CHAPTER TWELVE
EXPLORING THE ROLE OF DIASPORAS
IN REBUILDING GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
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Can diaspora members help to rebuild governance capacity in post-conflict countries? Worldwide, conflicts abound\(^1\) and OECD member countries are spending billions of dollars for post-conflict reconstruction and development.\(^2\) These conflicts produce many refugees and are the cause for much migration.\(^3\) Several studies have examined the role of organized diasporas in promoting policy and regime change in their home territories (see, for example, Byman et al., 2001; King and Melvin, 1999/2000; Cohen, 1996). Collier and Hoeffler (2001) found that after five years of post-conflict peace, the presence of diasporas increases the likelihood of renewed conflict in the home country sixfold. Few studies have instead focused on the potential constructive contributions of diasporas, particularly for post-conflict governance reconstruction. Diaspora populations may be one of the most fruitful sources for human capital in reconstruction processes. Indeed, while not often documented or systematically researched, international organizations and their contractors look to diaspora populations to staff their reconstruction projects and programmes (see, for example, Brinkerhoff and Tadesse, 2008).

Well beyond their often-cited remittances, diasporas mobilize to influence or contribute to the homeland. Contributions may include post-conflict

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1 Since the end of World War II, 231 armed conflicts have been recorded worldwide, with 121 of those occurring since the end of the Cold War alone (Harbom et al., 2006).
2 According to the OECD, member countries spent $79.3 billion on 14 post-conflict countries between 1971 and 1994, and by 2004 had spent $200 billion in Iraq alone (Barton, 2004).
3 In 2005, conflicts generated 12 million new refugees and asylum seekers and 21 million internally displaced people; worldwide, 7.89 million of the refugees have been warehoused for five years or more (US Committee for Refugees, 2006). In the United States alone, between 1980 and 2005, over two million refugees arrived and over 21.7 million became legal permanent residents (US Office of Immigration Statistics, 2006).
reconstruction and development (Brinkerhoff, 2004; Iskander, 2008), human rights advocacy and the promotion of good governance (Brainard and Brinkerhoff, 2006), philanthropy (Brinkerhoff, 2008) and economic development (Esman, 2008; Gillespie et al., 2001; Gillespie and Andriasova, 2008). Repatriation, or even short-term return, is particularly important to countries emerging from conflict, where the filling of specific government and development positions is solicited from among diaspora members with the requisite expertise. Indeed, in post-conflict scenarios, such recruitment may at once be necessary and unavoidable, given the drive among some diaspora members to insert themselves into the rebuilding process. Governance and administrative systems are a particularly salient concern in war-torn societies as they are both part of the problem – due to their absence, insufficiency, or capture; and part of the solution – in their centrality to the viability of the state (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002).

The potential human capital contributions of diasporas are significant in Africa, where an estimated 23,000 qualified professionals emigrate each year (Ammassari, 2005, p. 18), including # per cent of doctors and # per cent of nurses (Clemens, 2008). Human capital needs are particularly salient in civil service reconstruction. A review of the World Bank’s civil service reconstruction projects from 2000–2002 revealed that for the four post-conflict countries targeted for reconstruction project assistance in Africa, civil service reconstruction projects accounted for 40 per cent (World Bank, 2003). Furthermore, from approximately 1987–2002, the largest share of Bank projects involving civil service reform went to the Africa region (ibid.). More importantly, Africa is a region for which post-conflict governance reconstruction will be a priority for some time. According to the World Bank (2006):

- one in four African countries presently suffers from the effects of armed conflict;
- about one-fifth of Africans live in countries severely disrupted by conflict;
- 46 per cent of all developing countries affected by conflict are in Africa;
- for the average country in Africa, half of the indicators point to a risk of conflict.

Attaining the benefits of diaspora governance expertise is not easy or risk-free. To date, no systematic research has examined the pros and cons of diaspora participation in post-conflict governance reconstruction. This chapter begins to explore the potential role diaspora members can play in rebuilding governance capacity in post-conflict societies. It reviews the literatures on diaspora motivation to serve the homeland, post-conflict scenarios and the particular challenges of rebuilding governance in post-conflict societies. It then provides a preliminary
review of lessons from repatriation and diaspora skills transfer programmes. Bringing these empirical and analytic threads together, the chapter highlights lessons specific to diaspora recruitment for post-conflict governance reconstruction and identifies areas for further research that can enhance programming and results in the future.

The Diaspora Motivation to Serve

Diaspora groups and members may be more or less inclined to concern themselves with quality of life and policies vis-à-vis their home countries. Much will depend on ‘their inclination or motivation to maintain their solidarity and exert group influence’ (Esman, 1986, 336). Political activism resulting from cultural identity, whether targeted to home or host country, is likely to be driven by ‘interests and obligations that result from migrants’ simultaneous engagement in countries of origin and destination’ (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). The higher the cost to status and security in their adopted country, the greater the likelihood that the diaspora community as a whole will split and/or fail to mobilize (Esman, 1986).

