it comes to reintegration of persons with disabilities who have engaged in violent extremist activities.

International humanitarian law and international human rights law take into consideration persons with disabilities, regardless of whether they have engaged in violent extremist activities and, in the case of an armed conflict, have participated in hostilities. International human rights law, particularly the Convention on the Rights of Persons with disabilities protects the rights and interests of persons with disabilities. The protections of persons with disabilities should be extended to individuals who get injured or are disabled as a result of violent extremist activities. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) defines persons with disabilities to include ‘those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’¹⁰³

In P/CVE-related DDR activities, persons with disabilities should be involved in decision making processes and particular concern should be taken in order to protect their rights. Those who have acquired an impairment as a result of violent extremist activities should be allowed to access health services and receive particular attention in terms of access to livelihood opportunities during reintegration processes. P/CVE-related DDR should also focus on ensuring that upon reintegration, disabled individuals live independently in the community, with freedom to choose and control their lives. Article 19 of the CRPD provides for the rights of persons with disabilities to live independently and be included in the community, with freedom to choose and control their lives. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with disabilities in General Comment No.5 provided the state obligations to repeal or reform discriminatory policies, laws and practices that hinder persons with disabilities from living independently and participating in the community.

In addition, reintegration process should particularly focus on women and girls who become disabled as a result of violent extremist activities. This is because as noted by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in General Comment No. 3

“International and national laws and policies on disability have historically neglected aspects related to women and girls with disabilities. In turn, laws and policies addressing women have traditionally ignored disability. This invisibility has perpetuated the situation of multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination against women and girls with disabilities. Women with disabilities are discriminated against on the grounds of gender and/or disability, or other possible grounds”.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, *Peacebuilding and reintegrating ex-combatants with disabilities* (2015) 19 *The International Journal of Human Rights* 3.

¹⁰³ Article 1.

¹⁰⁴ UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, *General comment No. 3 (2016), Article 6: Women and girls with disabilities*, CRPD/C/GC/3, 1.

11. MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)



Please refer to Section 3.50 of the Operational Guide to the IDDRS

While planning, designing and implementing P/CVE-related DDR activities, DDR practitioners need to take into consideration the following elements¹⁰⁵:

1. Laying the foundation:

The elements of P/CVE-related DDR activities should be clearly and transparently explained, as well as the selection of approaches and strategies underpinning these activities. This should include a conflict and gender sensitivity dimension. In order to achieve this, programming should begin with an analysis of what the situation currently is and what is the desired situation. This would help DDR practitioners lay down their objectives of the program while ensuring a “do no harm” intervention.

It is important to note that P/CVE-related DDR activities are highly political and sensitive interventions that are conducted in complex and volatile contexts, therefore a regular risk management tool should be adopted throughout.

2. Activity design:

An M&E framework should be developed to identify the factors of vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in the DDR context. This should be coupled with a set of theories of change and measurable indicators of success and failure, as well as assumptions, risks and risk mitigation factors. Indicators should also be developed in a manner that is participatory and includes relevant stakeholders, while considering their potentially conflicting perceptions about the sensitive topics being dealt with such as radicalization and extremism.

The M&E framework should also include critical thinking mechanisms that would encourage DDR practitioners to test assumptions upon which interventions are based, and to define clear directions for change.

3. Monitoring Strategy and Data Collection

Data collection, analysis and reporting strategies should be put in place to ensure a timely, accurate and detailed flow of information throughout the different components of P/CVE-related DDR activities. In a highly volatile context such as that of violent extremism, data,

¹⁰⁵ This is adopted from the UNDP – International Alert Toolkit on Improving the Impact of Preventing Violent Extremism Programming.

tactics and responses could change over a short time span. Therefore, it is essential to ensure the existence of reliable, accurate and credible data sources.

4. Evaluation and Learning

Evaluation mechanisms should be designed to ensure regular assessment of the different activities and timely responsiveness to problems that may arise. A range of methods to contextualize and validate data should be in place to ensure the dismissal of biases and subjectivity.

Finally, the impact of P/CVE-related DDR activities should be assessed regularly to ensure that objectives are being achieved, while taking into consideration that P/CVE-related DDR activities are long-term interventions and thus a number of milestones need to be planned for and assessed.

*