With deepening assimilation, diaspora members may increasingly focus on improving their quality of life in the hostland as opposed to contributing to the homeland, as identity rooted in the ancestral homeland may dissipate. However, this is not necessarily a linear process and there is no consensus on whether subsequent generations necessarily lose their ancestral homeland identity roots and interest in the homeland. For example, in the case of Salvadoran, Dominican, and Columbian immigrants to the United States, contrary to what one might expect, Guarnizo and Associates (2003) find that the longer a diaspora member has been in the host country, the more likely s/he is to be actively engaged vis-à-vis the homeland. Homeland crisis may also inspire renewed interest among later diaspora generations, as seen in post-conflict societies, for example, Afghanistan (see Kerlin, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2004).

Diaspora members mobilize, in part, to express their identities, and these identities can be reinforced through activity on behalf of the homeland. Some may be motivated by a sense of obligation or guilt, as they seek to reconcile their preference for the adopted homeland with their allegiance to a suffering homeland (see Brinkerhoff, 2006b, under review). The felt need to actively express identity may derive from various forms of marginalization (social, economic, political, or psychic), confusion and a sense that the homeland identity will be lost without proactive expression, or simply in response to social reinforcement and perhaps pride (Brinkerhoff, under review). Diasporas may proactively promote and
recreate homeland identities, and these efforts may be more acute in the absence of a physical homeland (see Koslowski, 2005).

In addition to their homeland identity, many diaspora members may come to share civic and other values of the host-country, learned through exposure and/or social pressure, or consciously sought (sometimes through elective migration). US-based diasporas are believed to embrace American values of pluralism, democracy, and human rights. Based on the integrationist pluralist model, it is anticipated that such diasporas ‘prefer, express, and adhere to the same democratic values when allowed to flourish and attain the best that is in them’ (Shain, 1999, 26); and they are expected to ‘extend to others the same rights they themselves claim’ (ibid.). John F. Kennedy’s famous inaugural speech, ‘Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country’, seems to have broad appeal across many US-based diaspora groups. They apply it as a call to serve not their home residence where it was inspired, but the now distant homeland.4

Hybrid identities – combining homeland and host society features, including liberal values – inform political considerations and action agendas vis-à-vis the homeland, whether they pertain to potential conflict within the homeland and/or among sub-groups of its society, or human rights, quality of life, or partisan political agendas. For example, issues of freedom of speech, democratic values, self-determination, and human rights are readily applied to Somalia’s inter-clan conflict and failed state (Brinkerhoff, 2006a), Afghanistan’s tribal conflict and reconstruction (Brinkerhoff, 2004), Tibet’s political impasse with China and aspirations for a free and independent Tibet in the future (Brinkerhoff, 2006b), and improved quality of life and human rights for Copts residing in Egypt (Brainard and Brinkerhoff, 2006). Liberal values ideally give rise to a belief in basic freedoms, and psychological empowerment, reflecting a belief that these diaspora members can effectively work to advance, protect, and embody these rights for themselves and potentially the homeland (Brinkerhoff, under review).

Beyond identity expression, diaspora members may also mobilize to maintain or acquire power or other resources, confirming that not all diaspora participation may be welcome in the homeland. The characteristics of the diaspora experience and the receiving society may yield defensive or hopeful perspectives. Feelings of marginalization and social exclusion have been shown to lead to violent behaviour and exacerbate existing conflict (see, for example, Lemarchand, 2000). When the migrant’s home country is itself embroiled in conflict, national and homeland

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4 See, for example, regarding Somalia, Brinkerhoff (2006) and Afghanistan, Brinkerhoff (2004). It was also quoted by a Haitian diaspora member in a discussion concerning ‘Haiti’s Diaspora: Can it Solve Haiti’s Enduring Social Conflict?’ (Washington, DC, US Institute of Peace, 25 July 2006).
identity can become problematic, increasing stress and a sense of marginalization (see, for example, Esman, 1986; Cohen, 1996). All of these challenges are, of course, compounded when the diaspora is a result of forced migration. Assessing the merits of resulting diaspora contributions is necessarily subjective. As is so often heard, one person’s terrorist is another one’s freedom fighter.

Post-Conflict Societies and the Challenge of Rebuilding Governance

The complexity of rebuilding post-conflict societies is encapsulated in Leatherman et al.’s (1999, p. 8) three-dimensional orientation: ‘a rehabilitative dimension oriented to the past, a resolutive dimension oriented to the present, and a preventive dimension oriented to both the present and future.’ In other words, sustained peace requires:

long-term strategies focusing on equitable and sustainable economic development, the establishment of strong and legitimate political institutions, the relaxation of cultural tensions, and the strengthening of social practices to resolve peacefully deadly disagreements. (Ibid., p. 46)

Such strategies are the product of, and therefore necessitate, good governance. Broadly construed, good governance can be seen as incorporating and integrating three related components: effectiveness, legitimacy, and security, or administrative-economic governance, political governance, and security governance (Brinkerhoff, 2007).

While re-establishing some degree of security is a prerequisite to all three, initiating economic recovery and rebuilding basic service delivery are high on reconstruction strategy agendas (UNDP, 2000). Societies emerging from conflict have long suffered deprivations and need a tangible stake in a peaceful future. This includes the restoration of basic services, such as health and education, the rebuilding of infrastructure, and the re-establishment of a working economy, inclusive of employment and profit opportunities. These, in turn, require a functioning civil service, basic management systems, control of corruption, and appropriate legal frameworks, particularly to support economic growth (Brinkerhoff, 2007). Government capacity is also needed to make effective use of external assistance (see, for example, Middlebrook and Miller, 2006). Beyond government, governance effectiveness requires capacity of the civil society and private sectors, which increasingly directly provide services and meet basic needs alongside of and ideally in cooperation with government.
Despite immediate needs, a sole emphasis on effectiveness can impede the sustainability of governance systems, which require security and legitimacy as well. On the one hand, citizens may withdraw government support if immediate needs and longer-term material interests are not adequately addressed, either through lack of capacity, insufficient political will, or corruption. On the other hand, regardless of service delivery performance, the legitimacy challenge is exacerbated by continuing rivalries among social groups that were party to the conflict, particularly when there are strongly perceived ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, with the ‘losers’ perceiving the winners as having captured the spoils of government. Parties to conflict, as well as international intervenors, often must strike a devil’s bargain, where political representation and deal-making trumps the needs for effective government and public administration, and a functioning economy (see, for example, Herrero, 2005).

Constitutionally, it may be decided to leave vague certain issues that might make too stark the winners and losers of particular spoils (Belman Inbal and Lerner, 2007). Issues of identity are particularly contentious in constitution making and may lead to conflict re-emergence. A pragmatic trade-off is to postpone agreement on such issues by leaving their resolution vague in constitution-making processes. However, this diminishes input-oriented legitimacy, derived from consent, placing a heavier burden for sustainable peace on output-oriented legitimacy, or the ability of government to produce tangible results (ibid.). Legitimacy, then, relies fundamentally on emergent political structures as well as demonstrated will and capacity indiscriminately to meet the needs of society. The latter is a particular imperative necessitating capacity recruitment and development for a strong government.

This tall order is further complicated by donors’ tendency to meet immediate needs through direct provision, bypassing nascent government structures and related mechanisms for citizen voice (Blair, 2007). This practice may create a de facto ‘second civil service’ comprised of NGOs and private contractors performing tasks that would be, under normal circumstances, in the purview of government civil service (ibid., p. 168; Middlebrook and Miller, 2006). And this second civil service is exorbitantly more costly – expatriates demand higher salaries; what local capacity may exist is drained, as comparatively higher pay is available; and the resulting structures are less sustainable. At best, such provision does not contribute to building government’s legitimacy; at worst it may undermine it as government

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5 For example, in Afghanistan, in 2005, government employees earned $35–40 per month, while Afghans working for donors or international NGOs could earn $500–5,000 per month (International Peace Academy and Center on International Cooperation, 2005).
continues to be viewed as irrelevant and powerless. This is an increasing concern in the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Patel, 2006).

One of these tangible needs is the provision of security, which allows citizens to resume the normal routines of life. Security, on its part, depends upon governance effectiveness, which can provide a stake in a peaceful future, deterring would-be criminals, or at worst, conflict entrepreneurs. A high priority is ensuring that youth have access to jobs and livelihoods. In short, rebuilding governance is a complex endeavour, heavily laden with interdependency challenges among the three governance components. Sequencing issues become key, yet components of the three must also be addressed simultaneously (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002).

Rebuilding government is perhaps the greatest challenge and a precursor to the provision of these three governance components. The civil service is ‘the main agent delivering the state’s obligations to the citizenry and encouraging the latter to accord legitimacy to the state’ (Blair, 2007, p. 161). Yet, recruitment for civil service is no less politicized than the distribution of political office. For example, diaspora members’ experience in the Palestinian Authority has often been ineffectual; RAND (2005, p. 28) credits this to the ‘overtly politicized and personalized decisionmaking process.’ These processes tend to be characterized by chronyism on the one hand, and threats and intimidation on the other (see, for example, Lister and Wilder, 2007). The result may often be an oversized civil service, which nevertheless lacks capacity to make good on the provision of good governance (for the Kosovo case, see Herrero, 2005).

Under these circumstances, the donor community may assume responsibility for staffing at least some portion of civil service directly with international staff. While this may solve the effectiveness challenge, at least in the short run, especially at the local level, sustainable peace also requires participation in building state institutions in order to ensure their subsequent acceptance by those who are governed (ibid.; Lister and Wilder, 2007). Acceptance of a third party recruiter and staff tends to be short-lived and must be balanced with the politically engaged actors on the ground. Perceptions of the legitimacy of both actors are subjective, diverse, and near impossible to assess. Like capacity more generally, its presence is only known by its result – acceptance of the resulting administration and an enabled effectiveness.

External actors can influence post-conflict reconstruction and the prevention of conflict re-emergence and escalation through contributions of resources, socialization, and political incentives (Leatherman et al., 1999). Traditionally, the international community of nation-states, including inter-governmental organizations, and to a certain extent NGOs, were looked to for these intercessions. Yet diasporas have long played a role in conflict and post-conflict in their
homelands. Indeed, they have the potential to apply each of these currencies – resources, socialization, and political incentives, including their specialized skills and knowledge, to the reconstruction of governance in their homelands.

Capturing the Skills and Experience of the Diaspora: Preliminary Lessons

Diaspora participation may be essential for the expertise that is needed, but may also pose challenges to security and legitimacy. Some preliminary lessons can be identified from three sources: post-conflict governance reconstruction generally (as reviewed above), general migration return and knowledge exchange programmes, and specific efforts to access the human capital available in the diaspora for post-conflict governance reconstruction.

Diasporas and Post-Conflict Governance Reconstruction: General Challenges

The literature identifies three important sets of challenges to securing diaspora governance expertise contributions. First, a recent review of post-conflict state building confirms that the repatriation of diaspora members can lead to the emergence of a new political elite, which can give rise to new political tensions (Chesterman, 2004). For example, the experience of Eastern Europe in drawing from its diaspora to staff key political and governmental positions was short lived as Western diaspora members came to be seen as threats to the local political and economic elites (for the Ukraine experience, see King and Melvin, 1999/2000). As noted above, diaspora members may have mixed motives for seeking participation in the reconstruction of their homelands. Some may aspire to political power and influence exacerbating these tensions as well as the other challenges noted below.

The second set of challenges pertains to the diaspora experience itself. Those who have professional skills are often the first to leave, the most likely to successfully integrate into receiving societies, and therefore, may be less inclined to return even for short-term service opportunities (see, for example, IOM, 2005). Those who do return may face resentment and blatant hostility for having escaped the worst of the conflict (see, for example, IOM, 2005). Depending on the length of their separation from the homeland, they may be more or less effective at navigating political and cultural systems and reading associated cues. Their

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6 It is beyond the scope of this chapter also to identify risk factors – to diaspora members, sustainable peace and governance sustainability.
perceived relationship to the homeland may even inspire a hubris that is not representative of the accuracy of their local knowledge.

Third, if they are hired as outside experts at international wage levels – even if only temporarily, they are likely to inspire resentment from whatever may exist of the indigenous civil service (see Blair, 2007). Comparatively high wage levels may be necessary for accessing needed expertise but may also inhibit outside experts from working effectively with the indigenous civil service. Resulting resentment not only may present obstacles to the effective application of outside experts’ skills, but also can prevent the cultivation of relationships necessary for the effective transfer of technology and capacity. This is a challenge common to technical transfer generally, where locals may resent being directed by expatriates; expatriates may have disdain for local counterparts whom they are their to ‘rescue’ and judge them for not exerting the same effort and professionalism as they; thus creating ‘a social and psychological environment that makes the mutual exchange of ideas and learning extremely difficult’ (Mkandawire, 2002, p. 18). When these outside experts are members of the diaspora, relationships can either be smoothed through common identity bonds or exacerbated due to the added tensions noted above (i.e., concern about political motives, and added resentment that these compatriots may have escaped the worst of the conflict).

Experiences from conflict/post-conflict settings confirm these challenges. In discussing diaspora knowledge transfer in Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bernard Lututala Mumpasi, rector of Kinshasa University confirms that returnees may be out of touch with the needs and relevance of their expertise to their native country. Furthermore, he notes that these returnees may manifest disdain for their local counterparts and systems. Such disdain, whether real or imagined, yields significant resentment on the part of local residents ‘who, in extremely difficult conditions, make sacrifices … to continue to operate, despite being abandoned by politicians and development actors’ (quoted in Government of Belgium et al., 2006, p. 231). Return programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for whatever purpose, generated substantial resentments on the part of continuous residents when they provided additional subsidies in the form of salaries or housing assistance as perks for returning to which local residents had no access (see, for example, Black, 2001).

What We Learn from General Return and Knowledge Transfer Programmes

Several programmes have been implemented to try to recapture skills and knowledge lost to the home country through migration. The following is a brief overview of selected programmes focusing on Africa. Programmes may emphasize knowledge transfer, such as the UNDP’s Transfer of Knowledge Through
Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme (1976–2003), which emphasized cost-effective volunteers (not competitive wages) and resulted in contributions of 5,000 experts in 49 countries globally (Tindimubona, 2006). Or, the emphasis may be on return, as in the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) programme.

RQAN attracted more than 2,000 highly-skilled persons back to 41 African countries over a period of 16 years (1974–1990) (Page and Plaza, 2005). An end of project evaluation noted numerous implementation difficulties, including those inherent to the political situations of targeted countries, those owing to the complexity and geographic scope of the programme, and some poor management decisions, for example, with respect to data management (IOM Office of Program Evaluation, 2000). While the benefits to governments were ‘understood and welcomed’, the IOM reports that “ownership” of the program by governments is almost non-existent (ibid.). As a consequence, the evaluation concluded that the programme activities were not likely to be sustained and recommended government input into the design and implementation of future programmes.

The Government of Belgium decided to fund an RQAN successor programme in the Great Lakes region, IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA). MIDA supports a wider range of return options than its predecessors, which include circular, temporary and virtual migration. According to its Africa Regional Advisor, Meera Sethi, MIDA seeks to strengthen institutional as well as technical capacity, in part, by reintegrating African expatriates into key public sector positions (MIDSA, 2004). From 2003–2006, MIDA supported over one hundred institutions in Burundi, Congo, and Rwanda through the organization of over 240 missions of returning diaspora professionals from Europe. Priority sectors, identified by recipient governments, are health, education, and rural development. The Government of the Netherlands has also funded IOM RQAN programmes, through IOM’s office in The Hague. In April, 2006, IOM announced a two year programme, funded by the Dutch Foreign Ministry, that specifically works with diasporas in the Netherlands to support the temporary return of qualified nationals for post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia Montenegro and Kosovo. RQAN Sudan supported diasporans based on local salaries, with some reintegration assistance; whereas in Sierra Leone, IOM the Hague supported virtual migration, where Netherlands-based Sierra Leonean agricultural workers provided online technical and management support to agricultural NGOs in Sierra Leone (Welcker and Gulam, 2007).

Building on these more general global and regional programmes, country-specific programmes to secure at least temporary return and knowledge exchange have also been developed. (Those targeted to post-conflict reconstruction are
discussed below.) For example, the UNDP’s Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support (QUESTS) programme, based on TOKTEN, seeks to secure temporary skills and knowledge contributions in health, education, and agriculture. In this programme, the onus for matching needs and skills is placed on the Somali receiving institution (private, governmental, or nonprofit), which identifies both the need and the diaspora individual with the requisite expertise, and then approaches QUESTS for the necessary funding and logistical support. In some instances, diaspora organizations have played an intermediary role in this process. For example, the Himilio Relief and Development Association (HIRDA), an Amsterdam-based Somali diaspora organization with a field office in Somalia, has sent two diaspora members through QUESTS to provide teacher and farmer training (see http://www.hirda.org).

What can be learned from these general knowledge exchange and return programmes? First, depending on capacity priorities, diaspora interest, and other feasibility concerns, programmes may choose to focus on return, temporary return (including circular models), or other forms of knowledge exchange (e.g., virtual return). Permanent return may not always be necessary or realistic for post-conflict governance capacity building. Migrants may have the motivations to serve the homeland, but at the same time enjoy a quality of life in an adopted homeland, perhaps with a set career trajectory and children integrated into the host culture, such that permanent return is not desirable. Rather than forgoing their potential knowledge and skills contributions altogether, temporary, virtual and circular options may be more palatable and even welcomed options.

Among other challenges, permanent return programmes have been criticized for their low cost-effectiveness, coming as they do with great expense for relatively few takers. Ammassari (2005) argues that these findings reflect evaluations conducted too early and that, in fact, some returnees’ contributions have been significant in the longer term. This raises a significant measurement and evaluation challenge for diaspora human capital and knowledge transfer contributions – permanent or otherwise, which may be further exacerbated by the complicated context of post-conflict settings. A key question in evaluation efforts concerns the relative priority among objectives: acquisition of specific expertise or volume of participating diaspora members, short-term contributions or longer-term commitments?

More general lessons have been articulated in the literature. As early as 1996, research confirmed that return incentives can generate dissatisfaction and reintegration problems in the home country; showed that migrants were more likely to return the older they were when they left, and less likely to return the longer they had been separated from the homeland; and found that economic returns were greater the earlier it could be determined if migration was temporary
or permanent (Dustmann et al., 1996). IOM (2005) summarizes the characteristics of diasporas necessary to improved human capital: they bring skills beyond those they left with, the skills are relevant to homeland needs, and they are willing and able to apply these skills. Ghosh (2000) provides empirical evidence that these conditions are rarely met. Effective contributions are most likely if the period of absence does not exceed 10–15 years (Olesen, 2003). Black et al. (2004) find that non-economic factors are more important to voluntary return than the material incentives often incorporated into formal programmes.

Whether the homeland faces post-conflict reconstruction or more conventional development challenges, research has shown for some time, and recent debates on migration have highlighted, that migrants are more likely to return (permanently or temporarily) if they have permanent legal status in the host country (see, for example, Black et al., 2004). Such status may be more likely in the case of the highly skilled, who receive preferential treatment in the immigration process, but it may not always be the case, particularly for those who may be the best match of skills to needs in the homeland, and particularly in post-conflict situations, where residential standing may be based on temporary legal status.

In sum, diaspora recruitment programmes, for whatever purpose, need to account for what is essentially a cost-benefit analysis on the part of potential candidates, whereby they assess the potential costs to their quality of life in the host society in comparison to the gains they will experience in making their contributions to the homeland. This confirms the need for flexibility in the types of returns (short term, circular models and virtual return, as well as permanent return) and the importance of secure legal status in the hostland. There also appears to be a trade-off in that migrants who are older at the time of their departure from the homeland may be more likely to return and younger migrants will make greater contributions if they first establish their professional credentials and career trajectory; but in both instances, these migrants may be out of touch with the contemporary realities of the homeland, making the transfer of their knowledge and skills more challenging.

In terms of who participates in the design and implementation of these programmes, the experiences of RQAN and its successor MIDA programmes confirm the importance of government involvement, with the latter having incorporated government identification of capacity priorities. The extent to which government can and – in the case of conflict situations – should be involved in the actual implementation of these programmes is uncertain. The QUESTS programme demonstrates the potential of involving diaspora organizations to provide an intermediary matching service between identified needs on the ground and skills available in the diaspora. In fact, it is likely not very realistic to expect
that institutions in conflict societies would have access to the information necessary to identify potential individual diaspora contributors.

Finally, the findings from these general knowledge transfer and return programmes confirm the tension between a perceived need to offer incentives to attract those with specialized technical knowledge, and the potential for resentment on the part of those who have remained in the homeland, which can interfere with the transfer of that technical knowledge.

Securing Diaspora Human Capital for Post-Conflict Governance Reconstruction: Selected Experience

Many of these same knowledge transfer and return programmes have been modified to specifically address post-conflict reconstruction. As the above review suggests, the stakes – both positive and negative – and the challenges are far higher in post-conflict societies, for the countries and the international community alike.

With respect to post-conflict governance reconstruction, MIDA seeks to respond to government-identified priorities, as well as donor support strategies. In doing so, it pursues strategies specific to governance objectives, and also sector-based strategies that may have a governance component. For example, the sector-based MIDA strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo includes the placement of diaspora public health specialists and administrators, as well as more technical health experts, in the Ministry of Health, regional health ‘zones’, and local health centers; and the placement of administrators in the central and regional administrations of the Ministry of Agriculture (IOM, 2006b). In Rwanda, MIDA has crafted both a specific governance strategy and a sector-based one. The former seeks to support administrative decentralization reform, initiated in 2006, by matching diaspora expertise to identified management and service delivery needs in the decentralized regions (IOM, 2006a).

IOM’s Return of Qualified Nationals programme for Bosnia and Herzegovina (RQN BiH), operating from 1996–2000, supported the permanent repatriation of 862 qualified nationals and reports an 85 per cent success rate of those professionals who remained in their original jobs after the programme support ended (see IOM-RQN, 2006). The programme provided matching between available jobs and qualified diaspora members, a one year minimum official employment contract, return travel for selected candidates and their dependants, budget subsidies to guarantee regular salaries, relevant institutional equipment, as needed, and limited reintegration support. Since returnees were paid comparable salaries to the local markets, possible tensions between returnees and continuous residents and counterparts were diminished. While the RQN BiH programme
secured needed skills for the reconstruction process, the numbers of returned diaspora members represent only 0.25 per cent of all returnees (Black, 2001). The primary objective of RQN BiH was not return but support for reconstruction. Similar RQN programmes addressing post-conflict reconstruction have been implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan. Following is a closer look at Afghanistan’s diaspora post-conflict governance reconstruction experience.

Afghanistan has benefited from the country-specific adaptation of existing diaspora return and knowledge exchange programmes. As of March 2006, Afghanistan benefited from 24 UNDP TOKTEN volunteers, who completed assignments with various government ministries (Karimi, 2006). In addition, IOM’s Return of Qualified Afghans Program helped to secure 700 returned experts from 28 countries, who then occupied 31 positions in key ministries and 26 governmental institutions (ibid.). The Afghanistan Expatriate Program (AEP) – a temporary, expert-based programme – has also filled 88 senior-level advisory positions in more than 20 line ministries and agencies (ARTF, 2006). The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) also implements a second tier expatriate recruitment programme, the Lateral Expatriate Program (LEP), to recruit expert diaspora members to fill second-level ministry positions.

The AEP confirms many of the challenges for post-conflict governance reconstruction reviewed above. An independent evaluation could not determine whether AEP has had a decisive impact on government capacity building (ibid.). Some of the challenges can be attributed to poor design and implementation; others are more subtle and concern the trade-off dilemmas and process issues noted above. The former include poorly defined objectives, which inhibits effectiveness measures; terms of reference that are poorly matched to needs and to what a candidate may actually do; and an allocation of advisors, despite originating on request from ministries, that has not necessarily accounted for the institutional environment of a particular ministry and whether the transfer of knowledge is feasible (ibid.). Many of these problems stemmed from misguided expectations. Assumptions were made about ministries’ ability to accurately identify needs and provide for environments conducive to knowledge transfer and capacity building (Simpson, 2006). In addition, while not always explicitly indicated a priori, advisors were sometimes expected to run a ministry, apply their specialized expertise, and build capacity or transfer that expertise at the same time (ibid.).

Resulting recommendations (ibid.) include: placing such programmes within the context of broader capacity building frameworks and projects; incorporating adaptable monitoring systems to account for the necessary flexibility in responding to emerging needs and priorities; carefully and transparently specifying terms of reference so as to clarify expectations and justify differing pay scales; evaluating
the recipient ministries’ support for the capacity building process; and providing to recruited experts orientation/training on the existing public administration system. Not all of the evaluation points were negative. One assessment praised the programme for a management structure that incorporated donor priorities, high level government participation, and lower level government decision making to ensure responsiveness to identified needs and government ownership (ibid.).

Confirming lessons already indicated, AEP also suffered from resentments and perceptions of the advisors as ‘outsiders’ who benefited from preferential treatment and higher pay. And, typical in post-conflict reconstruction, an external evaluation indicated that other donors and projects may be replicating or displacing capacity contributions of AEP by recruiting external technical assistance to meet expedient project objectives (Scanteam, 2005). The Scanteam report goes on to suggest that programmes such as the AEP and its second tier, longer term counterpart, the LEP, provide market valuable information about the value of particular skills and responsibilities; it recommends that donors harmonize their own pay scales with these indications.

In reflecting on all of these initiatives, Barna Karimi, Deputy Chief of Staff of President Karzai (Government of the Kingdom of Belgium et al., 2006), confirms experienced tensions both between returned expert diaspora members and Afghans who stayed in the homeland throughout the Taliban regime, and between these experts and the refugees or lower skilled returnees from Pakistan and Iran. Beyond the general resentments noted above, the tensions derive from salary differentials as well as clashes of new thinking and more traditional ways of operating. By referring to this latter source as ‘resistance to domination on debates and decisions’, Karimi implies the possibility that expert diaspora returnees anticipate a direct application of their expertise without sensitivity to relationship building, reciprocity, and negotiation. Karimi also confirms the absence of a sustainable model to retain these experts, as they are largely funded by trust funds and donor agencies and the Government of Afghanistan continues to lack the revenue raising potential and the luxury of prioritization to support their continued stay. Karimi concludes by noting a need to channel related external support through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Government of Afghanistan budget. In short, while recognizing and anticipating the tensions, Karimi acknowledges the importance of these contributions, the need for their continuation and the development of more sustainable means to ensure it, and the importance of simultaneously adhering to the capacity and legitimacy needs of government as a conduit for related funding and programme oversight.

This brief review of selected post-conflict governance reconstruction experience, particularly the case of Afghanistan, demonstrates that all of the challenges inherent to knowledge transfer and return programmes in more
stable contexts, where the needs may be less dire, are found in the post-conflict environment. A range of diaspora recruitment programmes can be considered to address a variety of objectives, from permanent return and regaining of lost skills and knowledge for the public sector (RQN BiH), to medium or long term staffing of government ministries (Afghanistan LEP), to more targeted and smaller scale recruitment of senior level expert advising (Afghanistan AEP). Depending on those objectives and structures, it may be possible to minimize discrepancies between perks offered to returning expatriates and their local counterparts (RQN BiH), though in some instances acquiring the sought after expertise may necessitate at least temporary incentives (AEP). Government ownership is still key; however, this priority may compete with donor agendas.

AEP, in particular, illustrates the importance of a clear and shared understanding of objectives among expatriates, donors, and various stakeholders within the government (including recipient ministries). It also suggests a need for training and orientation of recruited advisors and staff, both regarding the workings of the contemporary public administration, as suggested by the AEP external evaluations, and also regarding knowledge transfer and technical assistance processes. There seems to be an assumption that just because these individuals are expert diaspora members, all they need to know is the local culture and language and their targeted expertise. It is somewhat surprising that the professionalism that is expected from other external technical assistance providers – whose profession it is to transfer technology – is similarly expected of individuals who may have no experience in capacity building and technical transfer.

Improving Diaspora Participation in Post-Conflict Governance Reconstruction

The following highlights selected lessons learned from both the general literature and the experiences reviewed.

Clarity about Programme Objectives

Programme design should be tailored to priority objectives. In some instances the overriding priority may be immediate staffing, emphasizing governance effectiveness with less consideration to legitimacy; in other instances, effectiveness may still be the priority, but with an emphasis on longer term knowledge transfer and capacity building, which necessitates relatively more attention to legitimacy; in still other instances, the priority may be a maximization of skilled diaspora return, to generally regain brain drain. Each of these priorities would
result in programmes with different recruitment strategies (including incentive programmes), selection criteria, and implementation arrangements. Given the range and depth of post-conflict governance capacity needs, a variety of programme and return options should be considered.

Clarity about Short-term Duration and Emphasis on Specific Skills and Credentials

Such clarity may at least temporarily ward off perceptions of political ambition. While one could consider a careful interview and selection process to assess political ambitions/aims, it is unrealistic and possibly undesirable to expect that: 1) political ambitions can be accurately assessed; 2) these ambitions are static; and 3) these individuals might not become very effective political representatives and leaders.

Targeted Incentives with Minimized Visible Perks, Informed by a Market Analysis

Greater incentives should be carefully targeted to a select group of those with identified priority skills/knowledge. At the same time, in more general recruitment programmes especially visible perks should be minimized. In other words, the market should be assessed prior to determining incentive plans. An accurate market analysis requires knowledge about the diaspora population, mechanisms to communicate with them, and an understanding of potential drivers for homeland contributions. Marketing/recruitment campaigns can then be targeted to particular groups, highlighting identified drivers. As the TOKTEN experience demonstrates, some diaspora members may be willing to serve short-term on an expense-only volunteer basis.

Programme designers should be sensitive to diaspora members’ concerns regarding their security of lifestyle in the hostland. Where possible, the donor community could try to negotiate for permanent legal status in order to facilitate diaspora contributions, whether for short or long durations. As in more general post-conflict return programmes, ‘look and see’ programmes could also be considered.

Identifying and Utilizing Diaspora Organizations and Networks

As HIRDA’s experience with QUESTS modestly demonstrates, especially when diaspora organizations have a homeland presence, they can play an important
intermediary function in identifying and staffing for technical needs in homeland institutions. Having some map of diaspora social capital can also assist with identifying and better targeting the range of potential diaspora motives for homeland contributions (as above), and for disseminating information and recruiting for resulting programmes.

Training and Orientation for Selected Candidates and Counterparts

This training would include technology transfer processes, change management, and human resource management; as well as an orientation to the contemporary public administration system. These programmes should include presentations and session delivery by existing leaders, as well as participation of other counterparts in the ministries in which recruits will serve. The orientation could be designed to foster shared learning among these stakeholders and set the stage for a partnership approach to technology transfer, application, and capacity building.

Government Ownership

Government ownership is complex in post-conflict contexts owing primarily to two realities: 1) the leading role that the donor community plays in the immediate, and sometimes longer term; and 2) the occasional absence of a legitimate government representative at the moment when such programmes may be initiated to jump start service delivery. This is an area where more research and systematic assessment of experience to date can contribute to identifying appropriate processes to balance donor and government priorities and to foster government ownership under various scenarios.

Coordination among External Actors

The AEP confirms the often-repeated, obvious, well-known, but ever intractable problem of donor coordination. Most importantly, post-conflict scenarios demand better understanding and coordination among donors with respect to recruitment, wage levels, and resulting internal brain drain. Yet, it seems that these scenarios also present a classic prisoner’s dilemma, where unless all donors commit to a certain protocol, none are likely to follow it. A further complicating factor is that when it comes to the possibility of draining off needed skills for domestic public service and private markets, the possibilities range from high level donors creating a second civil service to these and a variety of private contractors and
NGOs siphoning off the highly skilled as drivers and interpreters. Avoiding labour market distortion requires coordination on a grand scale.

Conclusion and Future Research

Diasporas may play an essential role in post-conflict reconstruction, especially since the track record of donor attention to the long haul of post-conflict reconstruction is abysmal. In a study of ten post-conflict countries a pattern emerged wherein official development assistance spiked in the immediate aftermath, gradually declined in the subsequent two years, and the fell ‘precipitously’ (Schwartz et al., 2004; quoted in Blair, 2007, p. 166). More specifically, diaspora governance recruitment should be based on a thorough, albeit preliminary, in-country capacity assessment (for the Angola case, see Ammassari, 2005). Given the complexity and expense of these programmes, priority should be given to capitalizing on skills and knowledge transfer as opposed to simply filling gaps (Simpson, 2006).

In order to appreciate fully the potential of diaspora contributions to post-conflict governance reconstruction, and also to more effectively design and target related recruitment programmes, a better appreciation for diaspora motivation, as it relates to post-conflict reconstruction, is necessary. What is missing from these programme evaluations is a systematic assessment of the diaspora advantage, including an identification and even profiling of various motivations for diaspora members to serve in these capacities. The absence of these assessment efforts likely reflects cost constraints and/or priorities, and also suggests a palpable prioritization of short-term capacity needs over longer-term learning and planning.

Good programme design is not based on mechanics alone. While the diaspora phenomenon and the human relations it engenders are complex and messy, a better codification of the possibilities and interactions can inform more efficient and effective programme designs for the future. This might mean highly specialized and targeted recruitment programmes that, while costly on the recruiting end, may yield much better and sustainable capacity building results. Such programmes might be complementary to other more general programmes, less intensive in their targeting, much like Afghanistan’s AEP and LEP were envisioned.

These evaluations also do not investigate the security and legitimacy implications of diaspora recruitment into government. While we know empirically that these are general challenges, we only know somewhat theoretically that these issues may be particularly salient when diaspora members return, for short- or long-term, to serve in government positions. Again, a profiling of diaspora characteristics that could minimize security and legitimacy trade-offs would
be helpful to future programming. While it is obvious that there are threshold characteristics and relative selection criteria that would rule out particular individuals due to political affiliations, demonstrated motives inconsistent with the peace and reconstruction agenda, and even skill and knowledge areas, a more specific assessment tool with identified criteria could improve the effectiveness and efficiency of selection efforts, as well as contribute to transparency and a certain degree of objectivity. The latter could enhance or protect the legitimacy of the external actors – both the programme funders and the selected candidates.

Bibliography


